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ABSTRACT 
Kenya was a British dependence since 1897 in more ways
than just the political fact of colonial government. Even
after independence in 1963, the capitalist ideology and
economic structure pursued by the colonial regime has been
maintained with the well to do African bourgeoisie taking
over political power from the non-Africans. Private Foreign
Investment was one of the economic mainstays particularly
in Industry, at independence. It still is a dominant factor
in the present Economy.
Although the government of independent Kenya has not
used legislation much in regulating PFI, it has nevertheless,
sought to impose some form of regulation on such investment.
This study argues that despite such attempts, the active
encouragement of PFI has meant that the government has been
less than enthusiastic in pursuing its regulation with
vigour and that, on the whole, PFI has been able to establish
and operate in Kenya with minimal and often insignificant
regulatory constraints. The study examines the government's
three-pronged main thrust at regulation of PFI viz. the PFI
approval process prior to establishment; the attempt to
acquire corporate control over investment through Africani-
zation of equity and management; and use of financial and
fiscal measures. The study argues that these measures are
undermined by the policy environment that often rwscounter
to their intended objectives. It calls for a review of the
broad economic and social policies pursued by the govern-
ment in order to remove the policy-induced distortions that
afflict the attempts to regulate PFI thus rendering them
largely ineffective.
INTRODUCTION 
Private Foreign Investmeht (PFI) in underdeveloped
countries (UDCs) has been on the increase in the period
following the second world war. Such investment has played
a major role in the shaping of many of these countries'
economies. In Africa, such investment became prevalent
after the 1950s following independence of many of these
countries. Many of the newly independent African countties
viewed PFI as the panacea to the solution of their economic
problems. For many years after independence they sought to
attract PFI in the belief that such investment was necessary
in order to obtain capital, technology and skilled manpower.
The concern was with the quantity rather than with the qua-
lity of the investment that flowed into their economies from
abroad. PFI was viewed as a neutral ally in the pursuit of
economic goals. It was not, in general, associated with
exploitation or economic dominance over their economies to
their detriment. Nyerere graphically describes the blissful
ignorance the ruling regimes of the newly independent states
displayed on the issue of economic 'colonisation.' He writes
During our political struggle, some of us
thought that independence would be the end
of the process of liberation ... We were
now beginning to discover that political
independence, alas, is not enough. You
have to have economic independence, and it
is vital that the problems and areas of
economic domination should be politically
perceived before we can push the process of
liberation to its logical conclusion ... We
perceived the problems of colonisation in
its correct perspective. We saw colonisation as a
wrong. That wrong was perceived politically
by the leaders of the nationalist movements.
2Not all of us realized that we were also
economically colonised. That wrong was not
politically perceived ... There was an
underlying belief that political liberation
would take care of economic independence too.
Foreign investment has been, and still is, an extremely
important medium for the perpetuation of economic domination
by external economic interests. Many third world countries
are now beginning to realize that PFI is not synonymous with
economic development. The simplistic and naive perception
of PFI as a neutral ally in the struggle for economic
independence has undergone some significant change in the
last ten years or so and continuesto change in the light of
UDCs' experience of such investment. 2
The need for UDCs to control their economies has
received a great deal of attention in the rhetoric of many
spokesmen for these countries in national and international
fora. 3
 Again, Nyerere neatly summarises the theme of the
rhetoric. He argues that
The question is not whether nations should
control their economy but how they do so.
The real ideological choice is between
controlling the economy through domestic
private enterprise or doing so through some
state or other collective institution.4
One thing that seems to be accepted in all UDCs is that
regulation of PFI is a necessary condition to their serving
the interests of national economies. However, the divergence
of views on the degree, nature and objectives of such regula-
tion is almost as diverse as the number of countries involved.
Some of the UDCs have increasingly pursued a more regula-
tory approach towards PFI while others have reluctantly
imposed some form of regulation in response to specific
5
crises e.g. foreign exchange scarcity. A further distinction
is in the form of the regulation exercised on the establish-
ment of such investment. The Andean group of countries for
example have a fairly specialised formal institutional
machinery for regulating the aspects of foreign capital they
deem necessary to regulate, while Kenya has only ad hoc 
machinery for the most part. In each case, the form and
extent of regulation chosen corresponds to the general econo-
mic policy pursued by each state. In the majority of cases,
there exists a striking discrepancy between government rhe-
toric and the reality as exemplified by its actual practice.
This work is an empirical study of the nature and efficacy
of some key regulatory instruments over PFI in Kenya.
The declaration of a protectorate in June 1897 over
most of what is now known as Kenya marked the beginning of
a 70 years rule under British colonisation7. In December 1963,
the country became independent after a long bitter and bloody
struggle for independence. A year later, the country became
a republic. Political independence did not, however, mean
or lead to a complete break with the past. Kenya's economic
system and policies, as well as her political ideology, have
to a considerable degree been influenced by circumstances
and institutions whose origins are traceable to her colonial
past. 8
Economically, the country is predominantly agricul-
tural. The basic structure of the economy is one that was
largely inherited from colonial times. Britain's colonial
economic policy brought Kenya into the orbit of the capitalist
world economy. Much of the first half of the colonial period's
economic policy revolved around the need to extract the
country's resources for the benefit of the metropolitan
economy. The economy was a settler based one growing cash
crops and breeding animals for export to the metropolis.
The consumption needs of the European settlers and bureau-
cratic community were largely met by imports from the
metropolis.
After the second world war, Britain intensified the
extraction of resources from her colonies to help rebuild her
war-battered economy. In an attempt to reduce her huge
dollar deficit accumulated during the war years, she sought
to increase the export of primary products from her colonies
to dollar areas and to encourage the manufacture and process-
ing of consumer goods in the colonies to avoid importing
them from outside the sterling area. This was the begin-
ning of the development of the import substitution industrial
policy that has been pursued by independent Kenya with some
remarkable vigour. In the 1950s, the colonial administration
in Kenya began to adopt specifically protective investment
policies in its economic policy. This led to foreign firms
establishing production facilities behind these protective
measures primarily to protect their markets. Nearly all the
production facilities established were heavily dependent
on the metropolis.
Kenya's foreign investment policy and her regulation
of such investment are greatly influenced by her political
ideology. To the ruling regime, capitalism is the Kenyan
ideology while all other ideologies, notably socialism and
communism, are 'foreign' and therefore 'dangerous and sub-
versive'. 9 The system lays heavy emphasis on private enter-
prise which is in control of basic economic activities
particularly in industry. The role of the state was per-
ceived as one of identifying possible investment opportuni-
ties and acting as the guardian of private enterprise. Until
the 1970s, the state concentrated on creating the necessary
infrastructure and political environment in which private
enterprise would operate. Its control of the economy was
not expected to emanate from its active participation, but
from what the government referred to as a breed of 'sensitive
controls' which would supposedly secure equity without inter-
fering with the operation of the so-called 'free enterprise'. 10
Having opted for a private enterprise based economy,
the government was faced with a situation in which the domi-
nant sector of this economy was largely foreign owned and
controlled. To have got rid of foreign capital or discouraged
it would have left the regime with little private capital
and entrepreneurship to fulfil its plan targets. Thus,
since independence, the country has pinned her hopes for
rapid economic growth on foreign capital. 11 The government
therefore, adopted a very liberal policy on foreign invest-
ment. The foreign capital, on its part, responded to the
government policy on industrial growth based on import
substitution by increasingly setting up production facilities
in the country that were virtually assured of lucrative re-
turns due to the protection and other incentives given to
such ventures. This trend has helped a great deal in per-
petuating the dominance of foreign capital over the Kenya
economy.
By the mid-1970s, the government had begun to run out
of soft economic options based on import substitution indus-
trialisation. The easy phase of this programme had been
achieved largely through PFI. Despite this achievement,
its real benefits to the long term economic development of
Kenya remains doubtful. The Kenya regime has failed to
capitalise on the potential offered by such investment.
Given the incentives the country offers to PFI, this failure
is a costly affair. In 1975, the IBRD warned the government
that
The issue of how much foreign investment to
have is, in the last resort, a political one ...
The more immediate question is how to get
the greatest possible benefit from such
investment, because of its enormous importance
to Kenya, and because of the considerable in-
centives which are now offered to overseas
investors. Unfortunately, in many respects,
the present environment provides an abject 
lesson in how not to get much advantage from 
it all. 12
This study looks at some key policy strategies
adopted by the government since independence to regulate
and control foreign investment operations in Kenya. It
examines the overall regulatory and control environment
under which PFI operate in the country and its response
to the same. It seeks to .identify and trace the development
of government attempts to regulate PFI since independence.
The analysis lays emphasis on the political and economic
foundations and determinants of the regulatory policies and
measures identified. It seeks to demonstrate that the
regulation of foreign investment in Kenya has been, and still
is, conditioned by an interplay of political and economic
factors that are at times, conflicting, inconsistent and
misguided in their application to Kenyan circumstances.
Chapter one looks at the historical foundations of the
present economic system and many of the policies that have
contributed to its _evolution. '	 It is not in any way intended
to be an exhaustive coverage of the economic policies pursued
by the colonial administration. Its objective is to provide
an idea of some of the historical factors that have influen-
ced or shaped the formulation of current economic policies
in the country. It is for this reason that great attention
is given to some of the strategies adopted to ensure the
survival of capitalist relations of production and to retain
Kenya within the orbit of the world capitalist market.
In chapter two, government policy on private invest-
ment and in particular, PFI, is discussed in some detail .
An analysis of some of the basic legal framework in existence
for the safeguarding of the economic and political interests
of PFI is included as an indication of the government's
commitment to welcoming it to the country. In addition, the
government's explicit policy on regulation of PFI is outli-
ned. The objective of this chapter is to provide a picture
of the economic policy environment in which PFI operates in
the country. The assumption underlying this objective is
that any regulatory measures undertaken towards PFI will
reflect, ad be conditioned by, the nature of government
economic thinking which may be a significant constraint to
their effective application. The liberal open door policy
towards PFI adopted by the government since independence is
a major contributory factor to the lack of a comprehensive
policy on its regulation and to the inefficacy of the exis-
ting rudiments of regulatory framework that tend to respond
to individual crises and also to personal or group interests
as opposed to national ones.
Chapter three discusses the ad hoc regulation govern-
ing the establishment of PFI in the country. With the
1
exception of the 1964 Foreign Investment Protection Act3,
there is no other legislation in the country specifically
designed to regulate specific or general aspects of PFI
operations. This Act is not, and was not intended to be,
used for regulation purposes. Despite this lack of specific
legislative machinery for the regulation of the establi-
shment of PFI, other forms of regulation do exist. All
business ventures in the country have to register with
the office of the Registrar General in accordance with the
relevant legislation governing the type of business involved. 14
These statutes provide for certain procedural regulation for
the registration of establishing business as well as for
some substantive, though for the most part technical, regu-
lation for operation of registered businesses. 15 However,
the chapter is not concerned with these technical legal
aspects of business establishment, but with the regulatory
policies applied to prospective PFI independently of the
registration system. I have referred to this type of regu-
lation as the investment approval process. Using empirical
data, the chapter outlines and analyses the approval process
with the object of establishing its efficacy or otherwise
and the factors underlying the same.
In chapter four, the thorny issue of Africanization
of business and personnel is considered. For political
and personal reasons	 the predominance of non-Kenyans in
the ownership and management of business in the country was
unpalatable to a government that had come to power on a
nationalist platform. Having rejected public ownership as
the ultimate objective of government economic policy, the
government choseAfricanization as the alternative in taking
over business from foreign and non-African hands. The
emphasis was on facilitating African ownwership of equity
in private enterprise and engaging African personnel in
10
management positions. The former is premised on the notion
that owners of property have the right, power and the ability
to exercise effective control over their property. The basic
theme of the chapter is that this notion is not supported by
the reality in Kenyan projects associated with foreign ca-
pital. The chapter outlines the objectives and the process
of the Africanization programme since independence. Using
empirical data, it is shown that Africanization as a regu-
latory and control strategy has not succeeded in dislodging
foreign capital from its dominant position in the operation
of projects involving local equity participation. The key
reasons behind this failure are considered in the chapter.
This approach was considered necessary due to the fact that
the Kenyan regime has all along regarded the programme as
the linch-pin in the attainment of economic independence.
Although not all aspects of the programme and foreign
capital's counter-strategies, have been considered, the
chapter clearly shows that without a radical transformation
of the programmes' strategies, there is clear danger that
the economy is likely to be increasingly characterised by
what Berle and Means referred to as
Ownership of wealth without appreciable
control and control of w9alth without
appreciable ownership. 10
In order to concentrate on empirical evidence of the failure
of the programme as a regulatory and control measure over
PFI, the chapter does not deal with the technical legal
niceties on the powers of shareholders to exercise control
1 1
over their investments. This topic is adequately covered
in existing literature. 17
Chapter five deals with government financial and
fiscal regulation over foreign capital. It discusses exchan-
age control and taxation measures. A brief discussion of
the industrial training levy scheme is included to demon-
strate the futility of haphazardly	 developed legislative
measures in terms of goal achievement. Exchange control
and taxation are probably what most foreign investors in Kenya
regard as the most far-reaching regulation undertaken by the
government. The discussion in this chapter shows that this
is really not the case in the light of available evidence.
It shows that the present regulatory framework has been
substantially inadequate to deal with the problems posed by
the strategies adopted by PFI to circumvent the intended
control. A great deal of this inadequacy is a direct conse-
quence of the govemnment's open door policy on PFI and its
ambivalence over the issue of its regulation. After out-
lining the key measures adopted, the discussion concentrates
on the analysis of their shortcomings within the Kenyan
circumstances. Again the emphasis is on empirical factors
rather than on mere enumeration of legal provisions.
Chapter six concludes the study. It considers whether
the existing regulation system is properly equipped to deal
with the very complex problems raised by PFI in the country
and discusses the conclusions drawn from the overall analysis
12
in the study. The concluding remarks and observations in
the chapter deal with broad issues affecting regulation of
PFI rather than the detailed regulatory measures which are
adequately covered in the rest of the study. These argue
that since regulation is only a means to an end, the end
must be clearly perceived before any regulatory measures
are imposed. The underlying theme of these observations is
that it is not regulation that determines the economic,
social and political policies and goals of a country, but
rather that the latter determine the nature and extent of
the former. The basis of an effective regulatory system is,
therefore, the existence of coherent and rational economic
policies intended to achieve specific objectives in society.
In addition, the discussion in the chapter goes on to argue
that political will is a key element in the formulation and
enforcement of any regulation of PFI. Political will is
necessary to reverse the present trend where private interests
appear to have been substantially pursued instead of, or at
the expense of, public ones. The chapter also advances a
case for institutional reorganisation as well as that of the
decision making process in matters involving PFI.
RESEARCH AND METHODOLOGY
In the course of the preparation of this study, the
question of the scope of coverage arose. There was a choice
of adopting a legalistic approach to regulation which would
have meant concentrating on provisions of legal instruments
13
and the case law founded upon such provisions. This would have
led to the exclusion of those measures of control and regulation
not expressed in legal instruments e.g. the Africanization programme.
This approach was rejected for two main reasons. First, it would have
ignored the real issues involved in the task of regulating PFI by
concentraing on the form and legal theory of regulation rather than
the substance and reality involved in such a politically charged
exercise. Second, this type of regulation is well documented elsewhere
in readily available sources.
18
 Having rejected this approach, an
empirical approach to the problem was adopted. Furthermore, the study
is not placed within any particular or general legal theory or
theoretical framework on regulation of PFI. This is because the study
is intended to be a fairly comprehensive analysis of the Kenyan scene
approaching the subject from a legal as well as an economic and
political standpoint. This seeks to avoid the all too familiar approach
to the subject in which most studies limit themselves to one facet
of the topic such as the right of the state to regulate PFI,
nationalisation of foreign assets, dispute settlements, choice of
law in international contracts, regulation of technology transfer,
limitation on foreign equity holding etc.
In choosing such an area of coverage, the guiding principle
was the potential role that effective implementation
14
of pertinent regulation over such areas would play in the
formulation of a comprehensive overall economic policy in a
an environment in which PFI is already heavily involved.
This called for an investigation of the actual practice in
operation of the existing regulatory machinery.
The collection of data for this study was done during
the second half of 1978 and that of 1980 as well as in the
third quarter of 1981. The study covered a random sample
of thirty eight projects in which PEI is involved. Out of
this initial number, only twenty five projects provided
enough data upon which some form of analysis could be based.
The areas covered by the available data included the
following:
- identification of investment areas;
- pre- -investment studies;
- participants;
- negotiations between foreign and local parties;
- relations between government and projects;
- application of regulations to projects;
- PFI l s strategies in response to regulation;
-
institutional machinery for regulating foreign
investment;
- policy formulation on PFI and decision making in
matters concerning the same;
- the role of the Kenyan partners and personnel in
the operation of projects involving PFI; and
- agreements between Kenyan firms and foreign firms
as well as those between the Kenya government and
other governments or foreign institutions relating
to specific investments.
1 5
Not all data collected are used in this work. However, the
selection of data for use was based ontheir representative
character of the subject area or areas they cover .
The data collected are both primary and secondary. Thy
were collected within and without Kenya. The bulk of the
research data was obtained through interviews with project
and government officials. In conducting the interviews,
efforts were made in each case, to obtain documentary evi-
dence to corroborate the interviewees' responses. Owing to
the informal nature of the interviews, this was largely
successful. Thus in nearly all cases in this work where
the source is given as 'interview', documentary evidence
where it existed to back this was either shown, or made
available to the author. However, even where it was avail-
able, its open use in this study would have involved a
breach of an undertaking given by the author not to make
direct references to it. Some tabulated data and other
information was obtained from existing studies by other
researchers in similar fields. Nevertheless, even where use
of such tabulated data was made, the raw data upon which such
tabulation was based was available to the author independently
of the existing work in nearly all cases.
The services of a research assistant were used in
obtaining data from the office of the registrar general and
to conduct several interviews with four company officials.
Eighty two interviews were carried out, excluding numerous
1 6
repeat interviews, with business and government officials
between 1978 and 1982. 19 In addition, there were two
interviews with officials of a Swiss company in Geneva
conducted in 1981 and four with representatives of foreign
firms operating in Kenya which took place in Stratford-
Upon-Avon in April 1981. All the interviews, except the
Geneva ones, were conducted on an informal basis and all
the questions were of an open ended type. No questionnares
were used in this study.
Library research was carried out in Kenya newspaper,
parastatal and public libraries as well as in the university
library. In two important cases, I was able to informally
make use of government registries. Outside Kenya, the
resources of the following institutions were made use of:
- the British Overseas Trade Board Library, London
- the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Library, London
- the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies Library,
London
- SOAS, University of London, Library, London
- Company Registry, London
- Bodleian Library, Oxford
- IDS Library, Sussex University
- Warwick University, Coventry, and
- IDR, Copenhagen.
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NOTES
1. Nyerere, 1979, 20
2. For example, foreign firms in the copper industry in
Chile made a profit of 4b. dollars in 42 years on an
initial investment of a mere 30m. dollars. Again, in
just one year, American firms withdrew profits from
the third world that represented net transfers in
their favour of 1.723b. dollars of which 280m. dollars
came from Africa. (see Salvador Allende's speech to
the UN., 4/12/72 reproduced in Hugo Radice, ed., 1975,
at pp.236 and 242).
3. See for example The UN Charter Of Economic Rights And Duties 
Of States, 1974.
4. Nyerere, 1968, 264.
5. Examples of the first are India and South Korea while
Kenya and Sudan are good examples of the latter.
6. Tanzania is a case in point. Its rhetoric has emphasised
self-reliance while the practice has been more and more
dependence on foreign, in particular aid, resources.
Ivory Coast, Philippines, Nigeria, and Kenya are also
good examples to name just a few.
7. See G.K. Kamau, 1975
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CHAPTER ONE
SOME ASPECTS OF POST WORLD WAR II ECONOMIC POLICY IN KENYA 
A : A BRIEF HISTORICAL SUMMARY 
(a) Pre-War Period
When Britain declared Kenya a protectorate in 1895,
she set about consolidating her imperial rule over the
country	 that was to last for nearly 70 years. In 1920,
she formally annexed the territory with the exception of a
10 mile coastal strip. 1 The creation of a "whiteman's
country" 2 in which the native Africans were to be second
class citizens in their own country was the major theme of
the first half of the 20th Century. Their assigned role
was expected to be that of suppliers of cheap, and at times,
unpaid labour at the whims of the colonial rulers. The
"whiteman's" country was expected to be created "with a
flow of white people mainly from Europe.3
1902 marked the real beginning of a deliberate policy
of white settlement to the detriment of the native popula-
tion. That year saw the enactment of the Crown Lands 
Ordinance. 4 It provided for the alienation of native lands
to white settlers on 99 year leases. This Ordinance marked
the beginning of a series of legislation designed to econo-
mically subjugate the native population to the whims and
dictates of an alien community. The Crown Lands Ordinance 
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of 1915 declared all land to be Crown land thus disinheriting the
natives from their ancestral rights to land. The Ordinance formed
the legal basis of a racially determined land policy that the colonial
authority was to pursue with much vigour in the next 50 years. A
colonial judge, well schooled in his racial prejudice, had no doubts
at all regarding the consequences of this ordinance to the land rights
of native peoples. Among other things, he said, it was meant to vest
land reserved for the use of natives in the crown and in consequence
all native rights in such lands had disappeared and the natives in
occupation therein had become tenants at will of the Crown.
5
For most of the colonial period, the economy of the country
was based almost entirely on agriculture. It was for this reason that
the colonial administration encouraged white settlement in the
highlands. Its legally sanctioned racial policies aimed at basing
the creation of a monetary agricultural economy on such settlement to
the exclusion of non-whites. Thus, for example, Sir Charles Elliot
-
forbade Asians, on racial grounds, from owning land in the highlands,
an administrative measure that was sanctioned by the Colonial Office
in 1906 and 1908.
6
 The Privy Council, it too not unfamiliar with
racial prejudice, sanctioned this racial discrimination decreeing that
imposition of racially discriminative conditions of land sales were
within the powers of the Commissioner for Lands under the 1915
Ordinance.
7
 The emphasis on settler agriculture led to a situation in
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which the settlers' interest dominated the politics and
the formulation of economic policies. 8 The main interest
of the colonial power was to develop the colony into a
supplier of raw materials, mainly agricultural, for British
industries as well as a market for these industries. The
settler economy met this need sufficiently by supplying
such products as cotton, sisal, hides and skins,
meat etc. to British industry. Thus only a handful of
international firms were operating in Kenya prior to 1945
and most of them were in agriculture related enterprises,
mining and the provision of basic infrastructure. The
colonial office which wanted to develop Kenya into a market
for British industrial goods viewed colonial industries as
a threat to British products in the home market as well as
in other colonial markets. In her study of foreign corpo-
rations in Kenya, Swainson convincingly argues that the
British colonial policy towards the extraction of raw
materials from the colonies involved the positive discou-
ragement of colonial industrial development, with the
exception of such industries as were linked to the agri-
cultural sector of the economy. 9 Given such an attitude
to the establishment of local industries coupled with the
dominance of settler interests before the second world war,
foreign investment in Kenya remained low and was largely
concentrated in primary industries, that were mainly of
an extractive nature. 10 Table 1 shows the principal
foreign based firms in Kenya before 1945.
fe Name of Firm
A ,7rieulture and E tinCS
1924	 African Highland \
Produce Co.
1924	 Kenya lea Co.
1931	 Anglo-French Sisal
Co.
1907	 East African
Tobacco Co.
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Toole 1
	
The Principal toreign-bascd Companies in Kenya befoie 1945
ype of BuLiness
Tea
Tea and Colfec
Si q al Piant-ulons
Pareht Company and
Country of Origin
James Finlay, U.K.
Bicoke Bond, U.K.
British/French
Tobacco 1 radii g,	 Britisn American
Tobacco and	 Tobacco, U.K.
Cigarette Manu-
facture (1934)
1932	 East African	 Wattle Bark and
	
Natal Tanning and
Tannin:: and	 Extract	 Extract, S.A.
Exit act Co.	 Forestal Land and
Timber, U.K.
1936	 B.A. Sisal Estates, Sisal Production 	 Mitchell Cotts, U.K.
Ltd.
1906	 British Fast Africa Alents, Exporter.. 	 Mitchell Cotts, U.K.
Corporation	 of Prim try Produce
Trading
1920	 Bird and Co.,	 Nlerchantc, Trans-	 Bird and Co., U.K.
(Africa) Ltd.	 pc rte ,-s. Shippin.^,
Frei ,ht, Warehousing
1920	 Gibson and Co.	 Agents, Exporters	 Gi pson and Cc., U.K.
of Primary
 Produ.e
1934	 Holland Africa	 Shipping and	 N.:therlandi
Line	 Ware:101Am:
1924	 Gailey and Roberts Import aid I);stri- 	 United Africa Co.,
button of Aericul-	 U.K. (after 1937
to: at Machinery, etc.	 Unilever)
Manufacturing and Minerals
1911	 Magadi Soda Co., Extraction of Soda	 E African Syndicate
Ltd.	 (taken o‘er
1.C.I. in 1923), U.K.
1922	 East African Power Generation of	 Power Seem
and Lighting	 Electrical Power	 Balfour Beatty Co.
U.K.
1920	 East African	 Beer	 Ind Coope, U.K.
Brev,.cries
1933	 East African	 Cement Clinker	 Associated Portland
Portland Cement	 Grinding	 Cement, U.K.
1935	 Leibig	 Meat Processing	 Leibig. U.K.
Source: Kaplinsky, 1978, p.51
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(b) Post War change in Economic Policy 
The second world war brought about a significant
change in economic policy relating to industrialization.
During the war, the colonial office emphasised the need to
exploit colonial resources for the benefit of the war-
battered British economy. 11 The secretary of state for
the colonies, for instance, sent out a circular on economic
policy stressing the need for increasing the flow of colo-
nial supplies to help Britain meet its war requirements.
12
Thus a new colonial economic policy was prompted by the
changed position of Britain in the world economy after the
war.
13
 Increased production of raw materials and import-
substitution manufacture of products hitherto imported
from Britain became a pressing priority to help earn dollars
to offset the rising dollar deficit of the "mother country".
It became imperative, then, for the colonies to either
produce manufactured goods to meet their own demand, or to
import them from Britain rather than from outside the ster-
ling area. This policy meant that the economy of Kenya, by
being developed into a supplier of primary products to the
mother country and an importer of the latter's industrial
goods, was geared to fulfilling the economic needs of her
colonial power. The pattern of foreign investment that
followed reflected this phenomenon.
The existence of a non-African population, both as
producers and consumers provided the initial stimulus for
the development of manufacturing and processing in Kenya by
24
foreign capital. This population coupled with the slowly
rising purchasing capacity of the non-white population
_
provided a significant market for a range of industrial
consumer goods. This relatively larger home market than
that available to its neighbours, put Kenya in a favourable
position to capture the neighbours' market thus creating an
enlarged market for foreign capital. In addition, official
colonial policy favoured Kenya as an administrative head-
quarters for the region. This favouritism was partly in
response to the settler pressure on the colonial power to
put in more emphasis on Kenya than on her two neighbours
whose white population was only a small proportion of the
Kenyan one. By the late 1950s, Kenya had become the indus-
trial centre for the whole of East Africa. With an increasing-
ly favourable policy on industrial development, foreign
capital was bound to be a growing and dominant sector of
the colony's economy. 15
A rapid expansion of industrial development followed
increased supportive government intervention policies in
the post-war years. By 1954, the geographical net income
attributable to manufacturing industry had exceeded that of
settler agriculture for the first time in the colony's
history. 16 Competition from non-British sources led to a
system of protection that encouraged many British firms to
set up production facilities within Kenya. Following this
trend, a Royal East Africa Commission Report of 1955 out-
lined two measures of promoting economic development.
25
The first measure was, inter alia, the provision of suitable
infrastructure and removal of restrictive regulation on
investments. The second aimed particularly at overseas
capital which would be increased
... if there should be a climate of opinion
that is not obviously well disposed to a
continued inflow of external capital and
enterprise .17
In addition to the Royal Commission's recommendations, a
1955 government report on "Economic Assistance For Primary
and Secondary Industries," concluded that existing protec-
tion fell far short of being adequate to attract capital
into investment. It argued that:
appropriate assistance to an industry should
be granted to the industry as a whole ... and
this should be provided for by a special
amendment to the customs tariff ... In a
country where the setting up of a new indus-
try is still a venture carrying considerable
risks, it is doubtful whether a fair return
on capital employment is enough to induce
owners of capital to face the risks.18
It was foreign capital that led the way in exerting pressure
upon the government to provide protection against competi-
tion as an inducement to the investment of capital in Kenyan
production facilities. They usually insisted on specific
protection measures prior to setting up such facilities in
the colony. 19
 Foreign firms were in a better position to
pressurise the local colonial administration to adopt a
more protective policy than before for two main reasons.
First, they could invest their capital elsewhere if their
26
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demands were not substantially met. The local admini-
stration felt the country needed such investment suffici-
ently to warrant susbstantial concessions to the foreign
capital. Second such firms which were overwhelmingly
British at that time, could apply direct pressure on the
colonial government in London. Eglin suggests that the
ultimate introduction of a comprehensive system of protec-
tive tariffs corresponds with the date of the establishment
of foreign investment. 20 The pattern of protective tariffs
introduced after 1958 lends support to this argument.
Table 2 shows a sample of tariff protection introduced
after 1958. By 1958 protection of domestic industries, a
majority of which were foreign-owned, had received a major
boost through the introduction of a comprehensive custom
tariffs system.
In addition to the institution of a comprehensive
scheme of import duties, 1958 also saw the introduction of
a comprehensive system of import licensing under the
Imports, Export And Essential Supplies Ordinance of that
year. 21
 The Ordinance empowered the governor to appoint a
director of trade to issue licences for the importation or
exportation of goods subject to licensing thereunder. 22
8.4(1) of the ordinance gave the minister such wide powers
that:
Whenever from time to time it appears to the
minister, after consultation with such per-
sons as appear to represent commercial and 
industrial interest in Kenya, to be necessary
28
in the public interest ... he may by order
either prohibit absolutely or restrict, by
means of such conditions and limitations as
may be specific in the order, the ...
importation of any specified goods ... either
generally ... or from any specific country ...
(emphasis added)
This enabled the authorities to protect domestic industries
either by regulating the category of goods imported or the
source of such goods. This power was extensively used to
protect domestic industries from external competition in
particular from Japan. 23 Table 3	 shows a sample of pro-
ducts that were subject to licensing in terms of boththeir
category and source. Products such as cement, rubber pro-
ducts and textiles in which Japan offered very stiff
competition were high up on the list of regulated imports.
Financial support was another approach the colonial
administration adopted to encourage industrial development.
The Industrial Development Council Ordinance of 1954 24
created the Industrial Development Council to assist enter-
prises in the colony. The IDC was designed to
... facilitate the industrial and economic
development of the colony by initiating,
assisting or expanding industrial, commer-
cial and other undertakings in the colony.25
This body was to form the foundation of the system of part-
nerships between state and private capital up to the present
day. In addition to the creation of a local financing body,
Britain provided financial support or prepared ground for
the entry of international capital into the colony.
28(a)
Table 3 
Sample of Products subject to Lincensing on he basis of 
both category and source. 
Product
	
Country of Origin 
Wax-based boot and shoe polish
	
All countries
Rubber bicycle tyres
	 Japan
Rubber bicylce tubes
	 Japan
Cement-Building
	 Japan
Stocking and hose
	 Japan
Vests and Singlets
	 Japan
Underpants	 Japan
Slippers and house footwear of
all materials except rubber	 Japan
Footwear wholly or mainly of
leather	 Japan
Footwear wholly or chiefly of
textile	 Japan
Rubber footwear	 Japan
Source: Imports, Exports and Essential Supplies
(Import) Order 1961, THIRD SCHEDULE.
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The Overseas Resources Development Act of 1948, for example,
created two financial bodies to support investment by pri-
vate capital in the colonies. The two were the Common-
wealth Development Corporation (CDC) and the Overseas
Food Corporation (OFC). Each had a capital of £50 million.
They were intended to promote industrial investment by
British private capital by financing necessary infrastruc-
ture and subsidising such investment. 26 Grants in aid were
also significantly increased to help finance the development
of infrastructure conducive to investment by private
capital.27
By the mid-1950s, it was clear that the colonial
government was committed in its support of an economic
system founded on private capital. An overwhelming propor-
tion of this capital was foreign owned or was heavily
associated with the settler community in as far as it
had	 any local content. At the same time, it had
become increasingly clear that the struggle for independence
had gained such momentum that its defeat through military
means would, at best, be prolonged, costly and not condu-
cive to the exploitation of the nation's resources for the
benefit of metropolitan industry. By 1958, some far-sighted
settler groups, closely associated with the colonial admini-
stration had began to realize that independence for the
African majority population was just a matter of time. They
saw their most immediate challenge as that of ensuring that
the system of private enterprise developed so far survived
30
a takeover of power by the African nationalists. 28 They
advocated measures that would lay the basis for a conti-
nuation of an economic system formulated during the
colonial days that rested upon the foundation of private
capital. The colonial power was receptive to such ideas
as they would ensure the continuance of the benefits to
metropolitan industries. The existing economic system had
to be sold to the new African ruling elite as . a viable
system that would be worth retaining without radical
structural changes after independence. How this objective
wasachieved is the subject of discussion in the remaining
part of this chapter.
B : MEASURESTOPREEMPTRADICAL ANTI-PRIVATE ENTERPRISE
POLICIES AFTER INDEPENDENCE 
The first major issue the colonialists had to address
themselves to was the deep resentment among the native
population against its racial policy. Its policy of racial
aiscrimination was epitomised by the administration's policy
on land ownership in the highlands. Non-Europeans were pro-
hibited from owning land in the highlands where a small
number of white settlers held 7.5 million acres of land, or
31% of the country's best land suitable for agriculture
and intensive animal husbandry, and employed the native
population at low rates of pay ..29 In addition, following
the same racial policy, the administration forbade Africans
to grow cash crops in their so called reserves which were
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in fact little else but concentration camps. Untilthe mid-
1950s legislation and administrative practice fostered
the development of settler production to the detriment of
the non-Europeans. As Ghai and McAuslan pointed out
Since the Europeans had an overwhelming say in
the direction of government policy, ... econo-
mic and political development was looked at
from a European perspective, and legislation
was designed to further that development with
little or no regard to the economic or social
effects that such furtherance would have on
Africans.30
This approach to economic policy had to change if the
potential future African leaders were to be persuaded that
the system of private enterprise set up under colonial rule
could benefit them. It was, therefore, decided in 1959,
that the racial allocation of land should be abandoned.
This was legally implemented by a 1960 Order In Council
that abolished racially based division of the country into
scheduled and non-scheduled areas. 31 This decision paved
the way for the inevitable ownership of land in the high-
lands by Africans. The lifting of legal racial barriers in
many aspects of social and economic life constituted the
first measure by the colonial rulers aimed at making the
existing economic system and policies acceptable to the
emerging African elites destined to rule over the nation
in a few years time.
The second measure was to get the support of the
African designated ruling elite for the colonial economic
32
system with minor modifications that would leave the basic
structure substantially unchanged. This, they hoped would
guarantee a continuity of economic policies after colonial
political rule ceased. To achieve this objective, the
colonial administration set about incorporating the future
African ruling elites into the mainstream of the country's
class of the privileged few. This was seen as a means of
creating a vested interest in the maintenance of the system
by the African leadership. It was also expected to help
import western capitalist values to the African leadership
which would help them aspire to a capitalist way of life
thus opting for a capitalist economy. Blundell had no
doubt that
... the real challenge to us [colonizers]
is how we can give the Africans enough
conviction and force to carry forward our 
own ideas and our own civilization ...
Unless we can do that, unless the African 
himself can carry forward conviction that 
what we have to offer him is a real way of 
life, something really to work for, then
I believe we have lost the battle for the
continent of Africa. 32
If the future Africalleaders could be thus convinced, then
they could be expected to defend the private enterprise
centred economy provided they obtained sufficient tangible
benefits from it. This would make it possible for a post-
independence government to endorse the economic system that
not only rested on private capital, but largely on foreign
capital at that. The economic interests of the metropolis
would, therefore, be safeguarded without having to
33
retain a large force in the country.
As early as 1959 a new 'multi-racial' policy was
being propounded - in particular by the New Kenya Group33
led by Sir Michael Blundell. This group suggested a basis
of collaboration between European and African interests in
making a transition to political independence without any
radical change in the existing economic structure.34
 Its
fundamental axioms emphasised that
The social and political tenets of the free
world shall apply ... The rights of pri-
vate property and the sanctity of contracts
shall be respected.35
They saw economic factors as a major obstacle in the process
of integrating the African leadership into the existing ca-
pitalist structure of the economy. They advocated that
... the only solution, in our view is vigo-
rously to tackle the basic problem of low
living standards, so that there may rapidly
emerge from the poorer majority, people with
the same interests and similar ideals to 
those economically more advanced.36
This view was not a novel one. It was in line with the
earlier recommendations by the E.A. Royal Commission and
the Swynnerton Plan. 37 These had been accepted by the admi-
nistration as a basis for preparing the economic reforms to
adopt the system to a changing political environment.
Clearly the improvement of the African lot was not seen as
an end in itself, but rather as a means to an end. The end
was the continuation after independence of an economic system
34
established in colonial times in which foreign and ex-
settler capital had a substantial share. It is also clear
that reforms were not intended to affect the whole African
population, but a few who would emerge from the poor majo-
rity to join hands with the economically more advanced.
There was no doubt at this stage who were more economically
advanced - they were largely the Europeans who had set up
the then existing economic system. This would obviously
produce a stratified African population with a few econo-
mically well endowed Africans taking the helm and forming
an alliance with the existing capitalist class.
To achieve the goal of creating an African political
elite with a vested interest in the existing economic sys-
tem, the colonial administration set about to implement
two sets of economic reforms that would, and were expected
to, have stratifying effects upon the African population.
These were the land tenure reform in the non-scheduled
areas and the partial Africanization of the 'white high-
lands' - the scheduled areas. Both of these measures had
been advocated by the E.A. Royal Commission
... the analysis and recommendations of
which had been described by The Economist
newspaper as 'Adam Smith in Africa.'38
The mother—country ' s economic system, adapted to colonial circumstances,
was to be adopted in Kenya.
35
The land tenure reform in the non-scheduled areas
aimed at the commercialization of African-occupied land in
line with capitalist legal principles of property ownwership.
It took the form of land adjudication, consolidation and
registration. 39 Its immediate effect was the destruction
of customary basis of land holdings. By conferring land
ownership titles upon individuals, it became possible to
deal with land as a commercial property upon which the
aspiring African capitalists would base their accumulation
of wealth. The reform was spelled out in the Swynnerton
Plan. Its main political objective was to create wealthy
capitalist farmers, tied to and dependent for their accu-
mulation on, capitalist values, as a buffer between the
existing economic system and the landless masses. As
Swynnerton perceived it
In future, if these recommendations are
accepted former governmentjoolic y will be reversed
and able, energetic rich Africans will be 
able to acquire more land and bad or poor 
farmers, less, creating a landed and land-
less class. 40
A capitalist orientation of African agricultural economy
par excellence.
The partial Africanization of the hitherto 'white
highlands' envisaged the transfer to Africans of 3.5 million
of the 7.5 million acres in the scheduled areas suitable for
agriculture and intensive animal husbandry. The Africans
who were to own land in the highlands under this programme
36
were divided into two main categories: The first one
comprised of some landless Africans and the second
the emerging African middle class. The land was to be
bought off the settlers on a willing seller willing buyer
basis. The political history of the programme suggests that
it was a colonial administration's insurance policy against
too radical a change from existing economic policies follo-
wing the transfer of political power to the Africans. Its
main attraction was that it offered the African elite, poi-
sed to take over political power, a chance to step into the
shoes of the former white elites. However, given the willing
seller, willing buyer basis accepted by the African leader-
ship, 41 the programme would need some massive financial
aid from Britain. This gave Britain a negotiating card for
the African leadership was keen to replace the colonial
rulers and a programme that offered them some breathing
space to organise was welcome. For those who sought the
perpetuation of the economic system (shorn of its legally
based racism) they had no doubt about how the programme
ought to help. It was their view, that
It must encourage the evolution of a respon-
sible, contented middle class African who 
may be  a bulwark of the emergent African 
state.42
This programme, like its counterpart the land tenure reform
one, was intended to form the basis of accummulation for
an aspiring African capitalist bourgeoisie. These two
programmes incorporated the African elite into the monetary
37
agricultural sector which was at that time the backbone
of the economy. 43
Having designed the Africanization of the scheduled
areas to meet political objectives, Britain agreed to fin-
ance the programme with a large aid package in the f
	 of
both loans and grants. 44
 The future African rulers accepted
this 'aid' with pleasure. They saw it as a means of keeping
the lid on the kettle of the popular demand for re-distri-
bution of land. 45 In addition, the 'aid' benefitted, almost
without exception, all members of the small group of African
elite that was to take over power after independence and
hold tightly on to it thereafter. They got large tracts of
the best land in the country all financed by the aid funds. 46
This aid, indebted the new African government to the 'gene-
rosity' of the former mother country who intimated that
there would be more where that came from as long as the
African government kept to course. And so there was. 47
The independent Kenya government was to toe the line. As
Leys aptly points out, the education and climate of opinion
in which the African leaders had moved since school
... had in most cases been premised on the
acceptance of private property and the
highly regulated monopolistic, private
enterprise system established under colo-
nialism.48
The thought of radically transforming the system, as expe-
rience was to reveal later, hardly ever crossed their minds.
The worst theyhad in mind, it would appear, was the
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encouragement of African businessmen of a similar orien-
tation. Barely two months before independence in 1963,
the Minister of Finance (designate), James Gichuru, was
telling the Nairobi Chamber of Commerce (dominated by
foreign interests)
You do not have to go far in Nairobi today
to become aware of people in our society,
with new tastes, frequently with the money
to satisfy them, and themselves creating a
new demand amongst their fellows for better
things of life ... At the same time I hear
too frequently of the inadequacy of our
distribution system, or the cost of reach-
ing much of this potential market, and
incidentally stimulating consumer demands
and setting in train the urge 'to keep up 
with the Joneses' which can contribute so much
to our productivity. I suggest that the 
way of making good these deficiencies is 
through the African businessman.49
The African businessman was, therefore, not perceived as an
agent for transforming the structural foundations of the
existing economy, but of spreading demand for its western
tastes and products.
A series of foreign missions reinforced the African
leaders' willingness to retain the existing economic struc-
ture by emphasising the need, indeed indispensability, 	 to
Kenya of improving conditions for private enterprise inclu-
ding foreign capital if she were to attain any credible rate
of economic growth. Of particular importance was the IBRD
Economic Mission to Kenya of 1962 undertaken "at the request
of Kenya and the United Kingdom." At this time, Kenya was
still a British colony and there is little doubt that Britain
39
requested the mission to endorse the modified (largely in
racial terms) economic system formulated in Kenya between
1956 and 1962. A positive approval by an "independent"
body such as IBRD would convince the skeptics, if any,
among the African leadership of the value of retaining and
strengthening the existing system. The mission duly gave
its unmitigated approval. Its task was to
... undertake a general review of the
economic potential of Kenya and to make
recommendations designed to assist the
government in the development planning
for the period up to 1967, and in formu-
lating policies which would further
expand and stimulate the economy and so
raise the standard of living of the
people. 50
The Mission assembled in Washington in September 1961, was
in Kenya from mid-September to mid-December the same year,
and commenced the preparation of its report in Washington
in 1962. Thus in just three months, it managed, in between
cocktail parties, wildlife trips and a visit to the Coastal
beaches, to gather enough official and settler organisations'
reports to compile its seemingly "authoritative" report. If
speed were the only measure of efficiency, then the Mission
was indeed the very epitomy of efficiency.
In its report, the Mission faithfully emphasised the
need for not making any fundamental changes in basic econo-
mic policies. It warned that rocking of the boat was likely
to lead to the collapse of the economy. It left no doubt
of its conviction that Kenya's only hope of a stable economy
40
lay in her adherence to a capitalist economic system. It
was emphatic that during the "next four years"
... a first requirement would be the adop-
tion of and firm adherence to, policies
likely to establish economic conditions to
promote development. 51
It recommended that such policies be formulated forthwith
and reflect four main factors one of which was
(d) The promotion of the maintenance and further development
of production in private hands to be assisted by:-
(i) A clear statement of policy towards -
private investment. This might include
re-assurances about interference by the
state with private undertakings. Exter-
nal investors will be concerned about
freedom to transfer earnings and repa-
triate original capital.
(ii) Conditions in which private financial
institutions can continue to operate and
confidence in the currency preserved.
(iii) The opportunity to make reasonable profits. 52
The other factors were on fiscal solvency, the maintenance
of efficiency in all branches, and the maintenance of law
and order. The Mission went on to rationalise that pursuit
of these policies would have beneficial effects beyond the
private sector. Such an approach, it felt, should encourage
other governments and institutions
... to look more favourably on Kenya's
requests for external assistance.53
As the Mission had already expressed its opinion to the
effect that the economic growth of Kenya would "depend for
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some time to come on funds from abroad," 54
 this was clearly
a thinly veiled warning that availability of external aid
depended on conformity to economic policies acceptable to
potential donors. 55 On the role of the government in econo-
mic matters, the Mission was of the view that it should
remain unchanged.
Generally we do not think that the extension
of the role of government in production
would be beneficial during the next few years.
In advancing up a suggested program, we there-
fore assumed that the scope of government
intervention in economic life will be largely
unchanged. 56
Hitherto, the role of the government had been to support
private capital mainly from abroad in its exploitation of
Kenyan resources. It certainly had shown no intention
whatsoever of transforming the inequitable capitalist
oriented economic system into a more equitable socialist
oriented one.
The analysis and recommendations of the IBRD Mission
clearly represented the colonial administration's views
formed from around 1955 to 1962 as well as those of some
of the so-called liberal settlers organised under the New
Kenya Party.
	
There was neither objectivity nor origina-
lity in the Mission's report. Its recommendations on land,
restoration of the confidence of private investors, need
for continuity in economic policies, for example, had all
been well documented in official and other records. 57 It
is not surprising that the Mission's report should have
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turned out to be merely a compilation of economic analysis
and recommendations by the colonial administration and
pressure groups such as the New Kenya Party. This, it is
submitted with respect to the Mission, was precisely why it
was called in. It had neither the mandate nor the intention
of conducting an objective enquiry into the economic poten-
tial of Kenya with its peoples' welfare as the fundamental
point of reference. It is doubtful whether it had any other
mandate apart from giving a mark of legitimacy and respecta-
bility to an economic structure which had been fashioned by
a colonial administration largely in response to interests
of non-Africans , both individual and corporate.
C : CONCLUSION 
This chapter has examined, albeit very sketchily, some
relevant aspects of the colonial administration's policy.
We have seen that the administration adopted racial policies
in furtherance of its economic and political endeavours to
create a colony modelled upon the British capitalist model
to serve the economic interests of the mother country.
Before the second world war, Britain's economic policy to-
wards its colonies was based on the conception that the
latter were merely suppliers of raw materials to be used by
British industry, as well as a ready market for her industrial
products. The economic hardships resulting from the war
changed Britain's attitude towards the development of
industries in the colony. Thus by the late 1950s, the
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administration had begun to adopt a policy of increasing
protection and encouragement of investment in the colony,
the bulk of which were British in origin.
At the same time that the colonial authorities
began encouraging domestic industries, they also finally
realized that independence for the colony was just a
matter of time. They were keen that a future African
government should adopt their economic policies. So they
set about to create the conditions suitable for the survival
of the capitalist oriented economy after independence. They
sought to do this by incorporating the future African leaders
into the stream of the private system existing in the coun-
try. The land reform and abolition of racial policy in land
ownership in the highlands saw to this while the IBRD eco-
nomic mission to Kenya in 1962 provided the incoming leader-
ship with an acceptable economic policy. The first two
major economic policy documents 58 produced by foreign ad-
visors under the auspices of the independent African
government left no doubt that the measures taken by the
colonial government had successfully been adopted and
continuity of economic policy, at any rate a capitalist
oriented one, ensured.
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CHAPTER TWO
GOVERNMENT POLICY ON THE TREATMENT OF PRIVATE
FOREIGN INVESTMENT, 1963-81 
A.	 GOVERNMENT POLICY POSITION ON PRIVATE ENTERPRISE
In the last chapter, I discussed the colonial admini-
station's efforts and strategies to bequeath independent
Kenya an economic system designed in the twilight days of
colonial rule. This system rested on the pillars of private
enterprise dominated by external capital. These efforts
paid dividends: as the independent government expressly
accepted the inherited basic economic framework. It decla-
red at the outset that the base
... from which the economy must grow during
the plan period is the one established
during the 1954-64 period. The resources
now available for future growth have been
inherited from that period and the present
structure of industry, commerce and agricul-
ture, and the composition of output are the
products of that period.1
Although economic growth has proceeded at a rapid pace since
independence 2 , it has, nevertheless, continued on the lines
set by the earlier colonial structure. This is not to say
that there have been no changes. There have been many changes
in the economy. Kenyanisation, for example, has radically
changed the racial composition of the group of people in
the centre of power, but these have not radically changed
the basic structure of the economy. 3
 For over 70 years of
colonial rule, Kenya had been subjected to a system of
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private enterprise. Independent Kenya government's policy
has been consistently one of encouraging, supporting and
defending this samebasic private enterprise economic system.
In 1965, the government issued a major policy state-
ment - AFRICAN SOCIALISM AND ITS APPLICATION TO PLANNING 
IN KENYA4 - which has come to be regarded as independent
Kenya's economic blueprint. 5 Despite the inclusion of the
word 'socialism' in the statement, it ruled out collective
ownership of means of production as 	 the ultimate
objective of the government's economic policies. The key
principle embodied in the statement was the inviolability
of property rights as long as the nation's productive assets
were used "in the interest of society and its members". 6
The government committed itself to an economic system of
various forms of ownership.?
A major cause of concern to the government at inde-
pendence had been the fear entertained by a large section
of the capitalists in the country that their property would
be expropriated. In an attempt to assuage these fears the
Prime Minister, Kenyatta, assured them that the government
of Kenya
... will not deprive them of their property
or rights of ownership. We will encourage
investors in various projects to come to
Kenya and carry on their business in order
to bring prosperity.8
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This assurance, also embodied in the 1965 policy statement,
has become entrenched in the government's economic policy
throughout the last eighteen years. It has been restated
and re-emphasised in all later policy documents.9
After independence, the targets established for
increased investment in industry were left to be implemented
primarily by private enterprise, fostered by what was termed
as a government policy
... characterised by encouragement and -
support where needed, in order to secure
a maximum rate of economic growth and
the structure and location of industry
which will benefit the country most.1U
Under this policy 86% of investment in manufacturing was
expected to come from the private sector which was foreign
dominated. 11 The government then argued that state owner-
ship is not necessary to ensure that industry operates in• 
the national inteiest and that increased state ownership
might, to the contrary, have a detrimental effect on indus-
trial development by
(a) discouraging overseas private investment and government
aid;
(b) syphoning off public funds into compensation payments
to investors whose investments are expropriated; and
(c) blunting the edge of the incentives for aspiring
local capitalist entrepreneurs:"
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Even as early as 1964, before the 1965 policy statement
rejected nationalisation as an instrument of economic
policy, the Prime Minister had emphatically stated that
"the government considered that nationalisation will not
serve to advance the cause of African Socialism". 12
 How-
ever, if public control of any economic operation were
necessary, nationalisation would be undertaken regardless
of its cost. This would occur only if other less costly
controls are unavailable or ineffective. Thus the overri-
ding criterion for the nationalisation of private property
was set as the necessity of public control. According to
government expectations, such a necessity would arise in
instances:-
(a) when the assets in private hands threaten the security
or undermine the integrity of the nation; or
(b) when productive resources are being wasted; or
(c) when the operation of an industry by private concerns
has a serious detrimental effect on the public interest. 13
Should such a measure become necessary, the 1965 policy
statement made it clear that it would apply to both Africans
and non-Africans owning productive resources in any industry
involved. 14
 The commitment to non-nationalisation of private
enterprise has been strictly adhered to by the government
since independence. The incidences of outright nationalisa-
tion have been few.
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In 1964, the government nationalised the then Kenya
Broadcasting Corporation. This was to be the only case
involving 100% outright nationalisation of a private
business operation. In April 1970, the government purchased
51% of the shares of the East African Power and Lighting
Company. Later it purchased the rest of the shares with
the exception of a few belonging to 83 shareholders who
refused to sell out and their shares were transferred from
London to the Nairobi register. In 1970, the government
purchased 60% of the shares of 78 domestic branches of the
then National and Grindlays Bank Ltd. 15
 Following this
purchase a new corporation was created known as Grindlays
International in which the government held 40% of equity
with National and Grindlays holding 60%. This net corpo-
ration was formed out of the three remaining branches of
National and Grindlays and was to engage essentially in
international banking and related services conducted by
National and Grindlays. In 1971, the government purchased
50% of the shares in the Mombasa Oil Refinery. In each of
these cases, handsome compensation was paid to the expro-
priated owners. 16
 In most other cases in which the govern-
ment took over shares in private business, it did so because
it was invited by the enterprises in order to provide funds
or to save an enterprise from liquidation. 17
 In new
investment projects, particularly those involving foreign
investors, the government has been steadily increasing its
participation. This increased public ownership of productive
resources is, however, not aimed at displacing private
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enterprise. Its objective is primarily to attract foreign
capital into the country. It is worthwhile noting here
that these enterprises do not exactly fall into the category
covered by the government's explicit criteria for nationali-
sation outlined above.
POLICY ON PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
"It is the policy of the Government to welcome private 
foreign investment:" 18
Private foreign investment constitute a substantial
proportion of total private investment in Kenya.	 It
occupies a dominant position in large scale industries that
rely on relatively advanced technology. At independence in
1963, there was a general feeling of insecurity in private
foreign investment circles. They were not sure whether or
not the government of independent Kenya would really welcome
or adopt a hostile attitude towards them. The government
wasted no time in assuring them a warm welcome and a bright
future. It declared the prime need of the country to be
rapid economic growth in which private foreign investment
would play a key role. It expected such investment "to be
a growing sector rather than a shrinking one". 19 Indeed,
as Kenya expanded its industrial sector after independence,
its reliance on private foreign investment increased. This
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reliance is reflected in the role assigned to such invest-
ment in national economic development. For example,
private foreign investment was expected to contribute 52%
of the foreign exchange requirements for financing the
1970-74 five year development plan. 20
 In the 1974-78 plan
it was expected to contribute over 10% of the country's
entire capital formation. 21 In manufacturing, over 50%
of expected new investment for 1967-73 was in eight projects
all managed and controlled by foreign firms. 22 Table 4
shows the estimated book value of private foreign invest-
ment in 1972, the latest year for which such tabulated
statistic is available to the author.
The heavy presence of foreign firms in Kenya is not
restricted to the industrial sector alone. It is also a
significant feature in the tertiary and primary sectors
of the economy. In banking for example, Barclays and the
Standard Bank, both foreign-owned, together handled over
50% of banking business in 1977. 23 In agriculture, the
mainstay of Kenya's economy, foreign capital is still
present though notas dominant as it was at independence.
It has coffee,tea, pineapple	 etc. estates and processes
agricultural products. It also dominates in the supply of
agricultural inputs. The three main inputs in agriculture -
fertilizers, agricultural chemicals and fuel, are all
supplied almost exclusively by subsidiaries of foreign
firms. These three inputs alone accounted for 55.8% of all
material inputs into agriculture in 1972. 24
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Table 4 Estimated Book Value of Foreign
Investment in Kenya in 1972
Country	 Kim.	 % of Total .
UK	 87	 67
USA	 26	 20
Germany	 6	 5
France	 5	 4
Japan	 1	 2
Total
	
130	 100
Source: S. Langdon, 1976 p.136
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The prominence of foreign firms in such major sectors of
the Kenya economy is in response to Kenya's open door policy
towards foreign investment. It has been the policy of the
government to encourage foreign investors to set up busi-
ness in Kenya. The attraction of foreign investment is
seen as an essential factor in the country's economic
development. For example, the 1970-74 Development Plan
emphasised the need to attract more private foreign invest-
ment than the country had done so far.
... the success of the plan will also depend
in part also on the ability of the country
to attract private overseas capital ... so
as to cover the remaining balance of payments
gap. Overseas investment in the private sec-
tor must be significantly higher in the next
5 years than it has been in the past 5 years. 25
The 1979-83 plan promises foreign investors that
... Government will continue to maintain that
open door policy to foreign capital. Foreign
investment will be encouraged particularly in
priority industries....2b
The Vice President and Minister for Finance recently assured
firms that
... Kenya would continue to be a haven for
foreign investment...27
He summarised the government's past and present strategy for
industrial development as having
... been based primarily on import subs-
titution and on the need to attract
foreign capital and technology 	 28
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In the 1979-83 Development Plan, the government outlines
its industrial development policy. 29 It comprises of
three industrial policies one of which is stated thus
7.24 Encouragement of Foreign Investment 
As in the past, the Government will
continue to welcome foreign invest-
ment and to provide adequate measures
to safeguard such investments.30
It is clear that encouragement of private foreign invest-
ment has been and continues to be a significant factor in
the formulation of the government's economic policies.
This desire to attract foreign investments promoted the
government to formulate legal safeguards for private foreign
investment in addition to those contained in the constitution.
C	 SAFEGUARDING THE INTERESTS OF PFI 
Foreign inveztors are usually concerned with three
major aspects of host countries' investment policy. Viz.
the potential for making adequate or even excessive profits;
expropriation of private and in particular, foreign invest-
ment; and the limitation placed on repatriation of funds
abroad. Kenya has provided adequate opportunity and poten-
tial for profit making through its economic policies as
well as adequate legal safeguards against non-economic
risks to private foreign investors. It is to a consideration
of these that I now turn.
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(1) Potential for making adequate profit
A primary objective of private foreign investment is
to make adequate profit from their operations. Unless they
have the chance of making profits, no amount of legal or
other safeguards would induce them to venture into the
country. The profitability of any economic operation depends
on various factors which include its productivity, marketing
skill, available effective demand for its products, the level
of taxation, the degree of competition etc. All these and
many others can be affected by government economic policies.
Since independence, the government has pursued three major
incentive policies that have so far ensured foreign investors
good chances of making profit. The first is the creation of
a general environment conducive to profit earning by private
investors be they local or foreign. The second is to give
all investors in similar circumstances standard incentives.
These include a 20% investment allowance plus depreciation
allowances given to all investors, local or foreign, under
the provisions of the Income Tax Act, 31
 a 20% export com-
pensation for certain specified exports given under the
Local Manufacture Export Compensation Act. 32 These reduce the
cost of production in the case of the investment allowances
and operate as subsidies in the case of the export compen-
sation scheme.
The third and perhaps the most important policy to foreign
investment is the tendency by the government to provide
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certain valued privileges to individual firms. These pri-
vileges may involve protective measures and or exemptions
from certain statutory obligations. The key factor about
these privileges is that they are granted by the government
on an individual basis following individual negotiations.
This means that it is up to the individual investor to
negotiate for privileges he feels are to his best advantage
witha view to maximising his profits. These privileges are
incorporated in agreements with the foreign investors as
terms of contracts. The following are some of the privi-
leges that have been obtained from the government by various
foreign investors through such negotiations.
- duty-free imports of machinery, industrial
inputs etc.
- exclusive licence to produce certain products for
a period ranging from seven to twenty five years.
- exemption from price controls.
- sole manufacturing and/or importing rights.
- exclusive rights to supply all government's
departments.
- provision of essential infrastructure at no cost.
- permission for extensive use of expatriate
personnel.
- exclusive management and technical services
supply.
- Operation	 of external accounts.
To the foreign investor, this individual approach
means that he can insist on being granted the privileges
that suit his objectives and strategies best. For example,
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to one who has a good opportunity of engagino in transfer-pricinn,
an exemption from import-duties, an exclusive right to supply
machinery and services, and an exclusive export marketing right,
would immensely improve his chances of making excessive (undeclared)
profits through transfer-accounting. Thus a foreign investor's ability
to bargain for concessions may determine his potential for making
profits - declared and hidden. There is also the added advantage that
should any privileges obtained not prove sufficient to guarantee
adequate profits, the foreign investor can always go back to the
government and negotiate for more privileges. These may be entirely
new ones or improvements on existing ones.	 Thus the textile
industry, for example, led by a leading firm has been able to obtain
both new and improved privileges from the government. When such a
_
system is in operation and the government itself admitting to being too
eager to grant concessions to foreign investors,
33
 the prospects for
making handsome profits could hardly be better assured. Recent government
rhetoric contained in both the 1979-83 Plan and Sessional Paper No. 4 of
1980 suggests that the government intends to do away with the case by
case approach. However, this strategic policy shift appears, as far as
the author is aware and as of December 1981, not to have been
implemented.
(2) Legal Safeguards Against Non-economic Risks
Legal provisions for the protection of foreign investment,
although by themselves not very useful unless backed by government
willingness and ability to adhere to them, are usually a good index of
government attitude towards such investment. It is primarily to
demonstrate their welcime for foreign investment that many host countries
have enacted laws intended to protect such investors.34
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Private foreign investors are not only concerned with the
existence of laws guaranteeing them the inviolability of
their property rights, but also with laws that govern the
regulation of business operations in general. Such laws
include, for example, customs laws, industrial licensing
laws etc. In Kenya, however, the application of such
business regulation laws is at the discretion of the govern-
ment which has proved itself willing to grant exemption on an
individual basis.
There are three main legal instruments that guarantee
the rights and interest of private enterprise to operate
its business without undue government interventions. First,
there is The Constitution35 which guarantees the principle
of inviolability of private property. This covers both
domestic and foreign capital. Second, there is the Foreign 
Investment Protection Act 36 which deals specifically with
foreign investments.	 Finally, there exists a regime of
bilateral investment guaranty treaties between Kenya and
capital exporting countries. These too deal exclusively
with foreign investment. In the discussion of these three
regimes of legal protection, I consider the guarantee they
offer in matters concerning expropriation and repatriation
of funds abroad. These are the two main components of
non-economic risks faced by foreign investment.
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(i) The Constitution 
In the late 1950s,two important political facts became
clear to the foreign community in Kenya and the British
colonial regime. The first was that the people of Kenya,
even after the murder by the British of their leading
freedom fighter, 37 would never settle for anything less
than full political independence from British colonialism.
The second was that the British military machine would not
hold out for ever against the peoples' assault on this
bastion of the colonial power. Having realised that po-
litical independence was imminent, the foreign community
was gripped by fear that an independent Kenya Government
would expropriate their property, most of which they had
expropriated	 from the native peoples of Kenya anyway.
The colonial government which had presided over and provided
the firepower for the robbery, euphemistically referred to
as alienation, from the native people .of their rights and
interest38 over th country's natural resources also shared
the foreign community's fears. Its response to this fear
was the inclusion, in the country's independence consti-
tution, 39 of an extensive chapter on fundamental rights.
This chapter is a manifestation of both the settler
individualistic philosophy that dominated Kenya politics
in the colonial era 40 and the fearsabouttheir future in
Kenya. Commenting on these fears, Professor S. A. De Smith
observed that
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... the acute anxiety that many members of
the European community ... feel for their
future in Kenya is reflected in the unusual
tightness and scope of the constitutional
provisions in that country.41
The end result, as far as private property is concerned,
was a constitutional guarantee of the sanctity of private
property with few very stringent exceptions. It is ironical
that the colonial power should have insisted on such legal
guarantees when her 70 odd years rule over the country was
based on the denial of even the most basic of human rights
to the non-European peoples of Kenya. 42
The Constitution declares one of the fundamental rights
every person is entitled to as being
... protection ... from deprivation of
property without compensation.43
The section "refers to every person in Kenya" and the term
'person' includes any body of persons, corporate or unincor-
porate. 44 This would seem to grant equal protection against
expropriation without compensation to all property owners
including non-citizens. It is important to note that the
Constitution refers to 'deprivation of property without
compensation'. It is, therefore, not an absolute guarantee
against expropriation although it provides an absolute
guarantee (legally) of compensation. It would appear that
its drafters envisaged the possibilities of situations where
retention of some private property cannot or would not be
guaranteed. The substantive section on this subject narrowly
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circumscribes such situations 45 and the government has
been very wary of using the exceptions to the rule that
encroach on, albeit legally, the sanctity of private
property.
Section 75 (1) of the Constitution makes expropriation
of private property conditional upon the fulfilment of three
mandatory requirements. First, the expropriation must be
necessary in the interest of one or more factors such as
defence, public safety, public morality, public health etc.
or the development or utilisation of any property in such
manner as to promote the public benefit. Second, the neces-
sity of such an expropriation should be such as to afford
reasonable justification for the causing of any hardship
that may result to any person having an interest in or over
the property. Third, provision must be made by the law
authorising an expropriation for the prompt payment of full
compensation. These three conditions are cumulative. 	 In
addition, the section provides two other safeguards to the
owners of expropriated property. It prohibits any barring
of
... any person who is entitled to compensa-
tion ... from remitting within a reasonable
time after he has received any payment of
that compensation ... to any country of his
choice. 4b
Such remission has to be allowed free from any deduction,
charge or tax made or levied in respect of its remission.
This provision is of great interest to foreign investors for
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it in effect requires any compensation to be effective
by virtue of being made repatriable. If it has to be
repatriable, it must, therefore, be in convertible
currency. Finally, the constitution grants the owner of
expropriated property a right of direct access to the High
Court. The High Court is empowered to determine such
person's interests or rights, the legality of the taking
of possession or acquisition of the same and the amount
of compensation payable. Such access is also available to
obtain prompt payment of agreed compensation.
On the face of it these provisions would seem to
confer adequate protection to owners of private property.
However, on closer examination of the provisions, the
protection by them appears to be, at best, uncertain until
tested in the courts. The protection they afford would
depend, to a large extent, on statutory interpretation of
some vague terms such as 'public benefit', 'reasonable
justification' I necessary' etc. The term 'public benefit',
for example, would appear to be sufficiently wide to cover
a wide variety of expropriations. Would it not be to the
'public benefit', for instance, if the government expro-
priates land belonging to a private company for distribution
to landless masses in order to forestall social and political
upheavals? Would it not be to the 'public benefit' to
expropriate a foreign company in order to save or even earn
foreign exchange and/or to earn revenue with which to provide
basic services such as health facilities to the public?
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The author would readily argue that it would be unreasonable
and illogical for any court to hold that a measure that
benefits the public financially, materially or even one
that provides intangible benefits is not to the public
benefit.
In relation to foreign investment in particular, it
is arguable that the attainment of the government's stated
objective of attaining economic independence 47 is in the
public interest and therefore a public benefit. Any argu-
ment to the contrary would, it is submitted, find it hard
going proving that foreign economic domination of a nation
is in its own interest. Such issues will have to await
determination by the courts in Kenya should they ever arise.
In the only case brought and determined under the
provision of S.75 of the Constitution since independence, 48
none of these issues arose for consideration. However,
Chanan Singh, J. while outlining the provisions of
S.75 (1) observed that
... No special attempt has been made to
show that acquisition was for development
or utilisation for "public benefit" but it
seems to be accepted that the acquisition
of land for the purpose of settling squat-
ters on it would be for public benefit.49
This appears to be a reasonable interpretation and
one that may have wide support among the mass of landless
Kenyans.
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(ii) The Foreign Investment Protection Act (FIPA)
This Act was enacted in 1964 "to give protection to
certain approved foreign investments". 50 It is the only
legislation, in the history of independent Kenya, aimed
exclusively at foreign investment. Its enactment was
prompted by two main factors. The first of these factors
was the need to improve "the climate of confidence so
necessary to attract new private capital". 51 The uncer-
tainties prevailing in the private sector at independence
had led to a fall in the flow of private foreign investment
and an increase in the outflow of capital. Table5
shows the trend in the balance of payments over the years
1957- 1968. The government was anxious to assure foreign
investors that their investment was not in jeopardy and
therefore improve their confidence. The primary method it
chose was the enactment of FIPA. Its aims were to attract
more foreign capital and to reduce the level of capital
outflow from the country. The second of the factors that
led to the enactment of FIPA was the pressure from the
World Bank for the government to manifest its policy of
welcoming foreign investors. The Bank's mission to Kenya
in 1962 had emphasised that
... It is clearly to the benefit of Kenya
that foreign investment should be encouraged
in the future and the mission considers that
demonstration of a favourable attitude on
the part of the independent Government of
Kenya towards overseas capital would be an
appropriate and necessary measure to attract
funds .52
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Table 5 Net Inflows of Long-term Capital 	 and
Net Outflows of Investment Income 1957-68
Net inflow
of capital
Net outflow
of income
Retained earnings
after tax, foreign
investment
KE'000
Total
net
inflow
1957 1,119 5,360 - -4,241
1958 650 5,450 _ -4,800
1959 375 7,016 - -6,641
1960 5,642 7,283 _ -1,821
1961 -5,133 5,341 _ -10,474
1962 -2,696 4,845 _ -7,541
1963 9,800 9,843 3,514 -43
1964 10,800 8,665 3,546 2,135
1965 8,800 8,731 3,019 69
1966 2,100 8,750 2,800 -6,650
1967 4,100 9,170 4,400 -5,070
1968 9,000 9,590 5,000 -590
Source: Lal, 1975, P.183
Notes: (a) net increase in long-term liabilities (represented
by equity capital, loan and debenture capital,
and retained profits after tax)
(b) net outflows of dividends and interest, and
retained earnings after tax.
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The mission felt that Kenya would continue to depend on
external assistance for some time after independence and,
therefore, strongly recommended that the Government issue
a clear statement of policy towards private investment.
It suggested that
... This might include reassurances about
interference by the state with private
undertakings. External investors will be
concerned about freedom to transfer ear-
nings and repatriate original capital. 53
It is possible too that the British government which was
to supply most of the overseas aid to Kenya may have
put some pressure on the Kenyan government to follow the
World Bank Mission's recommendations. At that time,
the major foreign investment projects in the country were
almost entirely British. The Act offers assurances to
foreign investors in matters concerning repatriation of
fund and expropriation of property.
Under the Act, a foreign national who proposes to
invest foreign assets in Kenya may apply to the MinistPr
for Finance for a certificate declaring the enterprise in
which the assets are proposed to be invested, or have been
invested, an approved enterprise. 54 The issuance of the
certificate, referred to in the Act as Certificate of
Approved Enterprise (CAE), depends upon the discretion of
the Minister. Before exercising his discretion in favour
of granting the CAE, the Minister has to satisfy himself
that the enterprise would further the economic development
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of Kenya or would be to the benefit of Kenya. 55 In
considering an application for a CAE, he consults one
or more of five specified ministries depending on the
type of project involved. 56 The term "economic benefit"
has been interpreted to mean any investment that would
- Lead either to an earning or saving of foreign
exchange;
- result in a gain of technical and skills to
the country;
- result in an increasing in the economic wealth
and the social stability of the country by
raising the national income or promoting the
diversification of the economy.57
If a foreign investor's project meets these conditions, the
CAE issued to him brings him under the provisions of FIPA.
A CAE entitles its holders to two types of protection
afforded by the Act in relation to repatriation of funds
and expropriation of capital. The Act guarantees a holder
of CAE permission to transfer out of Kenya, in approved
foreign currency and at the official exchange rate, the
following:
(a) The profits, after taxation, arising from or out of
his investment of foreign assets
(b) The capital specified in the CAE or representing and
being deemed to be the fixed amount of the equity of
its holder in the enterprise for the purposes of
the Act: and
(c) The principal and interest of any loan specified in CAE58
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Prior to 1976, it was not clear whether or not capital gains
were profits for the purposes of the Act. The Capital
Issues Committee, which approves such transfers, had treated
them as as qualifying for repatriation under S.7 (a) in
certain cases and refused to allow this in others. How-
ever, the Act was amended and now capital gains are deemed
not to be profits arising from or out of the investment for
the purpose of the Act. 59 They are therefore not remittable
as of right. Their remission schedule has to be negotiated
for with the Central Bank. This amendment was aimed at
conserving foreign exchange by limiting remission of funds
arising from speculative dealings on the stock exchange, and
also to encourage re-investment of such capital gains. The
Central Bank argued that this was consistent with the origi-
nal guarantees offered by FIPA on repatriation of funds.
The freedom to transfer funds abroad granted under
the Act is available to holders of CAE "notwithstanding the
provisions of any other law for the time being in force". 60
This is no doubt with reference to the Exchange Control Act 61
which imposes some strict restrictions on the remission
of funds abroad. However, all dealings in foreign currency
are subject to approval and supervision by the exchange
control authorities.
The protection against compulsory acquisition is a
re-iteration of S.75 of the Constitution the Act simply
providing that
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No approved enterprise or any property
belonging thereto shall be compulsorily
taken except in accordance with the pro-
visions of the Constitution.62
S.75 of the Constitution is incorporated into the Act as
a schedule thereto.
The government considers FIFA as "the major instrument
for the protection of foreign investment in Kenya". 63 So
too do the foreign investors interviewed by the author and
also some major financial institutions. 64 Clearly the Act
provides some very vital freedom in repatriation of funds
which the constitution is silent about. As of today, it
symbolises the very favourable investment policy on foreign
investment that has prevailed in Kenya since independence. 65
(iii) Investment guaranty agreements 
In addition to the protection offered to foreign
investors under national law i.e. the Constitution and FIFA,
the Kenya government has entered into several bilateral
treaties with capital exporting countries 66 aimed at
further reassuring foreign investment. These treaties
deal with matters such as standard of treatment, guarantees
on property rights, currency restrictions, settlement of
disputes etc. Under the terms of such treaties the capital
exporting country acquires a right to guarantee any invest-
ment by its nationals in Kenya provided such investment has
been approved by the Kenya government. The effect of such
treaties is to impose treaty obligations on the host country
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undertaking to abide by the terms of the treaty in its
treatment of investments covered by any guarantee by the
capital exporting country. The USA/Kenya treaty, for example,
provides that
The Government of the US shall not guaranty
any investment in Kenya unless the Govern-
ment of Kenya approves the activity to which
the investment relates and recognises that
the Government of the US may guaranty such
investment. 67
Once Kenya has issued an investor with a CAE, he receives
a certificate for presentation to his own government for
purposes of obtaining a guarantee from that government in
accordance with the treaty provisions. 68 Kenya is then
bound to recognise the rights of that other state (against
her) as guarantor to the investment. The treaties give
full subrogation rights to the guarantor to the claim of
the foreign investor against the Kenyan government once he
has fulfilled his guarantee obligations. The subrogation
clause in the West Germany/Kenya treaty, for example
provides that
If either contracting party makes payment
to any of its nationals or companies under
guarantee it has assumed in respect of an
investment in the territory of the other
contracting party, the latter contracting
,party shall ... recognise the assignment,
whether under a law or pursuant to a legal
transaction, of any right or claim from
such national or company to the former
contracting party as well as the subrogation
of that ... party to any such right or claim,
which that ... party shall be entitled to
assert to the same extent as its predecessor.69
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Notice the deceptive expression of mutual obligations
as if the flow of investment were into and from both
countries.
The treaties also provide for national treatment of
the investors of the signatories within their boundaries. 70
However, the Kenya Government has reserved the right to
depart from its obligation to accord national treatment to
the other party's investors where this is necessary to
correct historical imbalances caused by the colonial regime's
discriminatory economic policies against Kenyan native
nationals. 71 They also provide for protection against
expropriation. Usually it is stipulated that the investments
by nationals of either party are not to be expropriated ex-
cept for public benefit and then only with adequatelprompt
and effective compensation. The terms usually repeat the
guarantees in the Constitution discussed earlier in this
chapter. 72 In effect, where such treaties exist, the pro-
tection offered to foreign investors is governed not only
by national laws but also by the treaties.
The protection offered by such treaties may be of
some vital importance in case of a change in national
laws. Both the Constitution of Kenya and FIPA can be
amended by the government with ease should it want to do so. '3
Thus the protection offered by national law is to a large extent
at the discretion of the government. Its treaty obligations,
on the other hand, are not as easy to shake off without some
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form of repercussions. 74 Again these treaties confer
rights vis - a - vis the Kenya government from which it
cannot easily withdraw while the constitutional guaran-
tees may be regarded as privileges to foreign nationals
that could rightly be withdrawn. Indeed, it is possible
that the government holds such a view. While discussing
the government's policy on Kenyanisation, the 1970-74
plan seems to take the view that while constitutional
guarantees are a right to citizens, they are privileges to
non-citizens. Thus it states
The Constitution of Kenya guarantees equal
rights to all citizens and the KANU Manifesto
states that citizens will have the right to
follow the profession and trade of their
choosing and to own property .. When these 
same perquisites are extended to non-citi-
zens, however, they become privileges and
not rights. The government may grant privi-
leges to non-citizens, but always with the 
understanding that they may be withdrawn 
should it be found necessary or useful in
terms of national interest.75
When the host government appears to hold such views, pro-
tection given by means that are in its exclusive discretion
to change may not be said to be founded on very solid ground.
The treaties provide an important procedural advan-
tage to foreign investors covered by them in matters
concerning compensation. It is a settled rule of inter-
national law that - a state may not take up a claim on behalf
of its national against a foreign state, unless that national
has exhausted all local remedies available to him under the
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municipal law of that foreign state. 76 Under these
treaties, a foreign investor does not have to fulfil this
procedural requirement as all he has to do is to recover
indemnity against his government or its agent for his
losses under the term of the guarantee. There is no pro-
vision in the treaties requiring the foreign government
to exhaust local remedies. Once the guarantor government
has made good the loss of the insured private investor, it
then steps into his shoes and claims reparation for any
damages in its own right on a government basis. 77 Also,
the effectiveness of any remedy available through the inves-
tor's municipal courts may be severely limited by the defence
of sovereign immunity78 or the act of state doctrine. Thus
in Banco Nacional de Cuba v Sabbatino 79 the US Supreme Court
held that in the absence of a treaty or other agreement,
American courts would not question the taking of property
within its own territory by a sovereign government
recognised by the U.S.
POLICY ON THE CONTROL AND REGULATION OF PRIVATE
FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
Although the government actively encourages private
enterprise, both domestic and foreign owned, it has never-
theless reserved the right to regulate the nation's economic
activities. Thus the 1966-70 plan declares that
77
The plan envisages that various forms of
ownership will be permitted and encouraged
but in all cases the state retains the 
right to plan and conLrol the uses of 
resources and to limit the excessive accu-
mulation of wealth. Indeed, the planning
and control of resource use are the prin-
cipal tools for managing the nation's
economy. 80
The 1974-78 Plan restates this 	 position and gives an
indication of the possible form such controls may take. It
states that
The ultimate power to guide and control the
use of all resources is declared to belong
to the state. The range of control is wide
and can take either direct or indirect
form .. Even when ownership is entirely 
private, some Government controls or inter-
vention may be appropriate.81
Private foreign investment, being part of the economy is
clearly subject to the government's powers of control
and regulation. The question is what approach the govern-
ment takes in the regulation of foreign investment. Here
I am concerned with broad policies and not specific measures
in response to particular incidents. On the whole, the
government has rejected the idea of formulating a compr-
hensive system of legislation on the regulation of foreign
investment sebLing out terms and conditions for operating
such investment in the country. It has chosen to try and
accommodate foreign investment within the framework of the
nation's private enterprise. Its attitude towai-ds this is
that
There are ... no rigid or doctrinaire views
for ... the degree of Government control
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that ought to be exercised on private enter-
prise. The approach being followed is both
flexible and pragmatic.82
There are three main approaches that the government has
adopted in what it sees as its 'flexible and pragmatic'
regulation of foreign investment. Viz
(i) an ad hoc system of project approval prior to their
establishment;
(ii) A Kenyanization process; and
(iii) Financial and fiscal regulation.
These approaches are considered in detail in the next three
chapters and, therefore, I need not say any more about
them here.
E	 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have discussed private foreign
investment within the overall framework of private enter-
prise in general. This approach has been necessitated by
the fact that government policy on foreign investment has
developed from that on private enterprise. The encourage-
ment of private foreign investment has become imperative
because the government had ruled out public ownership as
the only basis of economic development. Having chosen to
rely, rather heavily, on private enterprise to achieve
the targets set out in its development plans, the govern-
ment had little choice but to allow in and even actively
attract private foreign investment.
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There simply was not enough domestic private capital to
help attain the ambitious goals set for economic growth.
Encouraging private foreign investors to set up
businesses in the country has been a prime object of govern-
ment economic policy. To achieve the objective of attracting
more private foreign capital into the country, the government
has adopted an open door policy towards such investment.
This policy has entailed the granting of vital privileges
to foreign investors on an individual basis and the provision
of rather favourable legal machinery for the protection of
such investments. The government has been very liberal in
its dealings with foreign capita1.83
This chapter has outlined the major legal protection
offered to foreign investors. It has argued that protection
against economic risks has been achieved through the ad hoc 
individual treatment and that the legal protection machinery
is aimed primarily at what are generally referred to as
political risks. It has been shown that the Constitution, 
FIFA and bilateral treaties with capital exporting countries
may possibly have certain shortcomings owing to possible
difficulties in the interpretation of certain terms. In
addition, the government may change the relevant legislation
at its discretion. 84 All this would seem to suggest that
the guarantees offered by these national legislations may
not be watertight. While this may be so from a legal point
of view, it has not been so in reality. The existence of
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foreign investment in the last eighteen years and its
increase over the period would seem to suggest that foreign
investment is satisfied with these guarantees. Even more
important, to take advantage of the loopholes afforded by
the laws involved, the government would have first to
discard its policy of attracting foreign investment. As
long as the government is committed to attracting foreign
investment and to a non-nationalization policy, there is
little likelihood that it would take advantage of any
available legal loopholes if such a move would alarm
foreign investors.
The government recognises the need to regulate private
enterprise both domestic and foreign. With regard to foreign
investment, this regulation must take into account the need
to achieve the government's stated objective of economic
independence on the one hand and that of attracting suppo-
sedly needed foreign investment. As the government is fully
committed to an economy in which private enterprise plays
a major role, then the objective of economic independence
must of necessity mean independence from foreign domination.
It has been stated that
The heavy dependence of development in Kenya
on sources of foreign capital is a matter of
legitimate concern.85
It would thus be naive for the government not to take into
account this concern in the formulation of its regulatory
policies. How the government has Sought to regulate the
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activities of private foreign investment within the scope
of its stated policy of encouraging such investment is the
subject of consideration in the following three chapters.
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CHAPTER THREE
REGULATION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
The regulation of the establishment of foreign
investment in Kenya does not lend itself to easy
examination or classification. Anyone looking for legis-
lation that specifically applimto the establishment of
such enterprises in the country is bound to be struck
by its scarcity. The basic business legislation in the
country such as the Companies Act, the Banking Act 1 etc.
do not apply to the establishment of any specific type of
enterprise, domestic or foreign, but to the establishment
of enterprises in general. Even where they deal specifi-
cally with foreign enterprises it is in the form of formal
or procedural details e.g. the definition of a foreign
company. 2
 Such formal regulation usually applies only in
situations where a foreign enterprise enters Kenya and
-
establishes an entity in the form of a company or a
place of business. 3
 This chapter is not concerned with
such formal requirements, but with regulations that deal
with substantive aspects of foreign investment. Such
regulation may define the areas - sectoral and/or geo-
graphical - in which such investment should establish as
well as laying down the terms and conditions for admitting
the investment. The tern and conditions laid down for any
particular investment should (in theory) largely depend
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on and reflect the government's economic development
policy and the specific objectives of the particular
project in question.
It was not easy to differentiate	 merely
administrative from regulatory machinery. 	 The
machinery selected from the myriads of bureaucratic
procedures was that which	 the author felt had potential
or actual regulatory effect or was likely to be a founda-
tion for any regulation contemplated by the government.
Two main stages of the regulation of the establishment of
foreign investment in Kenya are discussed in this chapter.
These are the project (or proposal) evaluation and the
negotiation stages. Before proceeding to the discussion
of each of these stages, it is important to point out that
the establishment of foreign investment in the country is
considered by the authorities on a case.by
 case basis. There is
no rigid system of apriori 'dos and don'ts' that have been
laid down by the government as conditions for admitting
them into the country. Virtually every aspect involved
in the participation by foreign investors in economic
activities is negotiable on a case by case basis. The
hallmark of the entry regulation system is its ad hoc 
and discretionary characteristics arising from the case
by case approach. As stated earlier, recent government rhetoric
suggesting an abandonment of such an approach has yet to be
translated into practice.
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A : PROJECT EVALUATION
1. The Machinery
Prior to 1968, no institutional machinery existed for
the evaluation of project proposals submitted by foreign
investors. Such proposals received little, if any,
scrutiny from the government. In that year, the government
created an ad hoc interministerial committee to evaluate
such proposals and negotiate with the investor. This
committee is known as the New Projects Committee (NPC).
It is composed of representatives from Treasury, Industry
and the ministry under whose jurisdiction a proposed
project falls. If any of the parastatal bodies is expec-
ted to participate in a project, then it is represented in
the committee. Little is said or published about the
activities of the NPC. In the 1974-78 Development Plan,
it was envisaged that it would be
the main technical organ through which the
Government will administer legislation to
regulate the establishment of industrial
capacity.5
In view of this enhanced role, the NPC was to be given
legal status. 6 However, the proposed legislation to
require firms to obtain government approval to increase
capacity for manufacturi 7ng
 was never enacted and NPCts
status remained unchanged. It remained an ad hoc
committee with neither any clear mandate nor legislation
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to enforce or implement. The 1974/75 Plan Implementation
Report of the Treasury reported that:
Enactment of legislation to control
productive capacity has not been under-
taken. The New Projects Committee does
not provide an adequate mechanism for
controlling new investments.8
Despite the admission of the inadequacy of the existing
machinery, nothing has been done about it so far.
The role of the NPC as an evaluation and negotiation
body seems to be enhanced in the latest plan which states
that:
The New Projects Committee will co-
ordinate the evaluation of all industrial
projects. The establishment of new pro-
jects as well as the importation of machinery
and equipment will be undertaken only on the
recommendation of this committee. The New
Projects Committee will be gazetted as the
agency to approve all new projects. Projects
not approved by the New Projects Committee
will not be provided the Approved Enterprise
Status under The Foreign Investment Protection,
nor will they be entitled to any concessions
or investment allowance.9
If this had happened the NPC would have acquired a legal
status vesting it with the authority to vet foreign invest-
ment. However, as in the case of the changes envisaged in
the previous plan, nothing has come out of the current
plan and there is little chance of anything materializing.
The approval of non-industrial projects is ultimately the
responsibility of the Treasury. 10
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In addition to the NPC the government set up, in
1971, an Industrial Survey and Promotion Centre (ISPC),
under the then Ministry of Commerce and Industry whose role
includes "evaluation of project studies prepared by the
private sector". 11 However, owing to severe budgetary
and technical manpower constraints, the Centre has been
unable to fulfill this role satisfactorily. In the current
plan period - 1979/83 - the government had envisaged the
development of the Centre "into the principal instrument
for providing consultancy services in industrial develop-
ment." 12 Its proposed functions under the plan include:
- Continuous study and analysis of the manufacturing
sector in order to identify new investment
opportunities and prepare programmes to assist
in planning the development of the sector.
- Conducting regional studies to help plan for
greater geographical distribution for industries.
- Identification of areas for industrial research
and subsequent commercialization of research
results, and
- Preparation of pre-feasibility and feasibility
studies .13
It is not clear whether or not the ISPC would conduct such
studies in all proposed new projects. Should this be so
and the Centre performs its role successfully, this would
provide valuable information for use in negotiating with
foreign investors where projects have been approved.
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2. The Process 
Although the MPG has been described as a "a forum
for evaluation and approval of industrial projects," 14
 it
usually does no more than peruse
	 the investment
proposals submitted to it. Where it detects patent short-
comings in a proposal it sends back the proposal to the
applicants with instructions to correct these. Where it
finds the information in the proposal inadequate to base a
judgement on, it sends it back with a request for further
information or clarification. 15
 Sometimes when it has more
than one proposal it compares the two or more proposals
although this does not seem to have a great bearing at
times on the eventual outcome. The essential feature of
NPC's project 'evaluation' is its heavy reliance on infor-
mation and data supplied by applicants. It has little
access to any independent source of information.
Unlike the NPC, the ISPC is not an ad hoc body. It
is an established department of the Ministry of Industry
with a core of permanent technical staff. This makes it
possible for it to carry out a less superficial technical
evaluation of the proposals referred to it. This places
it in a position of being the only government source of
technical analysis of project proposals to the NPC. The
ISPC too does rely heavily on the information contained in
the proposals in its evaluation.
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Not all investment projects have gone through the
NPC. Even less are the projects that have been referred to
the ISPC. Some projects have been established by foreign
investors in Kenya without going through all the established
administrative procedures. This is a direct result of the
ad hoc and discretionary nature of the system. We shall
have more to say on this later. In practice, the evaluation
process is hardly ever separate from the negotiation process.
Since very little evaluation of any significance takes
place outside the negotiation stage, the primary role of
the NPC has been in negotiations. What evaluation that has
been noted in the projects studied will be discussed under
negotiations.
B : THE NEGOTIATIONS 
As stated earlier, the establishment of new foreign
enterprise in Kenya is considered on a case by case basis.
So also is the expansion of existing establishments where
such expansion involves injection of new capital from
abroad. The NPC is, in theory, the organ that is supposed
to conduct the negotiations and approve the projects.
However, the NPC hardly ever negotiates or evaluates projects
that involve no government participation either directly or
through one or more of several parastatal bodies. 16
 The
1979-83 Plan does, in fact, clearly recognise this
practice for it declares that foreign investors meeting
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the specified criteria 17
... and seeking no government participation
or special concessions will be free to
establish enterprises in Kenya subject to
meeting normal regulations.18
Normal regulations refer to the legal process applicable
to all entities carrying out economic operations in the
country19 as well as the formal application to the Treasury
for a CAE. This leaves the NPC to consider mainly the
projects that require special concessions or government
participation. Special concessions include tax exemptions,
duty exemptions, protection through import controls etc.
In practice, this apparent limitation is meaningless for
virtually all incoming investments require one or both
(special concessions or government participation) 7 More
often than not it is both.
Negotiations with foreign investors is carried on
simultaneously with the consideration of their applications
for CAE under FIPA. This also constitutes what is referred
to as project evaluation. In reality then the combined
processes of negotiation and evaluation are nothing more
than a consideration of the investors' applications for a
CAE and concessions from the government. Referring to the
pre - 1975 period, the government admitted that
... such projects as were submitted were
reviewed by the Government to determine
their profitability and their eligibility
for certain forms of incentive and protec-
tion.20
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The primary purpose of the reviews or negotiations was,
therefore, to consider applications as submitted and
recommend means and levels of protection to achieve
profitability acceptable to the foreign parties. They
had no interest in imposing terms of entry that would
produce results consistent with the government's stated
overall economic objectives. The government appears to have
recognised that such a micro approach to the evaluation of
new investment proposals may not necessarily be in the
interest of the national economy. It indicated that its
role in promoting new industries would undergo a signi-
ficant change and that in receiving proposed new industrial
projects
... greater attention will be given to
evaluation of projects from the standpoint
of their benefit to the national economy. 21
There is little evidence that this admirable rhetoric has
been followed in pT.actice.
Negotiation with a foreign investor is put into motion
by an application by such an investor for a CAE. Details
of the information to be provided by the applicant are
fairlycomprehensive. 22 For purposes of this study the author
considered the treatment of some of the main categories of
project details by the Kenyan evaluators and negotiators.
These categories are those that concern project description,
project sponsors, project capital cost and structure, pro-
ject profitability, marketing arrangements, machinery and
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technical processes, concessions, and other miscellaneous
aspects of projects involved. The performance of the
Kenyans in their evaluation of and negotiations over these
aspects of investment projects is considered here in the
light of the final agreements reached.
1. Project description
The manner in which a project is described in a
proposal may make the difference between its appearing as
an attractive project and its appearing unattractive to its
recipient. It is important for any project evaluator to
scrutinise the description of a project for possible
omissions	 or exaggerations in its presentation. The final
decision makers, in approving projects' have tended to rely
almost entirely on the description provided by applicants
in their proposals while ignoring the findings of the NPC,
ISPC and other independent sources where such have been
critical of some elements of proposals submitted. This
has led to the acceptance at face value of project that
have had little chance of success. Some of the projects
in which the decisions heavily depended on the description
suppliedinclude Ken-Ren Chemicals and Fertilizers Ltd.,
Kenya Chemical and Food Company Ltdan1Pan African Vegetable
Products Ltd.
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Ken-Ren was a joint venture between the Kenya govern-
ment and N-Ren Corporation, a US company to set up a
fertilizer plant in Kenya. In 1975, N-Ren submitted a
financial and technical proposal for an agrochemical
complex. The proposal was described in "brief and general
terms" and mainly concerned financial aspects of the
23project. . It glossed over vital technical issues and pain-
ted a rosy picture of the proposed project. Its description
of the benefits of the projects in terms of foreign exchange
saving was indeed an insult to the intelligence of the Kenya
negotiators. 24 In its technical description it included an
additionalstage of ammonia manufacture rather than importing
the required nitrogen. This alternative had been rejected by
all the other eight major applicants and an Italian govern-
ment mission as non-viable and therefore a non-starter. 25
N-Ren also omitted in its proposals any consideration of
the problems and costs related to the substantial amount of
effluEnt - 15 tons ger day of fertilizer dust alone - plus
other noxious stuff. 26 The ISPC felt that the technical
evaluation of the N-Ren proposal as described
... depends therefore to a large extent on
obtaining confirmation of the performance
of such small PFP ammonia plants, parti-
cularly in developing countries.27
No such confirmation ever materialised and the proposal
therefore was to stand or fall on the basis of its own des-
cription that left a lot to be desired. It stood as it was
for powerful forces in the Kenyan bereaucracy were only
too willing to accept the project as described.
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The KCFC Ltd. is a joint venture between the
government and four foreign companies, two of which are
subsidiaries of a Kenya resident magnate.	 The four
foreign companies are the sponsors of the project with the
government a holder of 51% of equity. In 1976, the
magnate, through
	
the so-called foreign sponsors,
submitted to the government a proposal for the establish-
ment of a molasses utilization complex in Kenya. With the
proposal he submitted a feasibility study of the same and
details of the proposed arrangements for the management of
the project. 28 The government, at the decision-making level,
accepted all these without question and committed huge
amounts of funds to the project. In the description of the
project, the very vital issue of raw materials was glossed
over and given little prominence, but leaving the government
with the contractual obligation of seeing to it that the
supply of raw materials was available. In the end the
agreement provided that:
GOK undertakes to arrange the supply to the
company of adequate supplies of molasses at
reasonable prices and all other local supp-
lies necessary for the company's business.29
The government thus was committed to virtually guaranteeing
the supply of the raw materials without ever being given a
detailed description of the raw materials significance in
the project. Although the project is still being construc-
ted, the issue of raw materials is still unsettled and it
appears that there may not be enough of thern •30 Also related
to the raw material issue, the proposal envisaged the supply
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of molasses at 160/= per ton at a time when Kenya molasses
sold on the export market for 600/= per ton. 31 Although in
this case the proposal's description indicated that it would
notbe viable without aheavy subsidy in the price of the raw
material, the government did not pay adequate attention to
this factor. 32 Another very vital factor that was omitted
from the project description was the intended end use of
the major product - alcohol. No details of its blending
with gasoline were given although the joint venture agree-
ment stipulates that
... Further, GOK shall procure that the 
outlets of alcohol sales within Kenya to 
petroleum companies respectively (sic)
end-users shall be arranged.
The use of alcohol for blending with gasoline in Kenya will
be dependent entirely on the government enacting legislation
to compel the oil companies to blend their gasoline with
alcohol. The construction of a blending plant, its location,
its cost, the savings in foreign exchange involved (if any)
etc. was never raised. The future of the project hangs in
the balance and it may never get off the ground. 33
PVP is a joint venture between two Kenyan parastatals,
two foreign firms and an international financial institution
in a vegetable processing plant. The present company was
set up in 1972. 34 In that year a company known as INHA
International Est. (E.A.) Ltd. is said to have
101
... got interested in the project not for
any other reason than the commission they
would get for selling some equipment for
manufacturers.35
INHA was then commissioned to look for outsiders interested
in financial participation in April 1972. On 19 September
1972, they wrote to the Ministry of Agiculture apologising
for the delay in the submission of a proposal adding that:
... When all information were (sic!) put
together we found that an improvement in
the viability of the project was required
and consequently have gone back to the
suppliers and other parties in order to -
re-examine the proposal before submission.36
A committee set up in 1977 to review the running of the
project had this to say about this stated reason for the
delay in submission of a proposal:
We would like to stress the significance
of the statement by INHA that an improvement
in the viability of the project was required.
... what we read or understood from this
statement is that when they had gathered all
available information the project was not
very attractive but because they were keen
to sell to Kenya a project that was only 
viable on paper they had to re-examine their 
figures, cook some of them where necessary,
omit information as required just to make the 
project look viable.37
It is significant that this observation was made in the
light of the investigation that had been carried out by
the committee. What it reveals is that the project propo-
sed by the foreign parties was only viable in its des-
cription. As it turned out, the proposal glossed over and
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misrepesented vital issues such as availability of raw
materials and	 costing. 38 Again the project was approved
as described. In 21 of the projects studies, available
information suggests that the project description by the
foreign parties involved may have been accepted without
any fundamental amandements.
2. Evaluation of Sponsors 
The Kenyan evaluation/negotiating team has displayed
some laxity in establishing the credentials of the foreign
investors who propose to establish projects in the country.
Although the Kenya government in its rhetoric insists on
-
having dealings with firms of 'international repute' 39
its attempts to establish the reputation of such firms have
left a lot to be desired. The government's view of what is
a firm of international repute appears to have nothing to
do with the appropf.iateness of any firm's establishment in
Kenya, but rather in reference to its reputed commercial
success elsewhere. In general, the NPC and the bureaucracy
have tended to take the applicants' account of their
credentials without much questioning. Even where information
that would cast a shadow over an applicant's self acclaimed
credentials is available, the Kenyans appear to have paid
little regard to such information. This lack of interest
in the credentials of foreign applicants , particularly as
to their capacity and ability to deliver the required goods
and also their motives for making the investment has had
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drastic consequences in the past. Three projects esta-
blished in Kenya in the 1970s provide telling examples.
Two of them have already been mentioned,Ken-Ren and
KCFC, and the third is Interfood (Kenya) Ltd.
In May 1974, the government advertised for tenders to
set up a fertilizer plant that would cater for domestic and
some export markets. By November of the same year a number
of proposals had been received and evaluated by the ISPC.
By the end of the year, the NPC had studied these proposals
and their evaluation reports from the 'spa and also short-
listed four of the applicants for further consideration.
Up to this stage, N-Ren Corporation had not tendered for
the project and apparently the tenders had been closed. 40
In December 1974, a representative of N-Ren International
S.A. (N-Ren's Belgium subsidiary) visited the Ministry of
Commerce and Industry. He proposed that N-Ren send a team
to prepare a proposal by end of January 1975. This it did
and the proposal was evaluated by ISPC, considered by NPC
and by April 1975, the principal agreement had been signed
and was ratified by the Ministry of Agriculture on behalf
of the Kenya government in August of the same year. Did
the Kenyan authorities 	 - really know the applicant they
had approved while totally ignoring the others? The answer
appears to be no for almost three years later, when the
project had cost the taxpayer a fortune, the government
announced that it had been conned by "Chicago conmen 11.
This was in an attempt to, itself, 'con' the public that
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The choice of N-Ren was outwardly unimpeachable. But was
the choice unimpeachable? The answer appears to be clearly,
No.
There was enough information available to cast a
doubt on the integrity and ability of N-Ren to deliver
its part of the bargain. The decision-makers involved
were, however, not concerned with establishing the creden-
tials of the applicant. They relied on N-Ren t s information
about its credentials. This was in itself very unconvin-
cing. To begin with, N-Ren provided no information on
its financial standing. The ISPC report on N-Ren's proposal
stated that:
... Reports and accounts are not yet avai-
lable to the sub-committee so that the
company's financial standing is not known.
Reserves 
	
 no information
Sales (Group) turnover 
	
 no information
Profits after tax 
	
 no information
Shareholders 	
 no information. 41
In view of this, the Centre recommended that:
In the absence of information on N-Ren, it
would be prudent to examine its reports and
accounts and to assess the company's finan-
cial standing in relation to the offer to
supply a fertilizer plant for $55.9m.42
This advise was not given the priority it deserved and at
the end of the day, it was an N-Ren whose financial standing
nobody seemed sure about that triumphed.
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In response to a request for information on N-Ren
by the Kenya government, the US Embassy in Kenya forwarded
a telegram from Washington. It appears that N-Ren had
made similar proposals to Gabon and Liberia in 1974, but
the telegram gave no more details on these. It went on to
state that:
... No significant information about N-Ren
was obtained,
except that it was established in 1973; owned 8% of
St. Pauls Ammonia Products, a public company which distri-
buted and manufactured fertilizers which 	 was affiliated
by merger since December 1973 with Miami Delta Inc. and two
other companies; that these companies 'were reportedly
producing and marketing in excess of one million tons of
nitrogen products' and; that it owned a 50% interest in a
successful operation" in Mauritius. 43
 Despite the lack of
any 'significant information' on N-Ren the telegram concluded
by stating that:
... no reason why Embassy should not
recommend GOK to give serious consideration
to N-Ren proposa1.44
On the contrary, the telegram contained very significant
information on N-Ren in the light of its claim that it
produced and marketed in excess of one million tons of
fertilizer in the US. The telegram did reveal that N-Ren
held a very minor - 8% - share of one of the firms that did this
and therefore its claim was a big exaggeration that to all
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intents and purposes amounted to a clear 'lie' on the part
of N-Ren. Also an ICDC mission to Mauritius had reported
that the project there was far behind schedule and had
suffered great losses owing to a fault in technical
designs that were a responsibility of N-Ren. The fault
appeared to have occurred not because of the complexities
of the technical work involved, but due to a simple error
in the choice of some inputs. This error, it would appear
occurred as a result of attempts by N-Ren to cut corners
thus using cast iron in place of steel in parts of the
project . 45
Meanwhile some ICDC officials who had become skeptical
of the proposal carried out some investigation on N-Ren.
The results were far from being encouraging which may account
for ICDC'c refusal to invest in the project. An ICDC
official observed that N-Ren "seem to be making a lot of
noise at present -"some say a little too much." 46 A commer-
cial contact in New York informed ICDC that N-Ren had sold
out its operating company to Bechtel Corporation and
warned that:
The question arises as to whether N-Ren
still retains adequate expertise following
the sale of its operating company to
Bechte1.47
Another contact brought information to the effect that
N-Ren's headquarters were in fact in Cincinnati, Ohio and
not in Bermuda as claimed in their proposal. As to N-Ren's
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claim that it produced small standardised packaged units
for manufacturing ammonia with capacities of about 100
tons per day, the source warned that;
Plants of this small size are not ordinarily
built in the USA except for special occasions.
We know of no such installation by N-Ren.48
It suggested that the Kenya government would do well to
obtain fron N-Ren a listing of companies where they had
built nitrogen plants and then contact these firms either
directly of through a fertilizer consultant for details as
to how buyers are satisfied with N-Ren's plant and perfor-
mance. This advice, had it been heeded, would have
probably been enough to save the country the huge losses it
incurred in the project. A foreign technical adviser to
ICDC could not find, through his contacts, any trace of
N-Ren in Senegal where it had claimed to have erected a
similar plant. He was, as he put it,
More and more surprised that our Ministry
of Agriculture jumped into this project
without even knowing who their future
partners will be.49
And that is the way it was. The government did not
really know much about N-Ren and its representatives had
displayed remarkable indifference to the necessity of
establishing the credentials of the foreign applicant.
In the case of KCFC project, which appears not to have
gone through the ISPC or the NPC, the government similarly
failed to establish the credentials of its foreign partners.
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Some of these so called 'foreign' partners are in fact a local
maanate who has incorporated companies in some offshore investment
localities. It would appear that the prime object of such a
roundabout way of investing is to repatriate funds from Kenya. To
date, all that the Kenyan partners know about one of these 'foreign'
firms is its collecting agent's address in London. The agents are
a firm of law agents. No attempt whatsoever was made at the start
of the project to establish whether or not the foreign partners were
capable of delivering their part of the bargain or who they were.
As it turned out, they just played the role of middlemen and the
-
plant is being constructed by sub-contractors. 5 ° Meanwhile project
overrun costs are running at nearly 300% with little signs of the rate
subsiding unless the project is completed, and there are doubts as to
this happening.
Interfood (Kenya) Ltd., is yet another example of the failure
of the Kenyan machinery for evaluating project proposals submitted by
foreign firms. It was a joint venture between ICDC, IDB, ADC and
Apeninn A.G., a company registered in Liechtenstein. The proposal
to establish a project to manufacture freeze dried meat and
coffee products for export to Europe had been submitted to the
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Kenya government, ICDC and IDB by an Italian national in
51
1975.	 The proposal was accepted and thus Interfood came
into being in 1977. The joint venture agreement committed
the project to enter into a technical service and management
agreement with a company known as Technopatent A.G., and
into an exclusive purchasing and marketing agreement with
a company known as Foodsimport A.G. These two companies
were also registered in Liechtenstein. At this stage,
nothing was known about Apeninn except that it had procured
the incorporation in Kenya of Interfood (K) Ltd., with a
nominal share capital of Kenya shillings 2,000/= with two
Italian nationals holding the requisite two shares as nomi-
nees for Apeninn. The Kenyan parties were then asked to
subscribe for shares in the company.
As for Technopatent A.G., Apeninn had described it
to the Kenyan shareholders as:
Apeninn's branch company that provides
know-how, engineering, chief supplier 	 ft
of management in the realization of
freeze drying turnkey projects. 52
Apeninn gave three examples of the plants it claimed
53
Technopatent had implemented "during the last three years".
Two IDB officials visited Italy in November 1976 to inspect
a plant equipped with freeze drying equipment supposedly
supplied by Technopatent. What they saw was far from any
clear proof of Technopatent's expertise.
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They saw a project in Sicily where equip-
ment for freeze drying juices was being
installed but did not visit any freeze
drying plant for meat or coffee either
being installed or operational. 54
Indeed what they saw had absolutely nothing to do with
Technopatent. 55 Even after this rather unconvincing tour,
the Kenyans signed a TS&M agreement with Technopatent in
which the latter describes itself (the agreement was drawn
by Apeninn, its parent company) thus
WHEREAS
A. The managers have considerable knowledge
and experience in planning, design,
engineering, construction, staffing and
operation of plants for the manufacture
and production of freeze dried coffee
and meat and other products...
-
There is no doubt that the Kenyans who evaluated the project
and those who negotiated with Apeninn relied on this des-
cription of Technopatent's experience without any resort to
independent corroboration. In addition to all this, the
president of Apeninn had claimed that:
Foodsimport engaged in marketing and
distribution of freeze dried products 56
and had a turnover of $20m. per annum.
Once again the Kenyans accepted this claim without bothering
to verify it from an independent source.
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In 1979, Technopatent defaulted and the truth at
last came out. The Kenyans had been duped. They found
out, inter alia, that
- Technopatent had been formed in 1975
specifically to enter into the TS&M agree-
ment with Interfood (K) Ltd.
- Technopatent did not previously have a
bank account in Switzerland and opened
one in 1976 specifically to conduct the
major transaction with Interfood - i.e. to
receive the 30% of total plant cost down
payment plus an irrevocable letter of
credit from Interfood for an amount that
was 40% of total plant cost - as per the
provision of TS&M agreement.
- Foodsimport had been formed in 1975 to
specifically enter into a purchasing and
marketing agreement with Interfood and
thus completing a neat looking investment
package.
The project eventually collapsed and the local shareholders
formed a re-constituted firm out of the ruins."
It is clear then that in these instances the Kenyan
negotiating team proceeded to negotiate draft agreements
submitted by foreign parties without questioning the ability
and capacity of the foreigners to perform their contractual
obligations. Even where independent evaluation, as in
Ken-Ren, was available it seems to have been totally ignored.
Four other projects in the sample displayed similar charac-
teristics while in the case of nine other projects, the
question was not whether they had the ability and capacity
to deliver, but whether they intended and were willing to
deliver at reasonable terms and conditions; at what cost;
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and most important, what exactly did they contract to
deliver? Many of these questions were never raised and
the foreigners were, therefore, able to chart their
operations virtually unhindered. For these firms, the
Kenyans ought to have considered, not their capacity and
ability but their appropriateness as well as that of their
proposed projects to the Kenyan circumstances.
3. Financial Matters 
We include, under this heading a discussion of issues
on capital cost and structure and the profitability fore-
casts of proposed projects. These are very vital aspects
of all projects for they bear on other important economic
considerations such as creation of employment, saving and
earning of foreign exchange etc. Prior to the approval of
any project, they should have a potential for contributing
towards such wider economic objectives in a positive way.
The NPC and other government departments involved should,
therefore, subject all proposals submitted to a thorough
financial analysis and should stick to a policy of evaluating
projects in the light of their contribution to the economy
at large. Sadly, this appears not to have been the case
so far. In their consideration of a project
	 financial
proposals the Kenyans have made little effort to analyse,
these in a realistic way. Two of the cases discussed above
illustrate this lack of effort on the Kenyans' part to
negotiate for reasonable financial arrangements in projects
1 1 3
involving foreign investors. These are once again,
Ken-Ren and KCFC.
The Ken-Ren financial plan provided for the cost of
supply of equipment from overseas and its construction
only. It did not provide for the cost of import duties and
sales tax on these items. As a result of this omission,
the real costs were likely to be significantly higher
than shown in the proposal. In the preparation of the
proposal, N-Ren had also assumed that the government would
pay for substantial infrastructure investment including
that of laying two pipelines to convey naptha and fuel oil
from the oil refinery at Mombasa to the fertilizer factory.
They therefore omitted these costs in their costing of the
project. These factors were pointed out to the permanent
secretaries in the Treasury and in Commerce and Industry by
an expatriate adviser to the government who observed that:
It is quite impossible to assess the project
at all unless it is costed taking into
account all factors. The financial plan
should then be drawn up on the basis of that
complete costing ... The full cost of the
project should be taken into account and
viability measured on the basis of that
costing.58
Nobody in the government departments involved, it seems,
took any notice of this advice.
, It appears that not only were important cost
elements omitted in N-Ren's proposal, but that even some
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of those that were included were deliberately understated.
This flaw in the proposal was brought to the attention of
the Kenyan negotiatiors,via ICDC, by the latter's two man
mission to Mauritius to study N-Ren's project there. 59
Noting that the Kenyan project was twice the capacity of
the Mauritius one, they commented:
It appears that the Mauritius plant expe-
rienced a gross capital overrun which arose
out of understatement and hidden cost.
Between 31.6.74 and 31.1.75 it was found
necessary to revise the cost of the pro-
ject by around $4.6m. The Kenyan project
is to cost $57m. and only some $5m. has -
been set aside for preliminary expenses and
capital. Considering that it will have a
turnover of $52m. per annum it is felt that 60the working capital is grossly underestimated.
(emphasis added)
-
A provision for overrun costs had been estimated at Elm.
This too was questioned. 61
 There was no provision for
inflation or contingencies in the plan and it was, there-
fore, almost certain that Elm. would be insufficient.
Regarding the capital structure proposed, the ISPC
felt that this would change considerably as actual costs
exceeded the estimated ones. But even assuming that the
estimated cost would not be exceeded, the equity to loan
ratio would be 25% rather than that given by N-Ren i.e.
30%. Under this structure N-Ren's equity participation
of £1.66m. would represent 7.6% of the total investment
with the government bearing the risk on the remaining
92.4% including its guarantee on the loan. 62
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The government risk burden was heavy compared to that
borne by N-Ren and some people felt that N-Ren should be
asked to increase its equity participation. A government
adviser felt that:
one of the few safeguards we have is to
require N-Ren to take a meaningful equity
stake in the new company which I would
define as being& least 50% and if
possible, more.
In the end, the N-Ren financial proposal was accepted
intact. The very pertinent misgivings outlined above and
several others appear to have been totally ignored.
In the case of KCFC, the deal that was approved also
underestimated costs by about 300%. It committed the
government to supply free electricity and water. The
initial gearing ratio was 30%, but taking into account the
project overrun resulting from the gross underestimation of
various items, this now stands close to 40%. The government
holds 51% of equity and has also guaranteed all the loans
to the project, both foreign and local.	 Another project,
Kenya Fibre Corporation involving the same foreign parties
has . also reached project overruns in excess of 200%. A
special audit report commissioned by Treasury in 1979 to
examine the project's financial affairs identifies the
main cause of project overrun as being a severe under-
estimation of working capital and the omissions altogether
of some important cost elements. The cost of buildings
for example was underestimated by as much as 175%.
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Yet these projects went through the approval stage without
alteration in any significant way. These were not the only
projects which exhibited these characteristics. Fourteen
other projects in the sample exhibited similar characteris-
tics in varying degrees. No information was available on
three proj ects while in the remaining six the financial arrange-
mentson paper, appear to have received sufficient attention.
4. Protection and Other Incentives Offered
In negotiating for the protection and other privileges
to be accorded to an applicant for a CAE, the Kenyan system
presents a really sad picture. The Kenyans have accorded
protection and other privileges asked for almost as a matter
of course. The rhetoric of the government has increasingly
been in favour of less protected and therefore more inter-
64
nationally competitive projects,
	
but this has been matched
-
by a practice that has favoured highly protected industries
that are non-viable at not only internationally coMpetitive
prices but also at nationally semi-competitive prices. The
NPC, wherever a project is referred to it, and the bureau-
cracy in all other cases have served as fora for dispensing
extremely liberal privileges to foreign applicants. In
dispensing these privileges, the Kenyans have, on the whole,
asked for little reciprocity. Instead of being a mechanism
for ensuring that foreign firms are admitted only on terms
favourable and conducive to the achievement of Kenya's
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Table 6
MAJOR ISSUES RAISED IN ENTRY NEGOTIATIONS INVOLVING 
19 KENYAN SUBSIDIARIES, 1965-1973 
Issues raised by Subsidiaries/
Government
Pct. of 19 Subs
Involved
Pct, of these requests in which
subsidiary/Govt.	 achieves object
A:	 By	 Subsidiaries	 .
53% 90%
1. Seek import protection via tariffs or
restrictions.
2. Seek right to import machinery and/or
inputs duty free. 32%
.
100%
3. Seek Government Finance in project. 16% •67%
4. Seek guarantee against domestic competition
for period.	 . 11% 100%
5. Seek	 long-term status-quo clause. 11%	
•
100%	 .
6. Seek guarantees on work permits. • 11% 100%
7. Seek approval for generous fee agreements. 11% .100%
Total Issues by Subsidiaries - 32.
8:	 By Government
.
1. Seek better Foreign Exchange Cash Flow
via higher capital invested,	 lower planned
dividends,	 etc. 26% 100%	 .
2. Seek assurance subsidiary take an African
partners, plan Africsnization of managers or
distributors. 21% 100%
3. Seek location outside N airobi and Mombasa 11% 50%
4. Seek higher government equity participation 5% 100%
5. Seek control over subsidiary pricing
formula. 5% ----
Total Issues raised by Government - 1
• This table covers all 19 interview cases in which subsidiaries negotiated with
government over substantive points to obtain a Certificate of Approved Enterprise,
during the period 1965-73.
Source: Langdon, 1976 P. 125.
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economic objectives the approval machinery has played
a very different role. Several other studies on Kenya have
also concluded that the protection and incentives offered
to foreign investors re extremely liberal.
Langdon, for example, argues that the oligopoly
perspectives - of multinational companies suggest that they
seek market security and protection from competition for
their investment and that available evidence shows that this
has been their primary objective in negotiating entry into
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African countries.	 He further argues that even when
negotiation takes place in Kenya, the effect is not necessa-
rily to constrain the MnC sector, but that empirical evidence
... suggests that the NPC is primarily a
channel by which subsidiaries obtain
economic privileges, particularly freedom
from external (and sometimes internal)
competition and from duties on their
imported machinery and inputs.66
Table 6	 summarises his research findings on issues raised
in entry negotiations in support of this argument. Other
studies by Kaplinsky, Swainson, Deepak Lal, Eglin, ILO and
IBRD fully support this argument!
7
Evidence from over 25
agreements involving foreign investors in Kenya examined
	 -
by the present author, but not presented here, support this
argument. As examples, a detailed account of privileges
granted to Firestone is produced below and those granted
• to KCFC in the joint venture agreement appear in Appendix 1
The privileges Firestone, USA demanded and obtained
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through the NPC included:
- An undertaking binding the government to
discourage "establishment in Kenya by any
individual, firm ... other than the New
Company (Firestone (E.A.) Ltd.) of any
activity ... within the scope of the pro-
ject. In particular ... the government
undertakes that no such establishment
shall be approved under FIPA ... or
the Exchange Control Act, or under any
comparable legislation" for seven years
from start of production. 68
- A quota restriction of tyre imports from
outside E.A. in accordance with a formula
stipulated by Firestone USA. 69
- A total ban on imports of tyres Firestone
would from time to time notify the govern-70
ment of its intention to produce in Kenya.
- Unrestricted import licences (including the
availability of necessary foreign exchange)
to the extent that, and for so long as, its
requirements for construction materials,
equipment, machinery, spare parts, or raw
materials.... 71
- Exemptions from import and customs-, duties
and from any other tax for and with regards
to items imported by the company. 72
- Unrestricted export licences and total
exemption from export duties. 73
- Freedom to use its own pricing formula in
the sales of its protected products. 74
- A commitment by the government to ensure that
its departments, including the armed forces
purchase tyres from Firestone (E.A.) Ltd. and
also ensure that the firm secured monopoly
rights to supply its tyre products to any
enterprise established in Kenya for the assem-
bly of motor vehicles.75
- A 20% investment deduction under the Income 
Tax Act for capital expenditure which
deduction would not be reduced below that
figure even if the law wereto be subsequen-
tly amended reducing the deduction allowable
to below 20% or abolishing it all together. 76
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This provision applies to Firestone E.Als
future capital investments.
- The grant of all government approvals and
licences necessary to establish and operate
the project. 77
 The necessity to be determi-
ned by FEA T S
 foreign management.
- The right to capitalize technical and
service fees due to Firestone USA. 78
- A government's undertaking that in connec-
tion with any dispute arising out of the
investment agreement there would be no plea
of sovereign immunity. 79
- An extremely favourable (to FUSA) process
and Licence Agreement to last for 25(!)
years from the commencement of production
date. 80
With the exception of the clause on sovereign immunity, such
privileges are prevalent in other projects studied that
involved foreign firms. Similar, and in some cases even
more liberal privileges have been granted to Del Monte
81 c
International's
	 subsidiary, Kenya Canners Ltd., the
Fluorspar Mining Company, Rift Valley Textiles Ltd., Pan
African Paper Mills Ltd., and many others. Not one of the
firms in the sample included in this study failed to obtain
some satisfactory form of protection and/or privileges.
5. Other Factors 
In addition to the factors discussed in some detail
above, the Kenyan approval machinery have, more often than
not, uncritically approved projects with various aspects
that may militate against the national interest.
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These include approval of projects:
_ containing restrictions on exports.
- tied to purchasing embodied and disem-
bodied technology from the foreign party
or his appointed suppliers.
- involving high and often duplicated
service fees
- involving the vesting of too much discre-
tionary decision-making power to the
foreign party.
Such concessions and several others lead, in the final
analysis, to the vesting of much of the decision-making power
over most vital aspects of projects in the hands of the
foreign party. These things are discussed in detail in
the next two chapters. The only purpose of referring to them
here is to emphasise the point made at the beginning that the
approval machinery does not necessarily constitute a signi-
ficant constraint to foreign investors. It is not merely
the fact that they appear in final agreements reached, that
casts a shadow of doubt upon the efficacy of the approval
machinery as a regulatory measure, but also the fact that
they receive virtually no critical review from those involved
in the approval machinery.
That the NET does not raise major critical issues in
the negotiations with foreign investors does not necessarily
mean that no one else does. In the Ken-Ren case discussed
above, for example, it has been shown that there were some
public officials who had taken the trouble to analyse
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N-Ren's proposal and question the wisdom of approving
it. This is not an isolated case. In virtually all the
projects studied, issues critical to the well-being of a
project or the wisdom of starting it were a common fea-
ture. At times they received some attention and at other
times they were simply swept under the carpet. 82 The
Firestone project 83 is a case in point.
During the negotiations with Firestone International,
some public officials outside the NPC raised issues rela-
ting to the proposal and made some recommendations. The
recommendations that received attention were those that
sought to have Firestone International bring in more capi-
tal and those that sought to have the company commit itself
to appointing certain African personnel at management
level as well as awarding its distribution business to
African distributors. These were in line with the government's
stated	 objectives of increasing the inflow of capital in
the form of foreign exchange and of Africanizing the perso-
nnel of companies involving foreign nationals as well as
the distribution business. The firm did not resist, and
was quite willing and prepared to accept, these relatively
easy conditions. However, where the firm dug in its heels,
the issues were simply swept under the carpet. One of such
casualties was the issue concerning the pricing mechanism
of Firestone's product. The Ministry of Commerce and
Industry had stated its position on this issue in the
following terms:
123
... In particular the most important point
was S.6.08 on price mechanism, and in this
connection the Firestone representative made
it clear that they did not expect the govern-
ment to control prices of products of the
company at any level and further, that any
excise duty or other forms of taxes imposed
would be passed on to the end consumers.
The government proposal on the other hand
was that the first clause - i.e. "There
shall be no control at any level of the prices
at which tyres, tubes and retread materials
are sold" - should be deleted •• 84
The clause was not deleted and appears as clause 6.08 of
the investment agreement in verbatim. In addition, the
Ministry objected to what is called "the implication" of
Firestone's draft clause 6.12 85 arguing that the Ministry
had so far maintained that the government:
... Cannot agree to commit itself now such
that it would prejudice its chances of
exercising of its sovereign prerogative of
making and amending laws. This stand seems
the only logical one and therefore no valid
reason is seen for abandoning 11.86
Logical as it may have seemed to the Ministry, the stand
collapsed in the face of Firestone's adamance. The clause
appears verbatim as clause 6.12 of the Investment Agreement.
Finally, the Ministry objected to part of clause 8.01 of
the draft agreement saying that:
It is superfluous as we have maintained all
along and we shoullpress for its deletion
from the section.
The offending part of this clause provided that:
The Government shall procure that in
connection with any dispute arising out
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of this Investment Agreement, there shall
be no plea of sovereign immunity.
Once again the Ministry's objection received the, by now
familiar response, the clause appears verbatim in the
agreement.
Criticisms of the draft agreement from other quarters
fared no better. Officials from ICDC and the Ministry of
Economic Planning, for example, objected to the quota
system of licensing tyre imports that Firestone were propo-
sing and had incorporated into the draft agreement, but to
no avail. 88
 On the issue of training Kenyan personnel, an
ICDC official observed that Firestone's
so-called training programme for Kenyan
citizens smells to me. Furthermore, the
Africanization is not their Direstone
International) business and should be
left to the government.89
He was of the view .that too much discretion in training of
the recruitment had been left to the foreign managers.
Twelve years later, the validity of this observation remains
90
unshaken.
	 The official was also of the view that Fire-
stone's request for an import duty exemption for raw materials
for over ten years had not been justified. He suggested that
Firestone be asked to specify its production costs so that
the committee could determine whether or not Firestone really
needed that kind of exemption in order to achieve the
forecasted profitability.
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As an institution, ICDC was of the view that the
protection offered was "a bit too long" and that the
attached conditions were "unnecessarily rigid". 91	In
addition, it felt that the government "should have power
in the agreement to decide whom to give residence permits
in connection with the project" rather than the right to
merely endorse Firestone's choice. In general, ICDC would
have wished the NPC to push for more benefits from Fire-
stone by tougher bargaining. Its executive director summed it
all up when he told ICDC'c team on the project:
I think we should take a very tough line
along the lines you have outlined Ci.e.
reject some of Firestone's demands
I do not think the requirements as above
are all necessary to induce them in. 92
As it happened, NPC, under pressure from both Treasury and
some highly placed officials in Commerce and Industry, did
not take a tough line in its negotiation with Firestone.
Indeed none of these criticisms on the terms of the draft
agreement was effectively utilised, by the NPC which seemed
to have been under pressure from above to approve the
Firestone project. There is little evidence to suggest that
the NPC made any serious effort to resist this pressure.
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C : COMMENTARY 
Having examined the approval process for the
establishment of foreign enterprise, one may wonder why
the machinery seems to perform rather poorly as a means of
imposing some form of regulation of such establishment.
Indeed the general tenor of all the agreements examined by
the present author indicate that the Kenyan approval machi-
nery has granted applicants for CAE far more economic
privileges than the concessions it has obtained from them.
As a screening process intended to ensure that only viable
projects that have a priority by virtue of the benefits
they bring to the country, the machinery can hardly be said
to be a model of success. The evidence presented herein
indicates there are still problems in the selection of pro-
jects that have a potential for contributing to the achieve-
ment of stated economic goals as well as in imposing, on
applicants, terms and conditions aimed at ensuring that they
so contribute, as g prerequisite to approval. Since the
early 1970s, for example, government policy statements have
emphasised the need to encourage a shift to industries that
are among other things, local-resource intensive, labour-
intensive and export-oriented. The approval machinery has
approved some projects that are the exact opposite of these.
It has granted exemptions from duties on imported raw
materials and other inputs and granted excessively generous
protection against competition. This, in turn, has led to
a situation in which capital and imported inputs have been
127
preferred in place of labour and local resources and in
which import-substituting industries have been preferred
to export-oriented ones. In addition the premium prices
resulting from very high effective protection has resulted
in inflated costs of locally manufactured intermediates
that tax agriculture, the most export-oriented sector of
the economy, and pricing out other potential exports."
This could hardly be one of the results the approval
machinery was intended to achieve. There are two main
factors that have contributed to the poor performance of
the machinery. For want of a better classification, these
may be classified as institutional and substantive factors.
1. Institutional Factors
The institutional framework that exists in Kenya for
approving foreign investment is an extremely muddled one.
By now the reader will have noticed that having identified
the two stages involved in the process - project evaluation
and negotiation - the actual discussion hardly follows
this pattern. Furthermore, the reader will have also
noticed that apparent formal machinery does not feature in
some, indeed, most of the examples given. This is prima-
rily because the formal system is very different from the
actual practice that prevails. In reality, no institutio-
nal process worthyof mention exists. It was emphasised at
the beginning that approval is on a case by case basis.
This has led to the development of ad hoc committees and
very often individuals constituting the sole machinery
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for approval. The NPC, for example, is only a committee
in name. Except for its Chairman, it has no fixed member-
ship. The committee members seem to be selected on a day
to day basis. In several cases where the committee sat in
negotiation for two or more days, different personnel sat
in the committee each day. 94 At best then, the NPC is no
more than a series of ad hoc committees many of them
differently constituted.
The lack, in reality, of an institutional set up of
the approval machinery affects the effectiveness of the
ISPC. Although it is a permanent department of the Ministry
of Industry with permanent staff, there is no institutional
requirement that all project proposals be referred to it.
Thus few projects are referred to it for evaluation. This
deprives the only evaluation body with the potehtial for
carrying out projeat analysis of any significant role in
the approval machinery. As the NPC has no technical
expertise of its own, the possibility of filling this gap
with the use of ISPC technical expertise is greatly hindered
by the very frequent side-stepping of the ISPC's machinery.
Even where the formal machinery is partly followed 9.5
as in the cases of Ken-Ren, and Firestone, its effective-
ness is weakened by the fragmentation of the various
government bodies, that constitute its membership.
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This fragmentation means that the Kenyans hardly speak
with one voice and have frequently been in opposition to
each other. In Ken-Ren's case, for example, ICDC was not
satisfied with N-Ren's proposal (and for good reasons) and
thus refused to invest in the project. The permanent
secretary in the Ministry of Agriculture on the other hand,
fought tooth and nail to have N-Ren's proposal approved
despite its patently manifest shortcomings. So too did the
Ministry of Commerce and Industry as well as the Treasury. 96
In the case of Firestone, ICDC 1 c executive director (and
therefore ICDC) supported Uniroyal's application while the
Ministries of Economic Planning and Commerce and Industry
supported Firestone's application. Once again, ICDC found
itself pitted against its parent Ministry. Such fragemen-
tation enables the foreign applicants to play the Kenyan
parties one against the other.
By far the most important weakness of the institutio-
nal set up is to be found in its decision-making machinery.
Its most glaring feature is its highly discretionary nature.
It also contains
	 rather relatively high degree of finality
and non-accountability. The decision making power and pro-
cess is completely divorced from the rest of the approval
machinery. Recommendations by the NPC are not binding on
whoever makes the decisions. Even if the formal approval
machinery were to perform an excellent job in evaluating
and imposing conditions on applicants, its effectiveness
would
	 be good only to the extent that the decision
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makers accept its advice and, even more, resist
	
inter-
fering with the evaluation process. Sadly, the practice
has been to the contrary. The decision makers have greatly
weakened the effectiveness of the approval machinery by
interfering in its running and ignoring its advice. They
have interfered in two basic ways. First they have approved
projects without referring them to the approval machinery
thus depriving the ISPC and the NPC a chance to evaluate
the proposals and negotiate with the applicants. 97 These
seem to be the projects whose promoters appear to have well
placed connections in Kenya's political system. Second,
the decision makers frequently interfere by entertaining
direct appeals from applicants in the course of negotiations.
Such was clearly the case when the NPC was instructed from
above to halt its considerations of short-listed applicants
for the fertilizer plant to give time to N-Ren to prepare
and submit its proposal after the dealine for receiving
tenders had long pa-ssed. 98
	It was also such interference
that forced the NPC to drop its pressure on Firestone to
reconsider the pricing mechanism for its tyres. 99
Technically the NPC is the body that ought to
evaluate projects and negotiate with the foreign applicants.
It is then supposed to advise the government through 'the
normal machinery' on whether or not the projects should be
allowed and if they should be, On what terms and conditions.
The reference to the normal machinery indicates that,
decision making power lies with the top level of the civil
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service. From the projects the author has studied such
decisions were made by no one below the rank of a perma-
nent secretary where such powers were not delegated at
all. Where no delegation took place, the decisions were
at ministerial level with some decisions being referred
to the cabinet for clearance. It is clear then that
decision making power lies with those who have little
expertise over the type of issues that are raised by such
projects. It, therefore, follows that where a minister
or the whole cabinet ignore its own experts' advice, it
is not on the basis of his or their superior knowledge
over the matter, but on the basis of their power to ignore
such advice with impunity.
The Treasury, has in theory, the final say for it is
its prerogative to issue the CAE under FIFA. However, it
is not easy to point out who in Treasury exercises this
power. Logically it should be the Minister of finance or
an official in Treasury to whom he may have delegated this
authority. Even where such authority is delegated to a
designated official, one must always bear in mind that
there is always the possibility of reversal by higher
authority. In a government by civil servants as obtains
in Kenya, the decisions of higher authority depends very
much on whose advice such authority decides to adopt. In
the case of Ken-Ren for example, higher authorities would
appear to have adopted the advice of the permanent secretary
in the Ministry of Agriculture rather than that of the
13 2
experts from ISPC or ICDC.
What must be emphasised is that the NPC has no
decision-making powers whatsoever. At times, this ob-
servation applies to government ministries and parastatal
bodies. Decisions involving major and very profitable
concessions from the government may be reached at a high
political level even before the projects have been seen or
evaluated within the ministry concerned. It is a familiar
occurrence for firms with the right political connections
to have their glossy agreements and other documents, com-
plete with high-powered approval, land as a fait accompli 
on the desks of the relevant ministry and or parastatal
officials. 100 In such cases, the mechanics of the approval
process become irrelevant.
2. Substantive Factors 
In addition to the institutional constraints outlined
above, several substantive factors contribute to the poor
performance of the foreign investment approval machinery.
The most important of such factors is the very real shor-
tage of the requisite qualified technical manpower and other
resources. The only body with some technical manpower is
the ISPC, but even here, the manpower is spread very thin,
lacks experience in dealing with multinationals' complex
business and investment processes and lacks the necessary
financial resources to conduct more than superficial
evaluation of project proposals. To confound such
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substantial limitations, it may be that the technological and other
investment aspects of a given project are just too complex even for
the available personnel to tackle adequately. Where such is the case
the approval machinery may be operating on rather limited information
which would make it even less competent in making any detailed
evaluation -of such a project. They are left with one of three main
choices: vis. to drop the project altogether, to engage an outside
consultant, or to accept the applicant's version of the prospects of
the project as contained in his proposal. The second alternative
is usually mistakenly ruled out as being too expensive and time
consuming. The first one may at times prove politically unfeasible
leaving the last course as the easier option. The choices are of course
only applicable where the projects are channelled through the formal
machinery. When they are not, then they constitute political decisions
and are established with political backing.
Another possible limiting factor to the effectiveness of the
machinery is Kenya's desire to attract private foreign investment.
It may be that the overriding consideration is the attraction of such
investors by offering them extremely liberal incentives. Some well
placed government officials feel that a rigorous application of the
approval process might scare away foreign investors. Certainly, the
government has been keen to assure the investors that they would be
offered adequate protection and other generous incentives.101
It appears that the approach taken
1 3 4
by the government is to bargain not from its power to
permit or reject foreign investors' applications for CAEs,
but on the basis of its desire to have investors invest
their capital in Kenya. Certainly, Kenya's strong capita-
list sentiments have meant that private foreign investors
have been accorded much more trust than would otherwise
have been in a less capitalist oriented environment.
Finally, there is the very substantial, but difficult
to pinpoint, problem of corruption. This is a fact of life
whose existence is in virtually every sphere of life in
Kenya and is widely accepted in general terms by the govern-
ment. The government preaches against corruption in general,
but has at the same time resisted frequent calls to set up
a select committee of parliament to investigate the malady. 102
In corrupting public officials, the interested party would
have to aim at decision-makers high up the ladder of poli-
tical hierarchy, as low level civil servants are not respon-
sible for approval of projects. It is difficult to prove
such clandestine dealings when those involved wield enormous
political power or they have patrons high up in the govern-
ment. The dilemma is that:
... Whatever your suspicions ... you are
unlikely to possess the kind of evidence
which can force the government to insti-
tute drastic measures in an attempt to
expose and punish those guilty of corrup-
tion. All the incriminating evidence is
usually in the hands of the guilty and
there is no reason why they should want to
divulge such evidence. 103
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However, the fact that it never comes to the open does
not mean it does not exist . Indeed, several officials
involved in foreign investment affairs believe that it
is fairly common and the reason the government does so
little that can be termed positive about it is because
many senior personnel are involved either directly or
indirectly through a protection racket. 104 Reginald
Green has contended that
Certainly some contracts are determined by
bribes both in the sense of being concluded
at all and of their specific content. Any
frequent negotiator for the African side
with TNC's who says he has never been offered
a bribe is either a trifle slow on the uptake
or a trifle disingenuous. 105
He should know for he has had the experience as advisor to
the Tanzanian government. Many people interviewed in Kenya
felt that corruption is a major factor in the relationship
with foreign investors. There are many forms that corrup-
tion may take ranging from apparently legal offers or gifts
to outright cash handouts. Although difficult to pinpoint,
it is a safe bet that corruption plays a significant part
in weakening the approval machinery in Kenya.
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D : CONCLUSION 
This chapter has examined the administrative process
for approving new foreign investment establishing in Kenya.
It has been shown that the approval process is governed,
not by legislation, but by some form of administrative
process. An underlying assumption of the discusssion in
this chapter is that the approval machinery and procedure
are part and parcel of the government's regulatory func-
tions and that by processing foreign investment through
such machinery or approval, the government intends to
regulate the type of investment that is admitted and the
conditions of its operation. Such regulation is deemed
necessary in order to integrate the investments admitted
into the overall economic system in a manner that is con-
ducive to the fulfilment of the objectives for which they
were admitted into the country in the first place.
The institutional set up of the approval machinery
has been a major constraint to its effective operation.
There has been no attempt to lay down even the barest of
minimum binding rules either of the procedure to be follo-
wed or in the substantive criteria to be applied in the
evaluation of projects. This has resulted in a situation
where decisions have been made not entirely on the basis
of a positive evaluation of projects. Because of the
rather unclear decision-making machinery, only limited
accountability for decisions taken exists.
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The approval machinery has failed as a first stage
of a regulatory machinery over the operation of foreign
investment in the country. It has proved unable to
scrutinise incoming investment in order to ensure that the
conditions under which they are admitted into the country
are carefully regulated in the national interest. This
would be a necessary step towards making foreign investment
play the role assigned to it rather than merely pursuing
Its individual business interests. The project evalua-
tion by the NPC has been inconsistent at times and quite
su s ceptible to political pressure. Lack of a clearly
identifiable demarcation of responsibilities, coupled with
severe manpower constraints have both substantially contri-
buted to the inadequacy of the machinery. The failure is
not inherent in the machinery, but rather has resulted from
failure to utilize it constructively; constant subversion
of its deliberations by political forces; and a lack of
clearly defined and coherent economic and other criteria
for admitting foreign investment.
It is now nearly ten years since the government
indicated it would pass comprehensive legislation to
regulate the establishment of productive capacity in the
country. No such legislation has been enacted, and even
more telling is the fact that no talk of such legislation
has been heard in recent years. Whether such legislation
would make any significant difference to the approval
process is difficult to tell without seeing it.
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What is not in doubt is that legislation or no legislation,
the ultimate success of any approval machinery will depend
on the willingness and ability of the government to imp-
lement it. As of today, the government's willingness to
regulate the establishment of foreign investment in a
realistic manner lags far behind its limited ability to
do so.
A major consequence of the failure of the approval
machinery to operate effectively has been the actual and
potential limitations placed upon the government's regu-
latory role by the agreements entered into with the foreign
parties. The failure of the machinery operates heavily in
favour of the foreign parties who more often than not
outbargain the Kenyans. They are able to have their pro-
jects approved as described and designed in their proposals
and the agreements reached are also tailored to suit their
interests in the projects. Thus for example in the case of
PVP's approval
... many people appear to have been more
keen on the implementation of what was
contained in the study Droposal by SIFIDIg
than trying to find out and be satisfied
that the contents of the report was truly
viable. 106
Having had their projects approved as presented, they then
draft the agreements in such a way that they are heavily
biased to their advantage ensuring that the only way that
the government can execute its regulatory role is by
committing a breach of the agreements. In the case of
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Ken-Ren, for example, it was
... Clear that at the moment, the agreements
are drawn solely from the point of view of
providing N-Ren with maximum advantages. No
doubt they do not expect to obtain all they
are asking for, but I regard it as essential
that the government stick out for much more
balanced agreement where the obligations are
more clearly shared by both sides.107
Yet, N-Ren obtained all it asked for and the government
picked up the tabs when the project collapsed.
The government has stuck to the terms of most of its
agreements almost to the letter. Where the agreements tie
its hands, it has allowed the provisions of these agreements
to override its own concerns. Thus for example, when in
1980, the government wanted to introduce sales tax on impor-
ted raw materials to meet its overriding industrial restruc-
turing objectives, it was unable to do so in certain cases.
The minister of finance expressly admitted that the govern-
ment's hands were tied saying that
In view of existing arrangements between the
government and a few basic industries, I
propose to exempt them from payment 53sales
tax on their imported raw materials..
There are many instances in the 25 agreements studied where
the government has exempted foreign investors from with-
holding tax, for example, and also granted the foreigners
powers in implementing and running the projects that are
totally disproportionate to their equity.
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This may limit the government's powers to effectively
regulate their operations. Some of the limitations on the
government's regulatory powers are discussed in chapter five
of this study.
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NOTES
1. Caps. 486 and 488 respectively.
2. See for instance 8.365 of the Companies Act.
3. Where the investment is in a joint verture for
example, the Companies Act has no application to
foreigners as it merely deals with legal entities
and the project would be Kenyan under the Act.
4. See Lloyds Economic Reviews 1971-79 and Langdon, 1978
for example.
5. 1974 -8 Plan, 285
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid
8. Ministry of Finance, Plan Implementation Report
1974/75, III - 36
9. 1979-83 Plan, 334.
10. Ibid, 30
11. 1974-8 Plan 284
12. 1979-83 Plan, 346
13. Ibid
14. 1974-8 Plan, 285
15. This information was obtained from the current chairman
of the NPC in August 1978. See also John Ndegwa, 1976.
16. Information obtained through interviews with government
and some project officials.
17. 1979 -83 Plan, 30
18. Ibid.
19. The most important are the Companies Act and the
Registration-of Business Names Act for commercial,
industrial and agricultural firms; and The Banking 
Act, and The Insurance Business Act for financial
and insurance firms respectively.
20. 1970-74 Plan, 315
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21. Ibid.
22. These are contained in an application form entitled
"Project Application Form 'A' To the NPC"._
It is usually accompanied by a booklet
entitled "Guidelines For Completion of The Project
Application Form 'A' To the NPC."
23. ISPC, Comparative Summary of Fertilizer Proposals,
14/2/75
24. These were summarised in a rather patronising letter
from the President of N-Ren, Thomas C. Snyder, to the
Ps, agriculture dated 5/3/75
25. See ISPC, 1975
26. See Ibid, where an expatriate adviser in ICDC described
this as a "political problem" adding that "As the Shah
of Iran once put it: 'We developing countires need
pollution at this stage'. This would appear to indicate
that such a problem was not for consideration by the NPC.
This view is re-inforced by the experience in the cases
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CHAPTER FOUR
AFRICANIZATION AS A MEANS OF REGULATING FOREIGN INVESTMENT
At independence, the Kenya government rejected
nationalization of the economy as a viable means of control
over the country's resources, saying that:
To imagine ... that the use of resources can
only be controlled through their ownership
or that appropriate ownership will guarantee
the proper use of productive assets are
errors of great magnitude.1
On the face of it, this would seem to imply that the
foreign capital that dominated the economy at independence
would remain dominant-over all economic aspects of the
nation. However, this would have been clearly politically
unpalatable to the African petty bourgeoisie who emerged
as the new ruling class. The ambition of this small group
to amass wealth and live like the whites had been suppressed
by the colonial regime and they clearly expected indepen-
dence to bring an end to this suppression. In the words
of their chief spokesman in the gorvernment:
... the predominance of non-Kenyans in the
ownership, management and control of private
enterprise is one of the most glaring defects
of the private sector in Kenya. No country
can accept the continuance of this kind ...
To turn a blind eye to the racial imbalance in
the country's economy would be tantamount
to inviting racial disharmony and conflicts
in the future.2
The solution adopted to tackle this 'glaring defect' was
the Africanization of the economy and the workforce. Thus
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from thebeginning, Africanization was viewed as an urgent
task-	which had to be achieved within a relatively short
period. The question facing the government was, therefore,
not whether to Africanize, but rather 'how to reconcile the
urgency of the matter with citizenship guarantees and the
desire for rapid economic growth'. 3 In his introduction
to Sessional Paper No.10 of 1965, President Kenyatta summed
up the government's view of its priorities and their
limitations. He said:
Our entire approach has been dominated by a
desire to ensure Africanization of the
economy and the public service. Our task
remains to try and achieve these two goals
without doing harm to the economy itself
and within the declared aims of our society. 4
One of the harms that was feared by the government was the
discouragement of the inflow of private capital from
overseas .5
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A : OBJECTIVES OF AFRICANIZATION 
1 Political Objectives 
The Africanization of the economy and the burea-
cracy has had two main objectives. The first and immediate
objective was a political imperative. This was the govern-
ment's desire to be seen as actively correcting the
imbalance that had been brought about by 70 years of racial
discrimination by the British colonials against the Afri-
cans in particular. Except by a takeover of economic
operations by the state, the only other way to excise these
operations from the hands of aliens was through Africaniza-
tion. Two phases in the process of Africanization since
independence are clearly discernible. The first phase in-
volved the most sensitive and politically volatile land
question. The expectations of the masses had to be
partially met by transferring part of the land to a portion
of the landless masses. 6
	This phase was largely dictated
by the political expediencies of keeping the expectant
masses at bay while the next phase was a more selective one
By 1965, the government had already decided to apply brakes
on the infant scheme of land settlement for the landless
masses. It had decided that in future economic benefits
to the country should determine the pattern of Africaniza-
tion of agriculture. It rationalised that:
Africanization in agriculture has taken the
principal form of land settlement ... This
approach has been necessary for political
reasons - to ensure that areas formerly
closed to Africans were opened to them.
These areas are now open to Africans;
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settlement policy should hereafter be based
on its economic benefits and on Kenya's
wishes and terms instead of those of the
United Kingdom as has hitherto been the
case. 7
Though the shift anticipated did not take place immediately,
the ruling clique had clearly decided that in future, their
interests rather than the clamour of the masses (political
reasons) were to dominate the Africanization programme.
It is interesting to note that the United Kingdom had dic-
tated the terms of this first phase which, in some ways,
was more in tune with the demands of the masses than the
second phase.
Phase two of the process of Africanization was
characterised by the dominance of the interests of the
emerging African elite who were in total control of govern-
ment policy-making, in as far as that was possible in an
ex-colony highly dependent on external sources for its
economic well-being. First came the policy of transferring
intact the best land available in the highlands to indivi-
dual or groups of rich Africans, while confining the
settlement schemes, which catered for the poor, to marginal
areas of the highlands. This meant that henceforth the
best land in the highlands would go to the political elites
who were the only people who had the political clout to
_
obtain huge amounts of finance from the state to purchase
the huge tracts of land. 8
	Then came the assault on the
Asian dominated commercial and distribution sector. This
153
included the distribution business carried on by foreign
firms. The now increasingly economically ambitious African
elite was poised to step into the shoes of the non-African
commercial group. There was to be no mass participation
in this phase and all the rhetoric about co-operatives in
Sessional Paper No.10 of 1965 had long been shelved. Greed
became the creed and the elites scrambled to take over the
distribution and commercial sectors of the economy. 9
	In
this phase comes the government's participation in projects
with foreign capital. A few African tycoons have now
started moving into industries, although largely - as junior
or dormant partners with foreign capita1.1°
2	 Control Objectives 
In its policy statements the government has pre-
sented its Africanization policy as a measure for controlling
or influencing the economic activities of private enterprise
and, in particular, as an important measure for checking the
dominance of foreign capital over the rest of the economy.
Thus it warned that:
... the foreign ownership and management of
productive assets could mean that economic
decisions in Kenya might be dominated by
foreign rather than domestic considerations. 11
It therefore felt that Africanization would limit such ten-
dencies. Its recommendation was that foreign investors
should be prepared to accept "the spirit of mutual social
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responsibility" (sic!) by assisting in the process of Afri-
canization. 12 In the view of the government, Africanization
is a means of:
... establishing Africans in a firm position
in the monetary sector by ensuring that a
large share of the planned new expansion is
African owned and managed. 13.
Given the fact that a substantial portion of the economy
that was essential as a basis for new expansion was in
foreign hands, it did not take long for the Africanization
programme to concentrate on existing economic establish-
ments.
An ad hoc committee of the Ministry of Commerce and
Industry was more specific about the intended control func-
tions of Africanization. It emphatically stated that:
... The Africanization of commerce and in-
dustry is the surest way by which Africans
can hope to control the economy of this
country. 14
This notion of Africanization as a means of wrenching the
control of the economy from foreign capital has become a
major part of government economic policy and has been pur-
sued with some vigour. 15	It is this aspect or objective
of Africanization that is the subject-matter for considera-
tion in this chapter.
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B	 :	 THE PROCESS 
The process of Africanization falls into two main
categories. The first is the Africanization of equity
ownership in firms owned by foreign nationals 16
 and the
second is Africanization of personnel in such firms.
	 In
theory, the process is one of Kenyanization, but in reality
Africanizing is the dominant theme and it is for this reason
that the term Africanization has been chosen for use here.
Both legal and administrative measures have been used to
secure, or in support of, the Africanization of parts of the
economy. In addition, the government has provided financial
backing to the programme.
1	 Equity 
The Africanization of equity in foreign firms has
taken four forms. First, those Africans with the means have
purchased shares in publicly quoted foreign-owned companies.
Second, the government has purchased shares in existing
foreign operations or entered into joint ventures with
foreign firms in new projects. Third, a few African tycoons
have entered into joint ventures with foreign firms. Finally,
there have been joint ventures involving foreign firms, the
government and some local business and/or political elites.
Government participation as used in this study refers to
either direct investment by treasury or through any of the
_
public development financial institutions or the two wholly
government-owned commercial banks.
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Initially, official Africanization policy laid
emphasis on inducing foreign firms to 'go public' and thus
enable Kenyans to buy shares in such firms. This approach
had two main shortcomings. The immediate one was that
foreign companies revalued their assets prior to going
public. These revalued shares were then sold on the stock
market and the proceeds repatriated. In addition, the re-
valuation resulted in a potential increase in the dividends
that could be repatriated without a corresponding inflow of
actual foreign assets. This was seen as a set-back on the
government's need to conserve foreign exchange. 17 The other,
and more important, shortcoming was that it was largely the
non-Africans, both citizen and non-citizen residents, who
were able to buy the shares offered to the public.	 Thus
the government reduced its emphasis on the offer of shares
to the public, but it did not actively discourage it either.
With increased levels of accumulation by a few Kenyans
partly as a result of the existing unequal distribution of
income (see 1979-83 Plan, 5), the government feels that it
can now achieve viable Africanization through the stock ex-
change. Thus it promises that:
In order to enhance the role of Kenyans in
industry, the Government will increase in-
dustrial services to small and medium-sized
enterprises owned by Kenyans. ... Besides
these measures, the Government will ensure 
that more companies will offer shares to 
Africans through the 3tock exchange. 18
It is worth while noting that the reference is specifically
to ensuring sale of shares to Africans. ThPre is no inuica-
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tion of how the government expects to go about ensuring this.
Certainly, no legislation has been enacted to achieve this
end. If any pressure has already been applied to foreign
firms to sell shares specifically to Africans, it is yet to
be made public.
In commercial and transport operations,the govern-
ment has used largely legislative means to achieve
Africanization of these sectors. Owing to the constitu-
tional guarantees to equal treatment for all citizens, the
government has relied on the administrative machinery for
implementing the legislation to give effect to the bias in
favour of Africans. In commercial trading, the operative
legislation is The Trade Licensing Act of 1967. 19 S.5(1)
of this Act makes all trading business subject to licens-
ing by the Department of Trade and Supplies. Subsection
(2) bars any non-citizen from conducting business:
a) in any place which is not a general
business area; or
b) in any specified goods unless his
licence specifically authorises him
to.
Thus the licensing system bars foreign firms from certain
geographical locations and leaves discretion to the authori-
ties on whether or not to bar such firms from trading in
certain items.
	 S.11 provides for what are termed as the
.'principles of licensing', one of which is that, in issuing
licences, d. licensing officer shall:
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a) be guided by the principle that busi-
nesses carried on in any place which is
not within a general business area ought,
where practicable, to be controlled by
citizens of Kenya, and that specified
goods ought, where practicable, to be
dealt in by citizens of Kenya and, in
particular, take into consideration:
i) Where the activities in respect of
which the licence is applied for
ought to be and could be carried
on by a business conducted by citi-
zens of Kenya.
It is clear that this Act, rigorously implemented, would be
a very potent instrument for the Kenyanization of commer-
cial trading in Kenya. With the 'proper' exercise of its
discretion, the licensing authority can ensure that, in
practice, Africanization of the businesses concerned is
achieved. The Act has been utilized a great deal, and its
only limitation is whether or not its dictates are practi-
cable. The 1979-83 plan states:
Since Independence the Government has en-
couraged Kenyans to enter the commerce
sector through various measures ... Notable
among these is the 1967 Trade Licensing Act 
... Partly as a result of this Act almost
all businesses in rural centres have been
acquired by Kenyans. In order to complete
this programme, the Government henceforth
will focus its attention on urban general
business areas where non-citizens are still
legally free to operate as traders. 20
In other words, the government has the intention of exclud-
ing virtually all foreigners from commercial trading in
_
Kenya. It also promises to review the law with the view to
closing the loopholes that have enabled non-citizens to sur-
vive in such businesses. 21
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In the transport business, the Transport Licensing
Act 22 performs a very similar role. It set up a Transport
Licensing Board (TLB) to consider applications for licences
to engage in any road transport business.	 It issues
licences in such a way that African applicants receive top
priority. The regulations confer upon the TLB discretion
To have regard whether an applicant is a
citizen of Kenya, or if an applicant is a
company, whether the members and its em-
ployees are citizens ... 23
It is this regulation that the TLB relied upon in 1968 when
it threatened not to approve the annual renewal of licences
for companies that had not sold 50% of their equity to the
public. This was in reference to foreign private companies.
The threat was sufficient to compel East African Road Ser-
vices, the largest company owned by foreign capital, to
comply. 24
As far as banks and financial institutions are con-
cerned, the government has not pressed hard for their
Africanization. In the early 1970s there seems to have been
a policy to Africanize the banking sector, but this seems to
have changed. It was at that time that the government took
over 60% of the National & Grindlays Bank Ltd., and also
negotiated with the other two leading foreign banks for
their merger with the government taking 50% of the merged
bank. Had this merger between Barclays and The Standard
Banks taken place as the government had intended, it would
no doubt have spelt the end of the dominance of foreign
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banks in the country. The move appears to have been aborted
for some unknown reasons. It appears that the government
became apprehensive of being seen to follow the Tanzanian
approach, thereby deviating from its avowed policy of non-
nationalisation of foreign investment. It has also been
suggested that the banks had later changed their minds about
the merger and, therefore, frustrated it. 25
Instead, the government established another wholly-
owned bank - The National Bank of Kenya - and later took
over the remaining 40% in The National & Grindlays Bank
Ltd. (now known as Kenya Commercial Bank) to compete with
the foreign banks. In the meantime, it allowed the esta-
blishment of more foreign banks in the country. 26
	There
is, however, no doubt that the establishment of the two
Kenyan banks has gone some way in Africanizing the banking
system. Furthermore, the government has pledged that:
Every encouragement will, however, be given
towards local participation in the owner-
ship of foreign banks operating in this
country. 27
If need be, some of this 'encouragement' could be in the form
of restrictions imposed on recalcitrant foreign banks.
In addition to participation in the banking busi-
ness, the government has made several amendments in the
rules and legislation governing banking business.
	 One of
these amendments introduces a discriminatory element between
locally incorporated banks and those incorporated abroad. No
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locally incorporated bank may be licensed to conduct busi-
ness unless its paid up capital is KShs.10m.or more (up
from KShs.3m). The corresponding figure for foreign incor-
porated banks is KShs.50m. (up from KShs.10m.). In addition,
foreign banks are now required to keep within Kenya an
assigned capital of not less than KShs.10m. 28 While merely
incorporating locally does not make a foreign bank Kenyan
(except in law), the requirement is designed to have the
foreign banks incorporated locally as public companies so
that local elites and public financial institutions can
purchase part of the shares on the market. It is part of
the 'encouragement' for local participation in the owner-
ship of foreign banks.
A similar approach has been followed in the case of
the insurance industry. The government has established the
Kenya National Assurance Company to compete in the business
while ICDC acquired 51% of the Minet Insurance Group to
form Minet ICDC Ltd. There also exists local participation
in other insurance firms. In addition to this, the govern-
ment has used legislative means to take over part of the
re-insurance business. In 1970, parliament passed the State
Re-insurance Corporation of Kenya Act, 29 establishing the
State Re-insurance Corporation, to which it gave a degree
of statutory monopoly for the re-insurance of certain types
of policies. Section 3 of the Act provides that:
Every insurer shall re-insure with the cor-
poration in such proportion as the minister
may, by notice in the Gazette, prescribe of
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each policy, other than a policy of re-
insurance, issued or renewed in Kenya by
the insurer.
Under this provision, the Minister of Finance has required
that every insurer re-insure with the corporation 30% of
every fire and accident insurance policy issued in Kenya. 30
The scope and potential of utilizing this legislation to
fully Africanize the re-insurance business is virtually un-
limited. Its only limitations are the corporation's ability
to cope and the government willingness to Africanize. 31
In the case of industry, the government has so far
not utilized legislative means to achieve Africanization,
but has concentrated its efforts on administrative and
political means as well as government equity participation
to achieve its goal of Africanization. Unlike in countries
such as India and Nigeria, Kenya has no legislation desig-
nating the levels of equity holding foreign firms are
permitted to have in specified industry. However, this ab-
sence of legislative means does not mean Africanization has
not taken place. A considerable degree of Africanization
has been achieved since independence. The government has
pursued Africanization of this sector mainly through direct
treasury participation and through parastatal organiza-
tions. 32	The leading conduit for the government's
Africanization of industrial capacity is the Industrial and
Commercial Development Corporation. 33	It participates in
joint ventures with foreign investors both in existing and
new industrial capacity. Its participation was intended to
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promote African ownership of businesses rather than public
ownership and control of the same. Its 1965/66 Annual
Report, for example, describes its functions as including:
... help to African industrialists and
traders to expand their operations, and the
promotion of overall Africanization of in-
dustry and commerce.
Five years later, this was still its major objective and
the corporation claimed to have:
... relentlessly pursued its promotional role
as an effective mechanism for the implementa-
tion of the Africanization of trade and
industry in furtherance of government policy. 34
In pursuance of this policy, ICDC has bought equity in
several existing private companies and entered into joint
ventures with others in new projects. Thus, for example,
as of June 1977, it had invested a total of K.Shs.
167,601,470/= in equity in 61 companies, only five of which
were its wholly-owned subsidiaries. Of this investment,
K.Shs.126,605,160/=, or 76%, was invested in just nine pro-
jects managed and controlled (regardless of equity holding)
by foreign capita1. 35 ICDC's total overall equity in these
nine companies was 44%. Other parastatal institutions have
made similar, though smaller, investments. 36
AlthouRh the original intention was for ICDC to re-
sell its equity to individual Africans, no such sale has
taken place yet. However, in most of its agreements with
foreign capital, ICDC's right to sell all or any of its
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shares to the public (usually through its subsidiary company)
without giving priority to its partners is expressly recog-
nised. 37 In view of this, it may be that ICDC will in
future divest itself of sach equity by selling them to its
publicly quoted subsidiary - the ICDC Investment Company
Ltd. Some such sale has taken place, but the bulk of ICDC's
equity in joint ventures with foreign capital is still held
by the corporation.
A few individual African entrepreneurs have bought
significant amount of shares in existing foreign ' firms and/
or entered into partnership with such firms in new projects.
However, this figure is still relatively small. No firm
data exists except an unpublished study by Kaplinsky under-
taken for the NCCK. This study of some 2,000 large-scale
manufacturing firms shows that individual African entre-
preneurs have as yet to seriously challenge foreign equity
holding in industry. 38 In the words of the government:
Whereas improvements in efficiency will open
up more opportunities for Kenyans to engage
in industrial activities, the Government re-
cognizes (sic.) that the share of industrial
output contributed by Kenyan-owned industry 
is still very small. 39
2	 Personnel
The Africanization of personnel in foreign firms as
well as in all employment sectors has been a major policy
objective of the government since independence. 40 Indeed,
the government had 1982 in mind as the target date for a
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complete Kenyanization of employment in the 1974-8 Plan;
it observed that:
The Kenyanization programme deserves special
mention in the employment context for two
reasons. First, the Government has made
significant progress towards the achieve-
ment of its target of complete Kenyaniza-
tion by 1982. In 1967, only 59 per cent of
all posts and middle level manpower posts
were held by citizens. By 1972, 74 per
cent of all posts in those categories had
been Kenyanized; only 25,000 non-citizens
remain in such jobs. 41
The major legislative instrument used by the govern-
ment to pursue the Africanization of personnel has been the
Immigration Act of 1968. The Act makes the employment of
non-citizens subject to government regulation by requiring
that they obtain a work-permit from the Department of
Immigration. Section 18 of the Act makes it illegal for
any employer in the country to engage a non-citizen without
a work permit, while Section 19 makes it illegal for a non-
citizen to be employed without a permit. The stated
government policy has all along been that work permits
should not be issued to non-citizens for jobs for which
qualified Kenyans are available. Here too the Africans
have received priority and policy has, in practice, largely
been one of Africanization. The permits are issued for
short durations of approximately one to three years, thus
giving the government a chance to replace non-citizens with
Africans as soon as the latter become available.
To speed up the programme, the government set up the
1 66
Kenyanization of Personnel Bureau in 1967, under.the Ministry of
Labour, to advise the Immigration Department on the availability
of local personnel for jobs in the country. The Bureau, which was
abolidmdin 1981, built up a manpower register of citizens
available for all types of jobs falling vacant in the econ-
omy. The intention was to keep the Department of Immigration
well informed to enable it to decide in which cases to renew
and those to refuse to renew the permits of those non-
citizens that have expired or to fill up new posts. The
Bureau's rolewas only advisory in nature, but it did-	 exert
some	 pressure behind the sceneson foreign firms to
Africanize their management. Swainson states that the
Bureau was consulted on the question of training and per-
sonnel in the preparation for management contracts. 42 This
is, in fact, not the case in as far as the present author
has been able to gather in the cases studied. In most
cases, the foreign managers include a list of the posts
they need to fill With expatriates and demand that the
government issue work permits for them. 43	Indeed, neither
the Bureau nor the Ministry of Labour wai3 ever represented
in the NPC or any other body negotiating management agree-
ments. Contrary to Swainson's argument, none of the more
than twenty agreements containing provisions for training
of manpower has any schedules that can be termed 'strict'
for the provision of training schemes for local personnel.
In fact, the training provisions in the relevant agreement
of the major concerns mentioned in Swainson's work do not
contain any specific training schedules. 44	Most of the
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training provisions are ambiguous with the manner, type,
extent, duration and even cost of any training conducted
being left largely to the discretion of the foreign manager
or technical co1laborator. 45 However, even with the agree-
ments being weighed against a vigorous enforcement of the
training obligations of the foreigners, the Bureau did
exert . some
	
informal pressure on firms to Africanize
and to expedite their training programmes.
The government has also used its equity holding to
expedite Africanization of management in ventures involving
foreign capital. Where the government has no equity hold-
ing, some form of political pressure may be exerted in
achieving a certain amount of Africanization.	 Largely
because of the government's Africanization of personnel
policy, the employment of Kenyans grew at a rate of 5.2%
as compared to an average annual growth rate of 4.5% in
total employment between 1968 and 1977.	 Over the same
period, the employment of non-citizens was being reduced at
an average annual rate of 10.7%. While in 1968, non-
citizens comprised 7% of total modern sector employment,
this proportion had fallen to 1.7% in 1977. 46
Despite the success in Africanizing a substantial
proportion of equity and personnel in operations involving
foreign investment, its effective regulation and control has
proved rather elusive. Students of the Kenya economy are
agreed on the view that Africanization per se has not led
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to significant levels of effective regulation over foreign
investment. 47
 Both the 1971 ILO and the 1974 IBRD mis-
sions to Kenya are also agreed on this point. So does the
government, which observes that:
Control over the nation's resources and
institutions has progressively passed into
Kenyan hands ... But as progress is made
on the Kenyanization of assets, the need
to examine the functions of the institu-
tions coming under Kenyan control assumes
greater importance. Many of those insti-
tutions were initially established to
serve foreign rather than domestic
interests ... to channel savings abroad
instead of domestic investments ... The
functions of these institutions must ndw
be redefined to serve Kenyans rather than
expatriates and to serve all Kenyans rather
than the few. 48
The considerable Africanization so far achieved has, there-
fore, not been very successful in effecting structural
changes in the operation of the businesses involved to
radically alter their pattern of behaviour. The notion of
Africanization as a method of regulating and controlling
foreign investors is based on the traditional assumption
that owners of capital exercise control over their invest-
ments either directly or indirectly through their
representatives on the boards of directors. 49	This
assumption has been questioned and sufficiently shown that
it does not necessarily apply in the twentieth century
business environment. 50
 However, the Kenya government
believes that:
Government participation also provides an
opportunity to influence the direction of
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company policy in accordance with general
industrial strategy. 51
This view is predicated upon the premise that boards of
directors effectively execute their legal role as the
policy-formulating bodies in companies. In Kenya this is
rarely the case where foreign investors are involved.
There are three major reasons for the failure of Africani-
zation as a means of regulating and controlling foreign
investment. These are: the use by the foreign parties of
non-equity means of exercising effective control; the in-
competence of the Africanized boards of director -s; and an
alliance between local capital and political elites, on
the one hand, and foreign capital on the other. The remain-
ing part of this chapter is devoted to an examination of
these three items.
C	 EFFECTIVE CONTROL THROUGH NON-EQUITY PARTICIPATION
There is no denying that it may be a lot easier to
exercise control over a 100% owned subsidiary than a 50%
owned one. Where such complete ownership is politically
unfeasible, or even unwise, foreign investors have in-
creasingly come to learn and appreciate that local majority
equity ownership is not necessarily a bar to their exercis-
ing effective control. It has been observed that:
... although a number of foreign investors
... feel that voting and technical control
should always be linked, a majority of them
consider their technical superiority an
170
adequate means of exercising a lasting de
facto control over the foreign joint ven-
tures where they are in a minority
position. 52
Foreign investors in Kenya and other underdeveloped coun-
tries have been able to sufficiently alienate powers of
control from boards of directors by playing upon the notion
of the indispensibility of their supposedly superior
management , technical and marketing skills.
1 Management Control
The device of a management contract between joint
venture projects (or even wholly-owned Kenyan ones) and
foreign parties is one of the most frequent channels for
alienating much of the control over a project from the
boards. In most cases the managers are also equity holders
in the project. There seems, in government circles, a
rather credulous belief that the interests of the foreign
parties as managers and their interests as owners can be
and are reconcilable. This assumed neutrality of managers
is, however, not supported by empirical evidence. Indeed,
such empirical evidence as is available suggests that
foreign parties use their role as managers as a strong
counteracting force to the potential exercise of control
by local equity holders. To the foreign investor, a
management contract is an important instrument for retain-
ing control over an enterprise in which it may have lost
majority shareholding. 53 The most significant feature of
all the 25 management agreements studied in Kenya is the
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alienation from the boards by management, under the terms
of the agreements, of effective control over the affairs
of projects. The foreigners regard such contracts as so
vital to their interests that they insist on their appoint-
ment, or that of their nominee, as managers of the projects
irrespective of whether they hold minority or majority
equity. They make their appointment as managers a condi-
tion precedent to their equity participation. 54
	In two
of the cases studied, it is revealing to note that the
foreigners had specifically insisted on EITHER MAJORITY 
equity or a minority equity with EXCLUSIVE management rignts
and powers. While some of the agreements stipulate 	 the
foreigners' exclusive rights to management, others stipu-
late
	
their exclusive rights to hold specific positions
in the management of the project for as long as they remain
equity holders in the projects. 55 One of them, for example,
stipulates that:
KRKA shall provide DA with their experts
to assist DA in modern type of business
organization. Their experts will be as
managing director and marketing manager,
and will remain in their posts for so
long as KRKA is a shareholder in DA
(emphasis added).
Unless their equity is taken over, the foreigner's control
of what they take to be the key positions to suit their
interests in this particular project would appear to be
aimed at being perpetual.
The foreigners do not only insist on being appointed
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managers, but in addition insist on management being given
virtually unfettered powers to manage. They draft the
agreements in such a way that they give themselves wide dis-
cretionary powers in running the project while limiting the
boards' effective supervisory powers over them. 56	These
powers comprise both general rights and specific preroga-
tives of management. The managers are, in all cases, said
to be solely responsible for day-to-day management for
which they enjoy an immense degree of autonomy from the
boards under the agreements. In the 25 management agree-
ments studied, day-to-day management is said to include
sole responsibility for
- training of Kenyan personnel (25)
- hiring and firing management personnel (18)
- preparation and implementation of produc-
tion programmes (25)
- formulation of management and financial
control systems (19)
- preparing financial budgets (23)
- negotiations and conclusions of all con-
tracts with third parties (14)
marketing (8)
selection of engineering and technical
consultants (14)
selection of machinery and equipment
suppliers (17)
- purchase of raw materials (20)
- preparation of feasibility, market and
other studies (9)
It is clear that the agreements deal with all the important
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issues falling to be decided in the projects. The only
limitation is the stipulation that the managers are to
operate within the framework of the general overall policy
and consistent with the directions and instructions which
may from time to time be given and subject to the control
and supervision of the board of directors. In the Kenyan
circumstances, as we shall see later in this chapter, the
supervisory role of the boards is largely illusory.
There is little doubt that the rights and powers
given to managers under such agreements play a very vital
role in the shaping of the balance of power between Kenyan
and foreign partners. I asked one of the representatives
of the foreign manager's why they insisted on the management
agreement that gave them so much discretion in managing the
firm. He answered without the slightest	 hesitation that
this was to 'safeguard' their investment, adding that:
we are a minority shareholder as you may
be aware; we have no hope of influencing
or shaping company policies using our vot-
ing power. The majority shareholder is the
government. If voting power were to be
used to appoint managers, we would be out-
voted. This would not matter very much if
the management were efficient, but if it was
not, we would be the uncompensated losers
...so we insist on managing the firm to
ensure efficient management for our own
good and that of the Kenya government.
Shorn of its rationalisation element, this is an admission
that management has a vital role to play in 'safeguarding'
sectoral interests. In this particular case, the govern-
ment has consistently been the loser while the managers
174
(whose two affiliated companies are equity holders in the
project) have dictated the course of events in the project
over the last four years. A government-commissioned audit
of the firm concluded that the management and its affiliates
were the only beneficiaries of the project so far, with the
board having played ball all along. From the point of view
of effective control, management agreements would appear to
put the Kenyan partners at a significantly disadvantaged
position right from the start, •by leaving key decisions to
the discretion of the foreign management.
2 Control over Technical Matters 
Like in the case of management, technical agreements
play a crucial role in the determination of the balance o2
power in exercising control over any project between the
local and the foreign partners. They are an integral part
of foreign investors' arsenal of non-equity means of exer-
cising control over investment projects. As in management,
foreign investors usually insist on their, or their
nominee's, appointment as the technical collaborator in
projects. In 16 of the 25 projects studied, one or more of
the agreements (investment, promotion, technical, etc.)
stipulated such an appointment as a condition precedent of
their equity participation. One such agreement provided:
CIC agreed to invest K.Shs.42.5m. in the
venture upon condition (inter alia) that
PEC shall enter into a Technical Engineer-
ing Agreement (TEA) substantially in the
form set forth in Annex I hereto ...
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In this example, the foreign party has also made the accep-
tance of his draft TEA as a condition precedent to invest-
ing in equity. The terms in the TEA agreement are heavily
biased in favour of the foreigner, through PEC, exercising
control over the project that is disproportionate to his
34% equity holding. 57	In the remaining nine projects,
the foreign party or his nominee has been appointed techni-
cal collaborator although the appointment apparently appears
not to have been a condition precedent. In seven of those
cases, the appointments are on exclusive basis, while
one of the last two agreements is silent on the issue of
exclusivity. The agreement in the last provides interest-
ing reading. On the one hand it provides for the appoint-
ment of the foreign party as technical consultants,
provided:
... the said appointment in relation to
Art. 6 COptional services-I shall not be
exclusive ... BUT PROVIDED FURTHER that
EAPC will give BCI one month's notice in
writing of its intention to appoint or
enter into any agreement with any other
technical organization ... in respect of
the duties covered by the said article.
(emphasis added)
The said Art.6 provides that at the request of EAPC, BCI
would 'be prepared' to provide the relevant optional ser-
vices. From this, one may deduce that the notice provision
is, in effect, a requirement that EAPC give BCI first
option to provide the services. Should BCI exercise this
option, then the 'powers' of appointing other consultant
organizations by EAPC would be more apparent than real. This
seems to be the case in practice. 58
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The terms of the technical agreement studied give
wide powers to the foreign collaborators including those of:
- training of technical personnel (23)
- choice of technology input, including where
to obtain and who to supply the technology
(2)1)
- determining size of production unit (25)
_ choice of products (11)
In all these very vital aspects of any investment, the
Kenyan projects are entirely reliant on the foreigners'
technical and technological resources.
	 By making the sup-
ply of such resources exclusively the right of one or more
designated foreign firms, the agreements greatly reduce
the range of choice available to the Kenyan projects in
related matters. For example, Firestone's exclusive Pro-
cess and Licensing agreement's terms meant that the Kenya
tyre plant could not utilize Goodyear, Michelin, Uniroyal,
etc. resources, even if they could prove cheaper and of a
better quality than those Firestone International offers in
Kenya. The ability of the Kenyan boards of directors to
exercise control in determining the type of technology input
is therefore nullified by the terms of the agreements right
at the outset. Tie-in provisions and export restriction
clauses in technical agreements are two specific examples
of outright nullification of the boards' power of control
over company affairs.
Tie-in provisions compel Kenyan firms to acquire
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from their foreign technical collaborator or from sources
specified by him either one, a given combination, or all
of the following items: raw materials, machinery and
equipment, intermediate inputs, process and/or product
technology, technical and/or managerial knowhow, other ac-
cessories such as packaging thaterials, brand names, etc.,
and any other relevant purchases to be made in relation to
a particular business. Such tie-in provisions are either
explicitly or implicitly included in technical agreements.
In 19 of the 25 agreements studied in Kenya, the tie-in is
stipulated	 in express terms. An example is to be found
in a Technical Assistance Agreement in one of the motor
assembly projects. It requires that:
FARAGHA Kenya, within three years from the
date of this agreement, will assemble one
or more of the motor vehicle models ...
from CKD component packs which it will
purchase from MRIJA MKUU.
The foreign party also had an exclusive right to supply
machinery and equipment. Even in personnel training, the
agreement ties the Kenyan firm to the foreign technical
collaborator. The remaining six agreements do not ex-
plicitly tie the Kenyan firms to purchasing items from the
foreign collaborator, but they nevertheless do so impli-
citly.
	
This is cleverly done by giving the foreigner
exclusive right and responsibility for providing plant design
and specifications for machinery and equipment 'Is well as
for the purchase of the same. 59	Such provisions do not
provide the foreigner with a contractual right to supply
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anything, but they give him (not the board) the right to
determine who supplies what. In the absence of a provi-
sion excluding the foreigner from designating himself or his
affiliate as the supplier, he is free to so designate him-
self. The important factor here is that a traditional power
of a board is nullified by contractual terms and granted to
the technical collaborator.
Export-restriction provisions nullify a board's
power to mark out its marketing strategy and the geographi-
cal scope of its application. They are a common feature in
technical and trade mark agreements. The policy of allocat-
ing markets to those they can exert control over is a long-
standing practice of virtually all foreign investors. 60
Vaitsos, for example, found the practice very prevalent in
Colombia, while O'Brien observed the same practice in Spain.61
In the Kenyan case, export-restriction provisions occurred
in varying degrees of strictness in all the 25 agreements
examined. They all prohibited, either absolutely or with-
out the permission of the foreign technical collaborator,
the production or sale by the Kenyan firms of the products
produced utilizing the foreigner's technical assistance
outside the geographical limits specified in the agree-
ments.	 In one extreme example involving Coca Cola, the
sale of the products was restricted to within a radius of
30 kilometres. 62
	Thus the power to formulate an export
policy is, under all the agreements, either taken away from
the boards or severely limited. It is difficult to see how
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the Africanization of the 25 firms involved in this study
can assist in the achievement of the government's commend-
able new economic thinking to the effect that:
Future industrial growth must be based in-
creasingly on the penetration of export
markets. This plan period will be used to
effect the transition from an industrial
sector primarily serving the domestic
market to one that is actively and com-
petitively engaged in export sales. This
will require substantial increase in pro-
ductive efficiency, appropriate export
incentives and aggressive export-oriented
management. 63
Without the removal of the pervasive export restrictions or
their being legally outlawed, such export-stimulating
strategies are likely to lead only to increased exporting
capacity without export markets.
3 Marketing Control 
Marketing is a vitally important phase of any busi-
ness. It comprises the promotional and sales operations
of a firm. The promotional aspects of marketing involves
bringing to the attention of buyers of a given commodity as
well as persuading them to buy one's product in preference
to those offered by competitors (if any). This is done
chiefly through advertising. Product promotion is particu-
larly intense, and therefore very important, in branded
products where several competing substitutes exist, as in
the case of toiletries or soft drinks. The foreign parties
utilize trade-marks and/or trade names agreements to exer-
cise control over domestic marketing. In export markets,
180
the foreigners usually utilize marketing agreements to re-
serve marketing decisions to the virtual exclusion of the
boards. The most extensive and far-reaching of domestic
marketing control by the foreign investors is 	 so far in
mattersrelated to promotional activities. Fourteen trade-
marks and/or trade names agreements were examined in this
study. They all contained elaborate provisions for the
rights and powers of the licensor to literally dictate mar-
keting procedures and strategy to the Kenyan projects. These
mandatory provisions give extensive powers to the foreigners
to determine the advertising campaigns, includihg minimum
costs to be incurred, 64 product packaging and labelling,
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pricing, etc. 66	In one case, for example, the agreement
-
requires the licensee:
To submit to the owner of trademark for
approval, prior to the use thereof, all
packaging, labels, advertising and other
material on which the said trademark
appear and to amend to the satisfaction
of the owner any such packaging, labels,
advertising and other material.
It is very doubtful whether the board of such a firm has any
powers left to it in marketing matters independent of the
foreigner who is a minority shareholder, but has effective
veto power. 67
The creation of goodwill for the foreign trade-
marked goods is given high priority to the extent of ex-
pressly prohibiting the Kenyan licensee from selling
products under its own brand names.	 Four of the fourteen
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agreements include such express prohibition clauses. 68
Again, in such cases the board can hardly be said to be in
control of product diversification through product differ-
entiation. The trademark laws in the country granting
firms rights to differentiate their products is thus clearly
rendered of no practical use to the Kenyan firms except in
so far as the foreigners approve. And they do this to
suit their interests.	 In addition to prohibiting use of
independent brand names, some trademark agreements also in-
clude express tie-in and export-restriction provisions as
well as quality control provisions designed to strengthen
the foreigners' control over domestic marketing. 69
In export marketing the agreements simply grant a
monopoly of such marketing to the foreigner in all cases.
Four such agreements were examined, all of them in what is
usually referred to as the export sector. The philosophy
underlying this grant of exclusive export marketing rights
to foreigners appears to be the belief that the services of
an 'established' international firm is an indispensible key
to success. 70	Thus in one of the cases, for example,
notwithstanding ICDC's reservations about the services
offered by the foreign parties, "in particular as to
whether it was desirable for B to be the exclusive market-
ing agent", 71 the agreement appointed the foreigners:
... to act as exclusive agents export for
the marketing of all of the products pro-
duced at the plant ...
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The reason for granting such monopoly marketing rights
despite the serious misgivings expressed about the foreign-
ers appears to be the belief of the indispensibility of
their services in the marketing of the products abroad. 72
Indeed, they were, in this case, the only market, as they
were to buy all the Kenyan firm's export produce.
In all the four agreements the marketing agents had
total and exclusive control over the marketing of the pro-
ducts abroad. The Kenyan majority owned firms who produce
the products have no say at all, under the agreement, in
this matter. The boards' powers over export marketing had
effectively been ceded to the foreigners and Africanization
was therefore of no consequence in this matter. Not a
single one of these agreements provided for the effective
supervision of the agents in their execution of their mar-
keting obligations. In one celebrated case, Kenya Canners
Ltd., the foreigners went much farther than utilizing their
marketing skills and rights to alienate export marketing
powers from the board. They used them to de-Kenyanise the
firm.73
INCOMPETENCE OF BOARDS
The imcompetence of many of the boards appointed to
projects involving local capital is a significant contri-
butory factor to the failure of Africanization as an
effective means of regulating and controlling foreign in-
vestments. There are several factors that account for the
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boards' ineffectual exercise of control. Some of these
also affect the ability to exercise control through the
Africanization of management personnel. The incompetence
observed in boards has little to do with inherent incom-
petence of the individuals involved, but is largely the
function of the environment in which they operate. As we
have already noticed, many key issues in business operation
have been taken away from the jurisdiction of the boards or
the African management personnel and given to the foreign
parties. Such contractual terms render the boards, as well
as African managers, short of acting in breach of the agree-
ments, legally incompetent to exercise any control over such
matters. In addition, even where the board has the legal
power to act, the power of the majority shareholders so to
act in key issues may be nullified by a stipulation that
such decisions require not a majority vote, but a unanimous
vote of the board. 74	This, in effect, gives the minority
foreign shareholders a power of veto over such issues. In
such a case, the only effective Africanizstion is a 100%
equity takeover.
	
In two other joint ventures in which
the government holds a 51% and 60% equity, a much more
subtle approach was adopted by the foreign parties. 	 The
two projects have common managers and technical collabora-
tors and their joint venture and other agreements are
virtually identical.
	
The management has no equity in any
of the projects. However, the joint venture agreement in
each case gives it the right to be represented on the board.
The agreements provide for the right of the government to
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have three directors on the board and the two foreign par-
ties two. In addition, the management is entitled to have
a representative director. Thus, in reality, in spite of
being the minority equity holders, the foreign parties
have managed to obtain equal representation on the board
by having the subsidiary of one of them as the management
with a right of representation. The required quorum is
five, three of whom must be the foreign parties. 75
The sometimes complex technical and financial nature
of projects may render boards incompetent in as far as the
ability of the members to absorb and critically analyse
the myriad technical and financial aspects of a given pro-
ject is limited. This is confounded by the fact that the
day-to-day management of projects rests with the foreign
parties or their affiliates under management contracts.
So also do the technical details for which the foreigners
are usually responsible under the relevant technical
agreements. This means that the boards must, of necessity,
rely on information, data and recommendations of the
foreigners. Although the boards are legally responsible
for the formulation of overall policy, this is in fact no
more than a line of action based on the analysis of aggre-
gate day-to-day factors over a period of time for which
the board must rely on the foreigners. For a board to be
effectively in control of the policies of a company, it
would need to have access to all the correct relevant data
and other information, as well as its membership being
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able to make critical analysis of the same and reaching
intelligent conclusions. In the majority of cases studied
the Kenyan directors are simply unqualified as entrepre-
neurs in the fields to which they are appointed. Most of
them have no experience whatsoever in the line of business
they are involved in. They hold their directorships in
the companies by virtue of either their jobs in the civil
service, political connections, wealth or a combination of
these. For example, in 1975/76, the local directors of the
East African Oil Refineries included an MP, two permanent
secretaries and a government official, none of whom had
any experience in the oil industry, and all owed their
appointment to the board to their positions in the politi-
cal system. Many such boards are, therefore, more likely
than not to accept the management's version of issues and
to adopt the latter's recommendations. By contrast, the
foreigners' representatives on the boards are usually always
technically qualified and well-seasoned in the line of
business in which they are appointed. 	 It is virtually
impossible for Kenyan directors to utilize their positions
on the boards to formulate policy and exercise control over
business operations about which they know next to nothing.
In addition to their lack of experience and technical
qualifications, most of them are simply overloaded and,
therefore, severely handicapped by their other commitments.
A handful of local businesses and political elites are
repeatedly involved in a number of projects because the
government has been reluctant to appoint representatives
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from without the mainstream of the bureaucracy. This leaves
the Kenyan representatives spread too thin to pay the
detailed attention to the affairs of their projects which
is required to ensure effective control. In Rivatex, for
example, by 1979 the nine Kenyan representatives (includ-
ing alternatives) on the board simultaneously held between
them 125 'other' directorships, while the seven foreign
representatives held between them only 14 'other' director-
ships. One Kenyan, for example, held in 1978 sixty-one
directorships, over 70% of which were in joint venture with
foreign companies and covered a very wide range of busi-
ness activities. 76
 If one adds the lack of technical
qualification and business experience to such an overloaded
system of directorships, it becomes easy to appreciate why
Kenyan directorships on boards have hardly had any signi-
ficant effect on joint venture company operations. The
views of one public institution official deputising for
his boss as an alternative are revealing; he thinks that:
There is little Kenyan directors can do
to control the management. The managers
are professionals in their fields and so
are the directors of the foreign companies
sitting on the boards. Kenjan directors
on the other hand hardly have any busi-
ness experience. They are appointed by
virtue of their positions in the civil
service or in these public institutions.
Quite frankly many boards sit to rubber
stamp the managers' suggestions. 77
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ALLIANCE WITH FOREIGN CAPITAL
In 1965, the Kenyan government gave unsolicited
advice to foreign investors on how to survive in an in-
dependent Kenya.	 It advised them that:
Foreigners have no vote in Kenya and
can only have a political voice now
that independence has been achieved by
enlisting the support of Kenya citizens. 78
This was a clear invitation to the foreign investors to en-
list the support of key political figures to help them
feather their nests. The foreigners were quick to adopt
this advice, as they have done in other countries. 	 The
relative success of the government's Africanization pro-
gramme is, in many cases, a result of the foreign investors
heeding this rather frank advice. In an administered econ-
omy as exists in Kenya, political support by persons or
groups with influence over the powers that be has become a
'commodity' much sought after by foreign investors.
	 Em-
pirical evidence gathered by recent students of the Kenyan
economic system suggest that foreign capital has had sub-
stantial success in obtaining such relatively unqualified
supporL. 79
While to the government Africanization represents
an instrument of control, to the foreign investors it has
served as a useful instrument of decontrol. They have,
therefore, supported the programme and in most cases in-
sisted on domestic participation. This has led to the
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forging of quite a strong alliance between foreign capital
and powerful local political forces. 80 Foreign capital has
long realized that while it might be much easier to exercise
control over a wholly-owned subsidiary, domestic participa-
tion in their ventures offers a useful and reliable
insurance against political risks. 81
 This is true not only
in Kenya but also in other countries. Thus, for example,
in the wake of the Zambian nationalization of the copper
industry in 1969, the Economist was quick to point out that:
The shrewdest businessmen in that part of
the world OfricD have argued for some-
time that 4o per cent stake in a business
whose success is underwritten by govern-
ment participation may be more valuable
than 100 per cent of a concern exposed to
all the wind that blows. Companies that
have anticipated the direction of events
and invited the government into partner-
ship have no reason to regret Zambian
investment. 82
In Kenya, many foreign investors have not been unwilling
Africanizers. Rather they have strongly pressed for domes-
tic participation 83 and actively Africanized their manage-
ment with Africans sympathetic to their cause. The alliance
forged between foreign capital and the powers that be
through the Africanization programme has provided the for-
mer with a workable insurance policy against unfavourable
government interference, as well as providing one for
government interference favourable to their cause. 	 One
recent study has observed that:
By making available relatively large sums as
both equity and loan finance, by a record of
minimal interference in the workings of the
firms, and by substantially reducing the
189
firms' risk by providing vital contacts
and a powerful ally in the firms' negotia-
tions with the government, parastatal
investments make attractive investment
partners. 84
For such foreign firms, Africanization is a "painless and
antiseptic" way of responding to government control 85
 or
for pressuring the government to grant further concessions
whenever needed. Thus, for example, in one case where one
such company wanted the government to block a competitor
from establishing production facilities as well as import-
ing the product, the firm applied for such protection. It
sent a copy of its application to its parastatal partner
with a request for the parastatal to pressurise the Minis-
try of Industry to grant such protection. The parastatal
immediately responded with a letter to the director of in-
dustries pointing out that:
As you are aware we have financed up
to 40% of ... a company that has been pro-
ducing a range of ... for the last 9 months.
The installed capacity is enough to supply
the local market with all types of ...
As a condition of disbursing our loan we
received some indication that the govern-
ment was going to give the required
protection by way of referring all appli-
cations for importation of ... to messrs
... for letters of no objection, ... We
would appreciate very much if this company
is accorded the requisite protection. 86
The company got what it wanted; a veto power over the im-
portation of competing products, as well as blocking the
establishment of a competing plant. 87
 In another case,
a company applied for the following protection:
- a ban on all import of all refined salt for
two years.
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-
a decrease in duty on coarse salt, which
must be considered as an industrial raw
material, from 30% to 15%. 88
-
increase in duty on refined and vacuum
salt from 30% to 60% after the expiration
of the two-year ban.
In its letter to the government containing those demands,
it argued thus:
First of all we wish to point oul' that the
majority of the equity of our company is
owned by ... [Iwo parastatag
The two parastatals duly supported the demand formulated by
the foreign managers of the firm who were also the minority
equity holders and the exclusive suppliers of coarse salt
to the Kenyan firm. The use by the foreigners of local
partners or personnel as channels for obtaining privileges
and concessions from the government was found to be exten-
sive as well as frequent in the present study. 89 In some
cases the 'lobbyist' role of the domestic partner was ex-
pressed in contractual terms. Appendices 1/2 contain extracts
from two joint venture agreements showing the 'lobbyist'
role assigned to the domestic equity holder.
The alliance between foreign capital and the powers
that be is cemented by the incorporation of key figures
from the political mainstream or the civil service into the
foreign managed business operations. This is achieved
through offers of executive management posts as well as
passing on increasingly large crumbs of the profits from the
excessive profits derived from the business. Many senior
1 91
government officials and other political heavyweights have
either a few shares in such companies or have lucrative
contracts for the supply of local inputs to the foreign-
managed firms or for the distribution of their products.
The selection of the personalities to be incorporated is
carefully done on the criteria of their potential abilities
to deliver the necessary influence over the powers that be.
A poignant example of the cementing of such alliance
occurred in 1976, when a prominent multinational company
operating in Kenya decided to issue one million shares to
the public. The company valued the shares at 15/= on the
basis of its 1975 profitability, but intended to sell them
at 13/=.	 However, the book value of the shares in 1975 was
8/65. In a confidential circular to selected prominent
Kenyans occupying key decision-making posts, the company
offered blocks of 2,000 shares to each of the selected few
at the par value of 5/=• 90
In the Africanization of personnel, the foreign in-
vestors find another channel for cementing their alliance
with the local bourgeoisie who wield political power.
Appointment to the very senior executive posts are usually
offered to Africans with close personal relationship with
those in positions of authority. 91 As for the rest of the
management and technical personnel, the new personnel be-
comes increasingly company oriented in their thinking rather
than defenders of national interests. They therefore absorb
and adopt the foreign parties' management philosophies and
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styles while seeking to make little change of any signifi-
cant consequence to the operation of the companies in whose
management they participate. A major factor in producing
loyalty to the company first rather than to the nation is
the material benefits that go with appointment to manager-
ial positions in foreign-managed firms. Conformity to
company views and policies as espoused by the dominant
foreign parties is an overriding prerequisite to reaching
the top level of management in such firms. Thus one gets
appointed to such posts not because of his exhibited poten-
tial to assert local shareholders' control over the foreign
managers, but because of those that exhibit his loyalty to
the company as run by the foreigners. This is one of the
reasons why the foreign management have sought and obtained
wide discretionary powers in matters relating to the
appointment, promotion and training of personnel. 92
 The
financial returns that go with such appointments are so
high compared with those available in any other sector that
the price of opposition to company policies can be financi-
ally very high indeed. As the ambition of a lot of those
joining the ranks is to acquire the affluence enjoyed by
their foreign counterparts, the high financial returns con-
stitute enough attraction to stifle any nationalistic
feelings they may entertain. One African marketing manager
of a Swiss-managed company in Kenya told me that he would
only consider accepting another job if it offered him a
monthly net income of 20,000/=. He explained that:
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I earn over 12,000/= a month; I have a
fully maintained company luxury car, my
three children have their fees paid for by
the company in exclusive schools, I have
a company house, I get a good bonus every
end of year. Where else would I get such
incentives? In any case, even if I would,
would I not have to conform to my super-
iors' policies? If I have to serve under
patronage, I would rather serve here,where
the returns are better.
There are many Kenyans who feel like that and who aspire to
such positions and the financial returns. 93	Their controll-
ing role is thus obviously limited by their pecuniary
interests. In his 1975 path-breaking work on the Kenyan
political economy, Colin Leys observed that:
After talking to a number of leading for-
eign companies' senior personnel, one
became conscious that external control was
really less important than the socializa-
tion of the new African executives into
their roles as foreign-company managers.
None of the managers I talked to, African
or expatriate, thought that complete
Africanization of top management would en-
tail any significant change in company
policies ... In retrospect, what strikes
one as significant is that in the course
of many discussions no senior African
executive mentioned this issue,	 of
control over fundamental company policies
and in general it was the identity of
views of African and expatriate executives 
that was remarkable, not the differences. 94
Years later, the present author found little evidence to
suggest the contrary. Even in 1982, African personnel are
still being appointed and socialized in foreign-managed
firms.
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F	 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has discussed the government's African-
ization programme as an instrument of regulation and control
over foreign investors. I have shown that the government
believes that Africanization would give Kenyans a greater
say in running the sections of the economy hitherto
dominated by foreign investors. This view is not shared by
independent observers, including the ILO 1971 mission to
Kenya. 95	Having outlined the pattern the Africanization
programme has assumed, I have endeavoured to show that
though it has no doubt reduced the volume of foreign owner-
ship to a level below which it would otherwise have been
without the programme, it has nevertheless not resulted in
the achievement of effective control over foreign invest-
ment. It is clear that foreign investors have increasingly
come to rely on non-equity channels of exercising control
with enviable success.
Another factor discussed in this chapter is the use
which foreign investors have made of the Africanization pro-
gramme to feather their nests in Kenya. It is clear that
they have achieved considerable success in their use of
Africanization to ward off possible control by the govern-
ment and as a medium of extracting vital concessions from
the government. Those African representatives of domestic
owners have consisted of the elite group in the society and
have proved, at times, unresponsive to national priorities
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or even government objectives, either because they were or
had been rendered incompetent to exercise any significant
control or because their pecuniary interests have compro-
mised them into an alliance with foreign capital. 96 Where
local participation takes the form of subscribing for
shares on the stock exchange, the dispersal of a majority
local ownership among a number of equity holders has
created a passive non-unified group, a factor that has
assisted minority foreign interest to perpetuate its con-
trol position with ease.
In the context of Kenya's discretionary and ad hoc 
system of regulatory mechanisms and interventions, Afri-
canization has provided foreign capital with useful allies
in pressurising the government to exercise this discretion
in favour of projects they manage and control in the
country. This guarantees their profitability, which is
their primary objective in investing their funds in Kenya.
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NOTES
1. SP 10/65 p.11
2. T. Mboya, 1969, pp.202-3
3. SP 10/65, 27
4. Ibid. Introduction by Kenyatta.
5. See for example Ibid at p.14
6. For more details see C. Leys, 1975; A. Hazlewood,
1979; J.B. Harbeson, 1966; V. Vinnai, 1973;
Gachuki, 1976.
7. SP 10/65. 28
8. For details see A. Njonjo, 1978
9• 'Elitinisation t would better describe this phase.
The small shop-owners in rural areas and those in
urban slum areas escape this elitinisation because
of their relatively low returns.
10. For details see Kaplinsky's works; Langdon, 1976;
Swainson 1980; Leys 1975; Marris and Somerset, 1971.
11. SP 10/65, 13
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid. at p.30
14. Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Report of an
ad hoc Committee, 1970
15. See for example 1970-74 plan pp.9 and 316; 1974-8
plan pp. (i), 2, and 41; 1979-83 plan pp.6, 27; etc.
16. Some operations owned by Kenyan citizens of non-
African origin were also taken.
17. For a useful example of the Canadian subsidiary E.A.
Packaging Co. Ltd., see Leys, 1975 p.129
18. 1979-83 Plan, 29. (emphasis added)
19. Act 33 of 1967
20. 1979-83 plan p.375
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21. Ibid. at p.376. The major loophole appears to be
s.2(2) (b) of the Trade Licensing Act  which defines
a citizen corporation thus "a corporation is a citi-
zen of Kenya if more than 	 of its capital is held
by or on behalf of persons who are citizens of Kenya."
22. Cap.404, Laws of Kenya.
23. Transport Licensing Regulation 15(3). L.N.264/1968.
Although the regulation refers to 'citizens', the
TLB has always sought to use it as a basis for
executing the government's Africanization policy in
the transport business. In one case, for example,
the board made a distinction between citizens of
different origins and, therefore, refused a licence
to those of non-African origin because this would be
in contravention of its avowed Africanization aim.
Certiorari went from the High Court to quash the
decision, the Court holding that the refusal was
unconstitutional. (Shah Vershi Devshi & Co. V. TLB)
(1971) EA 289.
24. See Leys, 1975, 128
25. The first of these two possible reasons for the failure
to effect this arrangement was suggested to me by
Steve Langdon in his comments on the first draft of
this work. This is the impression he got from his
interviews with government officials in his 1971/73
survey on multinational corporation in Kenya. The
second was given to me by a senior African manager in
one of the two foreign banks involved. He expressed
the view that the banks may have pressurised the
government to abort the plan.
26. No less than 8 new foreign banks have set up business
in the country since 1972.
27. 1979-83 plan p.72
28. See 1980 Budget Speech, at p.10
29. Act 20 of 1970
30. LN 233/1970 abd LN 265/1971. The initial percentage
was 20%
31. The indications are that the squeeze on insurers will
continue See 1979-83 plan p.71
32. Examples of the former are KCFC, KFC, and Mumias Sugar
Co. ICDC and IDB, between them, hold 30.5% of the
issued capital of the 23 biggest industrial firms
established in Kenya since independence (see their
1979 Annual Reports)
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33. It was set up in 1954 by the Industrial Development 
Ordinance of that year. Its present statutory form
was provided for in the 1967 Industrial Development 
(Amendment) Act which also expanded its interests to
cover the commercial sector.
34. ICDC 1970/71 Annual Report.
35. ICDC 1976/77 Annual Report. The nine were:
Fluospar Co. of Kenya Ltd 	 51% ...
General Motors of Kenya Ltd 
	 51% ...
E.A. Fine Spiners Ltd 	
 65% ...
Kenya Minning Industires Ltd
	
 51% ...
Firestone E.A. Ltd 
	
 20% ...
Brollo Kenya Ltd 
	
 40% ...
PVP Ltd 	
 37% ...
Rivatex 	
 36% ...
African Synthetic Fibres Ltd
	
 49% ...
Kshs21,942,280/=
Kshs12,535,000/=
Kshs15,330,360/=
Kshs 7,650,000/=
Kshs 8,435,860/=
Kshs 6,666,660/=
Kshs 6,345,0001=
Kshs31,000,000/=
Kshs14.700,000/=
36	 These are IDB, DFCK, AFC, KCB and NBK
37. For example clause 1(2) of the Joint Venture agreement
in Salt Manufacturers Ltd.,; Clause 9 of the promotion
Agreement in Dawa Pharmaceutical. Also the Investment
Agreement in Kenya Furfural Ltd.
38. See Kaplinsky, 1980 for statistical details in support
of this contention.
39. 1979-83 Plan, 29 (emphasis added)
40: See for example, SP 10/65 Pp.13 and 57; 1966-70 plan
41. P.93 . The term Kenyanization has been substituted for
Africanization in recent years.
42. N. Swainson, 1980 p.237.
43. Examples are KCFC's and KFC's Project Implementation and
Management Agreements; Interfood's Technical Services
and Management Agreement; PVP's and Kenya Furfural's
Management Agreements.
44. These include Kenya Canners Ltd., Firestone EA Ltd.;
AVA, Leyland Kenya Ltd.; GM Kenya Ltd.; and EAPC Ltd.
45. Examples are in EAPC, KCFC, KFC, etc.
46. 1979-83 Plan, 5.
47. See Langdon, 1976; Kaplinsky 1976, 1978 and 1979;
Eglin, 1978; Swainson 1980; Hoperaft 1979; Deepak Lal,
1975; Leys, 1975
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48. 1979-83 plan p.6
49. See E.S. Herman, 1981 at p.4
50. See Baran & Sweezy, 1966; E.S. Herman, 1981; J.K.
Galbraith, 1967.
51. 1970-74 plan p.316
52. Quoted in Lewis D. Solomon, 1978 p.109
53. Studies in other countries have reached similar
conclusions. Examples are A. Richter, 1980 and
C. Vaitsos, 1974.
54. Examples inlcude KFC, KCFC, Interfood Kenya Ltd.
Furfural, GM, Leyland, Dawa Pharmaceutical, and
Salt Manufacturers K. Ltd.
55. Eight of the projects studied have one or other of
such stipulations.
56. The KCFC joint venture agreement, for example, gives
the foreign parties the power of selecting and appoin-
ting the technical project mahager which is a vitally
important post in the project. The agreement provides
PEC (foreign technical collaborators) shall
provide the names of one or more persons who
in PEC's opinion are qualified to act as
technical project manager ... and subject to
the approval of Management (ostensibly foreig-
ners) (which shall not be unreasonably withheld)
one of these persons shall be employed by the
company and shall report to the management.
(emphasis ad,-clE)T
The board has thus no role to play in what should be
its funciton.
57. See Appendix 3 for sample clauses of Eximcorp!s
powers under the KFC's PIMA
58. Information obtained from interview with an official
in Treasury, January, 1980.
59. An example of such provision is to be found in KFC's
PIMA whose clause 1.1. of Art.1 reads "The company
hereby appoints the management to plan, construct,
carry out, set up, establish and ensure the completion
of the project on behalf of the company ... to the
intent that the management shall with land, building,
plant and equipment acquired ... in the name of the
company, be responsible for providing, establishing
and commissioning ... a complete polyester fibre
plant ...."
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60. See H. Martyn, 1964 p.97
61. See Vaitsos, 1974 and O'brien's Spanish case
study respectively.
62. The relevant clause read: "The corporation ... hereby
authorises the bottler, and the bottler undertakes
upon the terms and conditions following, to prepare and
bottle ..., and to distribute and sell the same under
the trademark in and throughout, but only in and
throughout, the following territory ... The township
of Nyeri and an area bounded by a radius of 30 km. from
the Nyeri G.P.O." The G.P.O. is located in the centre
of the township.
63. 1979-83 plan p.28
64. One agreement, for example, obliges the Kenyan licensee
to spend a minimum of 20% of sales revenue in adverti-
sing with 25% of this (i.e. 5% of sales revenue) going
to the foreign licensor as a marketing service fee.
65. Kenya Canners was obliged to import labels from Del
Monte International despite the fact that such labels
were available on the local market at comparative
quality. A pharmaceutical firm was obliged to import
'green' vials from its foreign licensor although vials
of comparable quality were available locally at cheaper
prices except they were not green! (See Hoperaft, 1980)
66. The firm referred to in note 62 above, for example,
influenced the pricing level of the Kenyan products by
setting the extent of trade discounts at 25%. Firestone
E.A. Ltd. is another example in which the foreign party
determines the price under the terms of the investment
agreement. As a result it prices its local tyres at
very large premiums above the imported equivalent a
factor which led in 1978, for example, to its making a
100% return on its investment.
67. An official of the firm informed this author that this
veto has been exercised in the past.
68. One such clause reads: "... licensee shall not manufac-
ture or sell products under its own brand names which
may be regarded by 'C' as competitive with the Licensed
products. In the event question arises, the licensee
shall abide by the decision of C and will withdraw from
its lines any products which C deems competitive or label
them to conform with C's instructions ..." Of the other
10 agreements, 6 have provisions that give de facto 
powers over such issues to the foreign parties.
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69. All the fourteen agreements included tie-in provisions
falling into four main categories. Twelve of the
agreements also included export-restriction clauses
while all the fourteen included provisions for quality
control by the trademark suppliers that were very
strict.
70. One marketing agreement, states in the preamble that
"The company (Kenyan) believes that a continuous
marketing of its products in overseas markets on favou-
rable terms can only be undertaken through a well
established importer and processor of dehydrated
vegetables." In the Kenya Canner's case, it was DFCK
that insisted on bringing in a firm like Del Monte with
international marketing experience.
71. See	 PVP Committee Report 1977, p.19
tr
72. For example, in a letter from the General Manager
DFCK to the executive director, ICDC dated 27.7.73, on
the subject, the former observes that; "If BW is wrong
in its appreciation of the raw material supply position
(i.e. in its feasibility study) it does not stand to
lose much. Its only investment is $154,000 in equity
out of a total project cost of $3.46m. Against this BW
appears to recover $25,000 for the feasibility study and
planning, $10,000 p.a. fixed plus 10% of gross adjusted
profits ... However, I share 1DB's view that if BW are 
driven too hard they may lose interest and they appear 
to be the only large scale user of dehydrates to have 
shown interest." (emphasis added)
73. Under a 1965 technical agreement, Del Monte was given
a right of option to purchase 60% equity. It exercised
this right in_1968. As of today, it holds 97% equity.
74. See for example, C1.9(d) of Interfoods Joint Venture
Agreement.
75. See Art.V1I of KCFC's and KFC's.JOintiVenture Agreements.
76. In addition to this, he was the Chairman of a parastatal
and had numerous other public roles to play.
77. Interview with a parastatal Senior Project Officer,
November 1980.
78. SP 10/65 p.13
79. See studies by Langdon, 1976; Kaplinsky, 1978 and 1979; Swainson,
1930; Hoperaft, 1979; Eglin, 1978 and Leys, 1975.
80. As this study is limited in its scope, the reader is
referred to the following work on the debate raging
on about the alliance of foreign capital and the
indigenous bourgeoisie in Kenya. Swainson 1980;
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Langdon 1976 and 1978; Kaplinsky 1975, 1978, 1979
and 1980; Bjorn Beckham 1980; Willy Mutunga 1977
and 1979; A Hazlewood 1979; A Njonjo 1978.
81. See Langdon 1976 and 1978 and P Hoperaft 1979.
82. The Economist 23/8/69 p.56.
83. Of the 25 projects studied, 11 of them insisted on
government participation as a condition precedent.
84. P. Hoperaft 1979, Part II p.15
85. See Ibid for examples. In June 1981, the Minister for
Finance in his budget prohibited the export of hides
and skins. This was aimed at encouraging local leather
industry in which Kenya can be competitive on the export
market. Three weeks later, after intensive pressure by
exporters of hides and skins the majority of who are
either foreign ownedormanaged and controlled, the export
ban was lifted by the President in an address to a
public rally.
86. Letter from IDB to Director of Industries dated 28.3.78
87. Letter from Ps Commerce & Industry to Import Licensing
Office dated 5.7.77.
88. The Italian company involved supplied the coarse salt
from Italy although it was available at Mombasa.
89. Such cases were observed in, among others, the motor,
tyre, paper, vegetable processing, can and textile
industries. Also in the Molasses complex in Kisumu.
90. It is significant that the circular was issued not under
the firm's letterheads but those of its African director
(then, an MP) who sent out the circular. The same person
held directorships in more than a dozen firms involving
foreign capital and once made a speech to the Association
of African manufacturers in which he said "... I am
convinced that unless the African who form more than 95%
of Kenyans population feels that he is part and parcel
of our ... economy ... it could be difficult to create
a stable economy ... He (the ordinary man in the street)
must be made to feel that it is truly his industry ...
You have a responsibility to assist in the Africanization..
if for nothing else, at least for the preservation of the 
institution and value of the free enterprise system".
Quoted in Ley-s 1975 p.145 (emphasis added)
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91. In the past these have included the President's
blood and marriage relatives, his close friends,
ex-government ministers, senior government officials,
their relatives etc.
92. One PIMA for example provides in Art.III clause 3.5
that "The management shall have the right to appoint
all such staff as required by the company ... inclu-
ding but not limited to the General Manager, Chief
Accountant, Works Manager and Chief Engineer. All
agreements studied gave the foreign parties great
opportunity fordeterminingorinfluencing the selection
and appointment as well as the promotion opportunities
of senior management staff.
93. A revealing case is that of a former classmate of the
author who felt that his American/ICDC Joint Venture
employers project was exploiting Kenya, but was also
paying him four times as much as he would be earning in
the civil service. He added, "if I had opposed company
policies, I probably would not even be here. Why should
I wage a war the government has shunned for 16 years
at the very probable price of losing my job?"
94. Leys, 1975 p.124 (emphasis added)
95. ILO Report, 1972
96. See Hoperaft 1979, for an example in the pharmaceutical
industry.
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CHAPTER FIVE
FINANCIAL AND FISCAL REGULATION 
Financial and fiscal regulation of business opera-
tions has been one of the "range of sensitive controls" 1
the government has used in its attempt to influence the
use of humanyeconomic and natural resources by private
capital. Such means of economic regulation are a common
feature in many capitalist economies both developed and
underdeveloped. It can be used by the government to influ-
ence the pattern and trend of the economy in response to
particular or general economic environment. It is possible
for the government to use financial and fiscal measures as
a 'stick' or as a 'carrot' or a combination of the two.
Used as a 'stick' the measures seek to either discourage
certain economic trends pursued by private capital by
penalising those who prompt such trends or encouraging
certain activities by threatening pecuniary penalties to
those who pursue other less desirable activities. Used as
a 'carrot' such measures constitute incentive to follow a
trend indicated by the government. 2 In a lot of cases,
fiscal measures are primarily intended and geared to gene-
rate revenue for the exchequer.3
Since independence, the Kenya government has increa-
singly applied financial and fiscal measures primarily
for the purpose of conserving foreign exchange and
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generating revenue. It has also utilized such measures as
incentives to attract capital and recently to try and achieve
other objectives such as geographical distribution of indus-
tries. This latter approach is a recent phenomenon as we
shall see in the following discussion. In this chapter,
financial and fiscal regulation is discussed under three
main headings. These are regulation by the Central Bank,
regulation through taxation measures and that under the
Industrial Training Act. This last measure is given special
attention not because it has been extensively used or even
particularly successful, but because it specifically deals
with the vital aspect of manpower training and employment
policy. The pre-occupation of the financial and fiscal
measures with foreign exchange matters will, it is hoped,
become clear from the discussion.
Except where the regulatory measures are specifically
stated to apply exclusively to non-resident persons, they
apply equally, if not more, to all investments. Our dis-
cussion is, however, restricted to the application of these
measures to foreign investors.
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A : CONTROL BY THE CENTRAL BANK OF KENYA (CBK)
The CBK was established by statute in March 1966 with
the responsibility of managing the country's monetary
affairs. 4 In particular, it is the sole agency of the
government responsible for all dealings in foreign exchange.
I shall discuss the regulatory measures by the CBK under
two main headings. viz, exchange control and limitation of
borrowing rights. These are the two measures that are fre-
quently cited as being among the leading measures in the
control of foreign investment. 5
1 Exchange Control 
Like many other underdeveloped countries, Kenya is
heavily dependent on imports from the developed countries
to maintain the momentum of her economy. 6 Her capacity and
ability to earn foreign exchange is far outstripped by her
demand for it. The country's five year development plans
since independence, have all been based on the assumption
that substantial portions of the targets therein would have
to be financed from external sources. 7 The current plan,
for example, classifies balance of payments as being
"the most severe constraint" to the achievement of plan
targets. 8 In view of such reliance on scarce foreign ex-
change, the government has established a comprehensive
exchange control system that is viewed as probably the most
important government regulatory measure affecting foreign
capital in the country. 9
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Section 30 of the CBK Act empowers the CBK to
administer any laws relating to exchange control in force
in the country. Under the powers conferred to it by this
section, the bank regulates all foreign exchange transac-
tions in the country. The legal basis of the current
system of exchange control is The Exchange Control Act 
of 1967. 10
 
It establishes a system of exchange control
whose primary function is conservation of foreign exchange.
It operates a regime of exchange restrictions which are
determined in quantitative terms by the exchange control
authorities. As operated in practice, the system-merely
regulates the distribution of available foreign exchange
to successful applicants rather than regulating its demand.
It also supervises foreign exchange receipts and payments
in an attempt to ensure that declared earnings in foreign
exchange are brought into the country and that foreign
exchange payments are made for authorised purposes only.
Under the Act, any-dealing in foreign exchange whether
involving receipts or payment of the same is subject to
authorization of exchange control in accordance with its
provisions.
In theory, therefore, the CBK has very extensive
powers to regulate foreign exchange transactions in the
country. However, this apparent power does not operate
in a vacuum. It operates in an environment, in as far as
foreign investment is concerned, that is far from conducive
to an effective regulation of their foreign exchange
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transactions. One of the major limitations to the efficacy
of CBK's foreign exchange regulation over foreign investors
is the Foreign Investment Protection Act (FIPA). This
Act places foreign investors covered by its provisions in
a specially privileged position as far as exchange control
regulation is concerned. It disapplies all but the proce-
dural regulatory measures under the CAE. Once a foreign
investor has obtained a CAE under the provisions of FIPA,
he is entitled as of right to repatriate the profits,
principal and interest and even the capital in accordance
with the provisions of the Act. This entitlement. applies
notwithstanding the provisions of any other
law for the time being in force.11
Thus where foreigners invest funds in Kenya and such funds
are covered by a CAE under FIPA, exchange control cannot
legally impose any restriction to the remission of the
earnings from such funds or the capital itself on its reali-
zation. The amount repatriable is not determined by ex-
change control, but by the terms of the CAE and all exchange
control can do is to approve the relevant amounts under the
exchange control machinery. 12 The amounts in question, or
the formula for calculating the same, are usually pre-
determined in agreements between the foreign investors and
their local partners or subsidiaries. This means that the
CBK supervises the remission of funds in accordance with the
terms ofa CAE in whose formulation it has no say. The Invest-
ment Agreement in Firestone, for example, provides that
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... there shall be issued to Firestone
(International) ... a Certificate of Approved
Enterprise with regard to each investment of
foreign assets, including the services per- 13
formed as contemplated by the Plant Contract.
The plant contract in Firestone stipulated the amounts to be
specified in the CAE and those that were to be subsequently
incorporated therein as and when they may be invested in
the future. The CBK was not party to the negotiation of
any of the four agreements involved in the Firestone tyre
project. All the agreements studied in Kenya by the present
author have provisions to the same effect and had applied and
received CAE l s covering their investment as specified in the
agreements. In his 1972/73 survey of 59 foreign subsidiaries
in Kenya, Steve Langdon found an overwhelming majority of
the firms had applied and obtained CAEs. His tabulated
results are shown in Table 7.
There are three major channels of remission of funds
in foreign exchange by foreign investors that exchange
control should be particularly concerned with. These are,
remissions as returns to capital invested; fees charged for
services rendered and payments made in trading transactions.
Available empirical evidence suggests that the exchange
control system in force in the country has had little impact
on the ability of foreign investors to remit funds through
these channels.
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(i) Remission as return on capital invested 
Remission of funds as return on capital takes two
forms. One is dividends (or profits in case of wholly
owned subsidiaries) which are returns on equity capital,
and the other is in the form of interest which is a return
on loan capital. The repatriation of profits by foreign
investors is guaranteed under section 7(a) of FIFA where
such investors hold a CAE. Exchange control has no legal
power to stop or limit such repatriation as long as the
investor conforms to the procedural requirementslaid down
by the CBK under the provisions of CAE. Under those
requirements, all such an investor has to do is present a
CAE along with an audited balance sheet and profit and loss
account with his application for approval to remit profits
to exchange control. 14 If these are in order, then exchange
control has to approve the remission. Failure to approve
it would be a breach of the statutory guarantee offered to
holders of CAEs under FIPA. In most cases, where the govern-
ment is a signatory to a joint venture, investment or any
other agreements of a similar nature with a foreign investor,
failure to approve the remission would be a breach of a
contractual obligation. 15 In addition, where an Investment
Guaranty Agreement with the investor's home government is
in force, the refusal would be a breach of a treaty
obligation. 16 Thus, in strict legal terms, exchange control
has little substantive power to regulate remission of
profits by foreign investors. However, bureaucratic delays
in approving applications for repatriation do occur
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in some cases. In addition, the CBK has sometimes
deferred remissions abroad due to balance of payments
problems. Such remissions are approved, but deferred
pending availability of foreign exchange. This is, there-
fore, not an abrogation of the legal guarantees under FIFA.
In practice, failure to apply for a CAE to cover
invested capital has not, in the past, automatically led to
refusals to repatriate profits though in such cases the CBK
has authority to refuse remission of foreign exchange. In one
case, a firm that did not possess a CAE had no difficulty in
remitting its profits including remissions of £300,774 in
1975, ten years after FIFA came into force. 18 The firm was
allowed to remit its profits in spite of the fact that,
according to CBK records, it had been taken over by another
firm in January 1969. Yet between 1971 and 1973, it re-
mitted profits amounting to K£6,250 p.a. under its old
trading name. Although CBK queried how the firm could
have earned profits after beingtaken over, these remissions
were allowed through. In 1974, the firm was allowed to
remit dividends of KShs8 ' 749,943 back-dated to the year
1965. The approvalwas erroneously given by CBK which later
sought to withdraw it without success. The successor to
the firm sought refuge in its new investment agreement
with the government which guaranteed free repatriation of
dividends. The CBK appears to have lost the battle for,
in January 1976, the funds were remitted. The CBK was not
bound to approve any of the firm's dividend remission
21 3
from 1965 onwards. Indeed it had legal power to refuse
such approval. There is no statutory right of repatriation
available to non-holders of a CAE. The only legal obliga-
tion on the Kenyan firm would be to pay dividends in Kenyan
currency. Indeed even in cases of the expropriation of a
non-CAE holder, the state would only be bound to pay com-
pensation in Kenyan currency. 19
Remission of funds in the form of interest by
foreign companies operating in Kenya and holding a CAE is
guaranteed under FIFA in similar terms as in the case of
profits. 20 In as far as Kenya does not impose any limit on
the amount of interest remitted, exchange control is legally
obliged to approve remission o- P interest earned by loan
capital covered by a CAE. The only indirect method of
limiting the amount of funds remitted as interest is the
administrative control over the gearing ratio of firms. A
Treasury Capital Issues Committee 21 which operates in close
co-operation with the CBK tries to limit the ratio to reaso-
nable levels. According to the government, a 66% gearing
is a reasonable level. 22 In practice however, foreign
firms operate on much higher gearing than this. Kenya
Canners, a subsidiary of Del Monte International, for
example, at one time operated on a gearing of 24%. 23 Where
the loan capital is from a foreign source, then its interest
payments are in foreign exchange and there is little exchange
control can do to limit it.
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(ii) Remissions in the form of service fees and royalties 
Service fees and royalty payments are an important
channel for remitting funds abroad in many countries. In
Kenya, many foreign investors choose to remit their funds
inthefmnffservice and royalty fees whenever possible. This
channel has several advantages over dividends. First the
supplier of any service or technology has an upper hand in
the determination of the fee to be charged or the formula
for arriving at such a fee. This is usually so because
technological, managerial and marketing industrial know-how
involved is usually in the possession of the foreign inves-
tor. 24 Second, unlike in the case of dividends, where a
joint venture with domestic capital is involved, non-equity
payments accrue exclusively to the foreigners while profits
are shared with the domestic partners. This gives the
foreigners involved in joint venture with domestic capital
incentive to remit funds in the formoffees. Thus for example,
in the Colombia chemical industry, foreign subsidiaries
reported royalties that generally amounted to less than 25%
of the reported profits. Yet for joint ventures in the
same industry the ratio averaged 32.3% for three firms and
142% for three others. 25 Table 8 shows a comparison of
after tax profits and service fees of nine Kenyan firms
involving foreign investment during the period 1966 to 1977.
It is significant that the proportion of service fees is
consistently	 higher than that of profits for seven of the
nine companies. 26 A third advantage fees have over divi-
dends is that they are usually not dependent on the firm
216
making profits. Most agreements providing for payments of
fees have fixed minimum fees payable and the foreign party
is therefore assured of remission of funds whether or not
dividends are declared. 27 Thus for example, between 1975
and 1978, Rivatex remitted abroad management and technical
services fees totalling DM3,180,684 while the company
consistently made losses over the same period. 28 A fourth
major advantage for foreign firms to remit funds in the form of
fees rather than dividends is the fact that, in Kenya, fees
are taxed at a lower rate than that	 applicable to
dividends. 29 Also they are allowable expenses for purposes
of calculating a firm's corporation tax. Where a foreign
party has majority equity, as in Kenya Canners Ltd., this
reduces the tax burden of such a firm. Furthermore, evi-
dence from projects studied clearly shows that it has been
extremely easy for the recipients of the fees to obtain
exemption from the applicable tax or to get a re-imbursement
from the local partner or licensee of any amount of tax paid.
There are other advantages associated with remission of
funds through fees rather than dividends but these are suffi-
cient for our purposes. 30
Clearly the potential advantages of using fees as a
channel for remitting funds abroad and the fact that there
is ample empirical evidence to show that foreign investors
appear to be taking advantage of this, 31 should be reason
enough for the CBK to enforce effective regulation over it.
However, as in the case of dividends, CBK and the apparently
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tight exchange control regulations have had little success
in imposing effective regulation (except of procedural
formalities) over the remission of service fees by foreign
investors. Again the major stumbling block has been FIPA.
Under the Act, remission of all income arising from the
investment of foreign assets is guaranteed, notwithstanding
the provisions of any other law. Foreign assets are defined
in s.2(i) as including
... rights, benefits or property obtained from...
the provision or the use of exploitation of
foreign rights, benefits or property.
As the fees payable are covered by FIPA, CBK has found itself
frustrated but unable to do much. The major problem is that
the fees payable are determined without consultation with
the CBK and the agreements are then submitted to it for app-
roval as agreed between the parties. In such cases, should
the CBK refuse approval,then it is for the foreign party to
decide whether or not to lower the charges. If they decide
not to, then the alternative would be to drop the investment
altogether. The CBK's attempt to limit the fees payable
have as far as we can gather, met with very limited success.
Of sixteen cases examined in which the CBK attempted to have
the fees payable reduced because they were or would have
been too high, only in two did the foreign party agree to
a fees reduction or a formula that would lead to a lower
fee. Even in the two cases, the CBK had to accept a compro-
mise. In one of them it asked for a fee of 3% of net profits
which fee would be subject to withholding tax instead of
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the proposed 5% of sale free of withholding tax. The
compromise reached was 3% of profits net of withhholding
tax with a provision for a minimum net fees. In the
other cases, CBK wanted a reduction from 5% of sales net
of withhholding tax to a lower percentage with the fees
being subject to withholding tax. It got 3% of sales net
of withholding tax. Yet in all the sixteen cases, CBK's
approval was obtained. 32 Having its legal powers limited
by the provisions of FIFA and not being able to substantially
influence the determination of the fees payable, the CBK
has had little success in regulating payments of-fees to
foreign parties. 33
Fees payable to non-resident directors have presented
few problems to the CBK. The appointment of a non-resident
34
director is subject to prior approval by exchange control authorities
Under this rule, foreign investors have been pressurised
into appointing resident directors, 35 and the CBK has
carefully scrutinised payments to non-resident directors.
An application to remit director's fees to non-resident
directors must conform to and be accompanied by the following:
- the exchange control reference authori-
sing the appointment of a non-resident
director; and
- a certified true copy of the director's
minutes fixing and authorising the
payment of the fees.36
21 9
The CBK is thus well placed to regulate the payments of
such fees in foreign exchange, and so far they have presen-
ted few problems. Perhaps the main reason for this state
of affairs is the fact that fees form only a tiny fraction
of the foreign investor's foreign exchange requirement.
(iii) Trading transactions 
Foreign investors in Kenya operate production
facilities that are heavily reliant on imported equipment
as well as intermediate inputs and raw materials. 37 Exchange
control has the responsibility of regulating payments for
such imports. In doing this, it cordinates its activities
with the department of Trade and Supplies which issues
import licenses. 38 As long as foreign exchange is available,
then exchange control cannot legally refuse to allocate
foreign exchange for licensed imports. In other words,
the country's impol.t policy is not determined by exchange
control. Other than the purely procedural role of alloca-
ting available foreign exchange to competing applicants 39
and supervising the surrender of foreign exchange earned
by exporters to authorised dealers, the CBK is responsible
for ensuring that the country earns or pays a reasonable
amount for its exports and imports respectively. In this
section, I am concerned with the regulation of manipula-
tions in trading transactions that result in hidden foreign
exchange costs. Such manipulations are commonly referred
• to as transfer pricing. From the experience of other
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underdeveloped countries, 40
 regulation of transfer
pricing is a difficult task and yet a necessary one to avoid
excessive loss of foreign exchange. The two main component
parts of transfer pricing involved in trading transactions
are the over-pricing of imports and under-pricing of exports.
The legal and administrative machinery for the control
of firms' transfer pricing activities in Kenya is largely
undeveloped and of doubtful efficacy. Exchange control
regulations require that all payments in foreign exchange
be approved by the CBK and any payments that do not conform
to this requirement are, therefore, illegal. 41 Legally,
this provides the CBK with the authority to scrutinise all
such payments to ensure that goods imported into the country
are worth the money paid for them. In practice, however,
the existing exchange approval process under the law merely
ensures that only authorised payments are made. Authorised
payments are not necessarily fair payments. Until 1972,
authorised payments were based on the prices stated by
importers of which a certain proportion may well have been
accounted for by over-pricing. When an importer who held
an import licence applied for a foreign exchange alloca-
tion, if his application was formally in order and foreign
exchange was available, he got an allocation. This system
did not and could not check on over-pricing. It merely
compared the total sum of foreign exchange allocated with
that claimed to have been used. If these matched, exchange
control did no more.
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The regulation of over-pricing of imports depends on the
ability to determine or ascertain the market prices of
imports on the international market. The procedure did
not give the CBK the ability to do this. It is for this
reason that the CBK entered into an agreement with General
Superitende nce Company of Switzerland (GSC) in 1972.42
Under this agreement, GSC is supposed to make pre-shipment
quantity, quality and price checks on imports intended for
Kenya whose value is K£1,000 or more unless they are exempt
from such checks. 43 Under this arrangement, the CBK air-
mails an inspection order to the appropriate GSC office
for each consignment of more than K£1,000. The GSC or their
agents then examine the goods and if satisfied in all three
aspects, it issues a "Clean Report of Finding" in relation
to the consignment. If not satisfied, it issues a "Non-
negotiable Report of Finding" and airmails this to the CBK.
If the former has been issued, the CBK gives the necessary
foreign exchange to pay for the consignment while it is
supposed not to give approval if the latter report has
been issued.44
While this arrangement may help control the practice
of overpricing imports, its effectiveness depends entirely
on the ability and willingness of GSC to conduct the checks..
Available evidence suggests that it has not been effective.
A UNIDO consultant's report to the government found that
during the years 1972-77, the estimated foreign exchange
saving attributable to GSC was in the region of £2,000,000
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excluding the unquantifiable supposedly deterrent effect
that GSC claimed was the most important factor in the
arrangement. In return for its services GSC received, over
the same period, £6,9546,713. The report goes on to docu-
ment major instances of over-pricing detected in the course
of its preparation and concludes that
In sum, we are led to the conclusion that
the real, measurable benefits of GSC's
intervention is substantially lower than
those claimed by GSC.45
The present author confronted a senior official of GSC with
these and several other findings of a similar nature and
asked him what he thought of it. His answer was that the
report had grossly underestimated the value of the deterrent
effects of the arrangement. He estimated that GSC had saved
Kenya about 2i times the fees it had received through check-
ing on imports. 46 Using the UNIDO figures, this would amount
to a saving of £17,366,782. Asked for substantiation in the
form of data showing the pre-GSC check prices and those of
post-GSC checks, the official statedthey were strictly
confidential. He however, stressed that the bulk of these
savings resulted from the deterrent effect of the checks.
Clearly GSC is not in a position to prove its claim which
is rendered rather incredible by several factors all admitted
by the GSC's official during the interview.
First, the GSC does not compare the prices of goods
with available substitutes of comparable quality. 47
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Thus where a supplier of a branded product supplies it to Kenya,
GSC compares the price charged with those of the same product elsewhere.
In which case if the supplier adopts a global over-pricing policy, his
prices stand. Even more interesting, 55C does not compare the prices
of CKD units with those of completely built up units (C8U). Thus for
example, in February 1980, a Japanese Suzuki 4-wheel drive CKD unit
would have cost Kenya 651,000 yens while a C8U was priced at 578,200
yens.
48
 Yet GSC would treat these as two independent categories,
arguing that its price checks are not meant to alter company pricing.
Second, GSC's past record on available data would leave GSC's claim
based entirely on the apparent deterrent factor.
49
 Third, the GSC
operates under substantial pressure from potential and actual legal
threats. In Switzerland, for instance, GSC faces a lot of pressure
from the very draconian laws on industrial espionage.
50
 The line
between legitimate inspection and spying for a foreign firm or country
on the affairs of Swiss firms is far from clear. Thus the potential
of law suits by individual firms means that GSC cannot pursue its
investigations without fear of possible serious financial
questions. The company official admitted that they do
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receive such threats and gave me a specific example of a
case in Nigeria in the cement industry where threat of
litigation was expressly made. Nevertheless, he went on
to say that they have successfully resisted such pressure.
At the same time, he admitted that
Too much check is considered by the firms
concerned as harassment unless there is a
clear case of irregularity.
Fourth, a lot of those firms subjected to GSC checks are
themselves clients of GSC for the same purposes. The company
admits that some of these clients are financially. more profit-
able clients than a small country like Kenya. Even though,
while admitting that this is a material factor for consi-
deration, its representative denied that it has ever
influenced GSC's decisions. This is impossible to check
because the GSC submits only its recommendations to CBK while
it holds the data on which it basis such recommendations. 51
Finally, but perhaps most important in relation to foreign
investors in Kenya, the company admits that it is very diffi-
cult to tell what a fair price is in intra-firm transactions.
In the case of under-pricing of imports, the CBK in
conjunction with the customs department has done no more
than ensure that the amounts stated in the invoices are
brought into Kenya as foreign exchange. Curbing of under-
pricing of exports would require a form of machinery for
comparing prices of such exports in the foreign markets
and political will, to make meaningful use of the findings
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obtained from such comparisons. Neither of these exist
in sufficient abundance in Kenya today. Indeed, in the
celebrated case of Del Monte's transfer pricing practices
revealed by a UNIDO consultant and long suspected by CBK,
the government has kept mum about the recommendations for
action to curb the practice. 52 Political will appears to
have been in short supply. African Business saw the govern-
ment's unwillingness to tackle Del Monte on its malpractices
in the following terms
Tough times on the horizon indicate that
Kenya may continue to coddle multinationals .
The interpretation of these events to be
that while Kenya Canners Del Monte's subsi-
diar0 may be making good profits, its value
to the economy is such that the government
has decided that discretion is the better
part of valour. In the light of Kenya's
current difficulties, this must be taken as an
encouraging sign for MNCs.53
It would appear that loss of the ability to regulate the
activities of foreign investors is part of the price Kenya
has had to pay for its heavy reliance on them.
Like in the case of service payments, CBK's potential
to regulate invoice manipulations is greatly whittled down
by the terms of the sales agreements entered into between
Kenyan parties and foreign firms. These have tended to
give the responsibilities of importing and exporting goods
to the foreign parties. This has tended to promote a great
deal of the foreign firms' intra-company deals which makes
it difficult to scrutinise such transactions. 54
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2 Local Borrowing 
Until the early 1970s, virtually all commercial bank-
ing facilities were owned and controlled by foreign capital.
Even by 1977, foreign capital controlled over 60% of all
banking business in Kenya. 55
 As the rest of the economy
was also substantially controlled by foreign capital, there
was a tendency for the foreign banks to direct their loans
to foreign firms rather than to the African controlled
activities. The 1975 IBRD report noted that
Although adequate statistics were not avail-
able it appears that commercial banks direct
funds from rural to urban areas, above all,
to foreign owned firms in the formal sector.
An indication of this is that, by December
1971 loans to Africans ... were only 13% of
all loans.56
Foreign capital have shown a preference for local over
foreign borrowing for two major reasons. One is that borrow-
ing.
 in Kenya is substantially cheap by international stand-
ards. 57 And two is that by committing as little as possible
of their own capital, foreign firms minimise the risk of loss
in case of expropriation, currency fluctuations etc. This
tends to encourage very high gearing in capital structure
with local savings comprising the major portion of the loan
capital. Since foreign banks which dominate the banking
sector have shown a preference for lending to foreign firms,
unlimited local borrowing by foreign controlled firms would
divert funds available for lending from the Africans to
foreign capital. In addition, availability of local funds
curtailed the volume of foreign assets (exchange) brought
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into the country. This last factor was a serious setback
to Kenya's policy of attracting foreign investors as a
source of foreign exchange. When the 1971 foreign exchange
crisis hit the country, it was this consequence of local
borrowing that led to the imposition of a limit on over-
draft facilities to foreign firms by Kenyan registered banks.
Section 32(4)(a) of ECA provides that except with the
permission of the minister, no person resident in Kenya shall
lend any money or securities to any body corporate resident
in the scheduled territories (E. Africa) which is by any
means controlled (whether directly or indirectly) by persons
resident outside the scheduled territories. Under the powers
of control granted by this section, the CBK issued ECN No. 19
of 1971. 58
 This Notice limited overdrafts to 20% of the
non-resident investment in the business of the borrower
except where a company is a resident controlled one, but with
mixed participation of both resident and non-resident share-
holders, in which case a maximum overdraft of 40% of the
total investment may be advanced. Beyond these limits
commercial banks need permission of CBK. It was hoped that
this limitation would make foreign firms bring the remainder
of their borrowing requirements from abroad. Like the other
measures aimed at conservation of foreign exchange, this one
too has had only limited success. Its ineffectiveness has
resulted from two main factors. These are its limited scope
of application and a pattern of granting exemptions from the
regulation that has now become the rule rather than the
exception.
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By restricting the 20% local borrowing limitation to over-
drafts only, the bank has unnecessarily narrowed the scope
for the application of the rule. In general, non-banking
financial institutions do not offer overdrafts. Their
lending is mainly of medium and long term range. Thus
although the limitation has commonly been referred to as
one on 'local borrowing', 59
 it does not affect non-
overdraft borrowing from non-commercial banking institutions.
These institutions include parastatal organisations whose
loan advances to firms involving foreign firms far exceeds
those by commercial banks in certain cases. Although the
CBK may restrict any kind of lending by withholding approval
under s.32(4a) of ECA, it is doubful whether this power is
exercisable over parastatal organizations whose lending
policies are determined directly by the treasury in conjuc-
tion with its partners where the organizations are jointly
owned as is the case of IDB or the DFCK. It is therefore,
clear that the bor p.owing limitation in force, even if it
were to be enforced to the letter, would only affect a very
small proportion of the total lending that overdrafts by
commercial banks form. However, implementation of this
narrow limitation is far from being adequate.
All of the 25 projects studied, had been given, at
one time or continuously, exemption from this limitation.
Some had over 75% of their foreign assets in local over-
drafts. As the power of granting exemption ultimately lies
with the Treasury, it appears that it has exercised its
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discretion in some cases without consulting the CBK. In
one case, Treasury had entered into an agreement with a
foreign firm in 1968, in which the firm was given an option
to purchase 60% of the Kenyan company's equity and still be
able to borrow up to 50% of its capital investment locally.
This was apparently done without consultation with CBK.
The CBK complained of not being consulted by Treasury on
the agreement. This was in spite of s.31 of the CBK Act 
1966 which provides that
The Bank shall administer any payments
agreement entered into by Kenya, and the .
bank shall be consulted by the Government
in negotiating any payments agreement.
On interviewing several Treasury and CBK officials, it was
clear that they were not aware of this statutory requirement
let alone being in the habit of conforming to it. In this
particular case, it appears that the authorities were not
even sure that the concession was of any use to the country.
Determining this was not an easy job as a Senior official
of a government institution pointed out in a memo to his
boss. He wrote.
The attached memo ... sets out the consequen-
ces of local borrowing concession given when
the government entered into an agreement
with ... for the latter to purchase majority
equity in the above company and to provide
management and act as the company's sales
agent. An effort will now be made based on
the financial statements we can get from the
company to see if we can show whether the
deal has been of any benefit to this country.
An initial difficulty in this exercise will be
our inability so far to find another company
with comparable export business.
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In another interesting case, Treasury informed CBK that a
certain company (in which a foreign firm held a controlling
though not a majority share but exercised near total control)
wanted an overdraft of £1.25 million. CBK immediately objec-
ted suggesting that the company obtain a loan from IDB -
which would still have been local borrowing but not
covered by the relevant limitation. Following intensive
pressure from some senior personality in the company, a
CBK official advised the bank that although it could reject
the application, it would be advisable to pass it despite
the objections.
For the sake of an understanding with
treasury that they would not in future
involve themselves with an investment pro-
ject dependent upon local borrowing without
appropriate reference to CBK.
The application was granted, but on condition that the company
would not declare any dividend until it has reduced its
overdraft to below the 20% limit. 60
No statistics are available that would enable one to
calculate how much effect this measure has had in inducing
foreign capital to bring more foreign exchange into the
country. Nevertheless, judging from the ease with which
foreign firms have been able to obtain exemptions from the
20% limit, it is doubtful that it has had any significant
effect. Its narrowness in scope leaves out a huge amount
of funds available to foreign capital without limitations
based on their foreign assets held in Kenya.
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Kaplinsky's NCCK study renders support to the conclusion
that, for the reasons given above, the limitations of
local borrowing by firms involving foreign capital has not
been an effective regulatory measure. He observes that
The major conclusion of interest which emerge
from this data Cin the studyj is the inability
of the Central Bank to enforce its admirable
policy of tying local credit to increasing
local ownership.61
Langdon on the other hand, feels that the limitation on
local borrowing has provided the GIG, which considers
applications for local borrowing in excess of the-limit,
with a fairly strong leverage against firms wishing to
obtain access to additional local credit. He also feels
that it is possible that the fact that some firms are able
to obtain local credit beyond the limit may indeed be because
the CIC has won other concessions from such firms. 62
readily concede to the possibility of this being the case,
but as I have no empirical evidence in support of this con-
tention, it must for the time being remain a matter of
conjecture.
The 1979-83 plan introduced a new element in the limi-
tation of local overdraft facilities. It stated that
... maximum credit will be based on the
monthly or annual wage bill for Kenyan
employees. Hence, short-term credit will
reflect more closely the finance required
for local costs.63
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This appears to be aimed at pressurising firms involving
foreign capital to adopt more labour intensive production
methods and to encourage them to Africanise their remaining
personnel. The author has found no evidence that this
measure has been implemented.
B : REGULATION THROUGH FISCAL MEASURES 
In his 1973 budget,the minister of finance declared that
We must use the tax system to encourage the
efficient use of economic resources. For -
example, our tariffs and taxes should not
encourage the excessive use of imported raw
materials and capital goods; the system
should not discriminate against production
for exports; and it should not discourage
the use of labour.64
This budget marked the beginning of a shift in fiscal policy
that was hitherto primarily geared towards the implementation
of a strategy for industrial development "based on import
substitution and on the need to attract foreign capital
and technology" 65 It was therefore, not concerned with
positive direction of the pattern of economic development
but rather with an increase in the volume of investments.
In this budget, the minister set out to change most of that.
He found it an uphill and largely an unsuccessful task with
his efforts virtually turning into personal efforts with
the weight and authority of the rest of the government
machinery being brought to bear against him. Thus, few of
the fiscal measures contained in the subsequent budgets
right through to 1981/82 fiscal year have been implemented.
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Those that have been, have nevertheless, been less than
enthusiastically implemented. 66
 A discussion of Kenya's
fiscal policies as it affects foreign capital would fill up
a volume on its own which is why the discussion here is
restricted to a very brief examination of key fiscal measures
that have been adopted. For all the details, the reader
is referred to the relevant statutes and government publi-
cations cited herein. The fiscal measures are discussed
under two headings; income tax and custom tax together
with sales tax.
1 Measures Under Income Tax Provisions
Income tax legislation67
 in Kenya provides for two main
regulatory measures that affect foreign capital in the coun-
try. These are the provisions on investment allowance and
those on withholding tax on payments to non-residents. This
is not to say that other provisions such as that on corporate
tax, do not affect foreign capital. They do in as far as
they apply to it, but they are primarily intended for revenue
generation rather than a regulatory role.
(i) Investment allowance 
Every investor investing funds in the construction of
buildings and installation of new machinery is entitled to
an allowance known as investment deduction of 20% of his
capital cost in the first year of operation." Until 1979,
the investment deduction was offered without conditions
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as an incentive to attract capital investment. Indeed it
was the most often quoted fiscal incentive aimed at attrac-
ting foreign capital. The government even boasted that
Taken together with the usual depreciation
allowances, an industrialist can write off
120% of his investment against taxable
income over a period of years.69
This is in fact, an underestimation in most foreign capital
projects. The practice of over-pricing machinery and
equipment means that the 20% of the stated cost investment
is considerably higher than 20% of the actual market value.
As long as the investment deductions were offered for the
sole purpose of attracting capital investment, they could
not be said to play any regulatory role. Indeed, their
offer without conditions had some negative consequences upon
some of the declared economic objectives. One of these, is
the creation of employment. The system of investment allow-
ance led to the substitution of capital for labour. As early
as 1966, the government had realized that this was happening.
The revised five year plan stated
The substitution of capital for labour in
recent years seems to have stemmed from three
principal causes ... The third factor ...
is the system of investment allowances that
has been established for tax purposes. While
these allowances attract capital to Kenya,
they also stimulate substitution of capital
for labour by reducing the cost of capital
relative to labour.70
The 1974-78 and 1979-83 plans make the same observation71
indicating that although the government was well aware of
the problem for the past 12 years it had, nevertheless, felt
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that attraction of capital into Kenya ought to take prio-
rity over the employment factor.
After 1978, the government finally introduced diffe-
rential rates of investment allowances aimed at influencing
investors to adopt more labour intensive methods as well as
locate their investments outside the established major
urban areas.
To promote dispersion of industries, more
effective use will be made of investment
allowances. To simultaneously promote emplo-
ment through the use of labour intensive .
techniques, account will be taken of the
amount of fixed capital involved in every new
job opportunity created. The rules pertain-
ing to this concession will be modified by
providing differential investment allowances
to new enterprises that take into considera-
tion whether they are established in semi-
urban or rural areas, and also whether they
are labour intensive or capital intensive.72
Under this system, enterprises whose fixed investment per
every new job created is less than KShs.100,000/= are entitled
to the following allowances:
- 10% in urban areas other than Nairobi and
Mombasa;
- 15% in semi-urban areas; and
- 20% in rural towns.
For enterprises with a high capital/labour ratio which entail
investment exceeding KShs.100,000/= per new job created the
applicable allowances are 5%, 10% and 15% respectively for
the above stated locations.
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These differential allowances constitute the first
attempt by the government to utilise the investment allow-
ances to achieve goals other than attraction of capital to
Kenya. Whether this new fiscal policy will have a marked
effect on the geographical dispersion (away from major
cities) of industries as well as on the capital/labour ratio
of new investments remains to be seen. Its effect may depend
very much upon other fiscal and non-fiscal measures such as
tariff and quantitative restrictions in protection of local
industries which are much more important to investors than
the allowances. If these are retained anywhere near the
present levels, then their benefits would more than compen-
sate for the loss of the allowances. As for the creation
of new jobs, the differential allowances on their own may
not be sufficient to affect the choice of factor intensity.
In a joint venture where the foreign investor is a minority
shareholder, for example, his major interest may be in the
supply of machinery and equipment to the project in which
case he has more to gain than to lose in not switching over
to labour intensive technique.
(ii) Withholding tax 
In 1971, the government introduced a withholding tax
for all payments to non-residents in the form of dividends,
interests, service and royalty fees, rents and pensions. 74
Except for pensions, all the other categories are normally
important means for remitting funds abroad by foreign capi-
tal. The withholding tax was introduced primarily to limit
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the amount of foreign exchange paid out. As Kenya does
not have any statutory or effective administrative limit
to the amount that may be repatriated in these forms, 75
the Treasury felt that this tax would reduce the foreign
exchange payable. It was also aimed at revenue generation.
In 1981/82, for example, the revision of withholding tax
rates was expected to bring an additional £3 million in
revenue.
76 On the basis of this figure, we estimated that
total revenue (and therefore an apparent foreign exchange
saving) brought in by this tax in 1980/81 to have been
approximately KE37 million, assuming that it had a . maximum
impact. 77
Although the withholding tax has good potential for
conserving foreign exchange by reducing the payments made to
non-residents,
	
it has not been properly utilised. In
order to have maximum effect, it is necessary that a fixed
formula be used to determine these payments and with the
exception of dividends, there ought to be fixed rates (or
maximum limits) applicable to fees such as management and
royalty fees. 78 What is happening today is that foreign
investors usually charge their fees net of withholding tax
or incorporate a re-imbursement clause in their agreements
with their Kenyan projects obliging the Kenyan operation
to re-imburse them any withholding tax paid if the fees
are not exempt from withhholding tax. 79 This means that
both the incidence and impact of the tax falls on the Kenyan
operation. The foreign investors simply slap a mark up over
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their market charges equivalent to the applicable rate of
withholding tax. Given this practice, it is doubtful
whether the revenue generated from the withholding tax is
in any real sense a savings in foreign exchange. The prac-
tice of demanding and obtaining exemption from withholding
tax as well as re-imbursement (in case of non-exemption) by
foreign investors has greatly reduced the impact of the
withholding tax as a regulatory measure for the conservation
of foreign exchange. In addition, they have been able to
charge such fees as would take into account the existence
of tax wherever necessary. In two cases, for example, the
foreign investors charged fees at rates dependent on whether
or not the fees were exempt from withholding tax. 80
2 Regulation Under Tariff and Sales Tax Measures 
Like investment allowance, tariffs have always been
used by the independent government with attraction of foreign
capital in mind. 81 Their other major objective has been the
raising of revenue. Since independence, they have been the
major revenue raising form of taxation. As incentives for
attracting foreigii capital, they are used to protect domestic
economic operations from competition from imports by raising
the landed prices of the latter above those of domestically
produced products. This has been in line with the government
industrial policy of import substitution, the achievement of
which has been the basic aim of trade policy for the first
fifteen years of independence. 82
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In the 1970-74 plan, there was no mention of exports among
the enumerated targets of manufacturing. Even in the third
plan, 1974-78, import-substitution was high up on the prio-
rity list of government's economic policy. Tariff protect-
ion was seen even then, largely as a measure of protection
aimed at encouraging import substitution industries.
The high rate of growth in manufacturing
since independence has been based primarily
on import substitution which has been encou-
raged through tariff protection of consumer
goods .83
Used in this manner tariffs played little role in regulating
foreign investment in the country. They no doubt did in-
fluence foreign firms to set up behind the ever rising
tariff barriers against their traditional exports to Kenya.
Table 9 shows a sample of increases in tariff rates that
have coincided with the establishment of local production by
foreign capital.
The use of tariff as a means of protecting domestic
industry has led to consequences that were not intended. 84
In 1973, the minister of finance warned that
... Perhaps the major fault of the existing
system is that it has tended to create highly
protected inward-looking manufacturing indus-
try in Kenya. Industry has been able to set
up behind high tariff walls simply to manu-
facture products for sale in the restricted
East African Common Customs area ... at
other times the cost involved in setting up
these new projects has been greater than we
should reasonably be expected to pay - high
cost products, mediocre quality, exclusion of
consumer choice, high import content, high
repatriation of profits and very little employ-
ment content . Is this the economic development
we want? I say No!85
Company
Bata Shoes
1955
1961
11
11 %
11`;;
22%
25%
Firestone E.A.
	
1969
E.A. Packaging Industries 1963
12%	 1960	 Free
Shs 125 1962 40 cts
per lb.	 par lb.
	
Shs 1/50 1968	 111
per lb.
11
171% 1962 121%
Product
Bicycle inner
tubes .
Industrial ink
Paints
Light diesel oil
Vehicle tyres
Iviultiwall paper
sacks
Bicycie tyres
Glue
Light bulbs
Radio and T.V.
assembly
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Table 9 Foreign Investment and the Provision of Tariff' Protection in Kenya
Year
Established Duty Previous Duty ,7nd
or &gat: Imposed Year Imposed
Production
1958	 93 cts	 1958 _ 55 cts
per lb.	 per lb.
Avon Rubber
(Kenya) Ltd-
	
1953
Coates 13ros. (E.A.)
	
19:.;0
Sadotins	 1959
Leyland Paint
Company
Robbialac Paints
Walpamur
Caltex Oil (Kenya)
Ltd.	 1960
Michelin (Tanzania) 	 1962
Gcneral,Tyre (Tanzania) 1969
1958 33}%	 1963	 25%
1960
1960
Car batteries
Electric cables
Toothpaste
Brooms and
brushes
Radio batteries
Stainless steel
tanks
Chocolate "
confectionery
Fishnets
Dunlop (Uganda)	 1964 Shs 1/25 1963	 Free
par lb.
Avon Rubber Co. 	 1964
John liciTer (Mining)	 1966	 30%	 147	 Free
Ltd.
Philips Electrical Lamps 1965	 30%	 1966	 Free
Sanyo (through ARMCO) 1966 Radio 50%196.6 1 .-.• 0/
	T.V. 50% 1966
	
Free
Joseph Lucas	 1966
	 30%	 1967
	
Free
East African Cables	 1966
	 15%	 1967
	
Free
Colgate Palmolive	 1966
	 30%	 1967
	 Free
L.G. Harris	 1967	 30%	 1967	 Free
Union Carbide	 1967	 30%	 1967	 22%
	
Hall Thermotank Overseas 1967	 15%	 1967 • Free
Cadbury Schweppes	 1970	 50%	 1963	 Free
Kenya Fishnet
Industries	 1970	 20%	 1970	 12-•% .
Source: Eglin 1978, P.107
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Coming from the person in charge of the economy's finances,
this is indeed a rare but revealing admission of the failure
of the use of fiscal policy as an instrument for regulating
investment, the bulk of which was foreign owned and/or
controlled. Other consequences cited as resulting from the
use of tariffs for protection purposes include, discourage-
ment of the development of domestic capital and intermediate
goods industries, discouragement of the use of local raw
materials and encouragement of transfer pricing practices,
in particular, over-invoicing of imports. 86 However, the
trend of tariff impositions have been upwards since 1972
when the minister began, what became thereafter an annual
phenomenon, his castigation of the government's fiscal policy.
Indeed, in 1973, for example, he raised the tariff applica-
ble to several products produced domestically by foreign
capital. Since then, little has been done to use tariff
as a regulatory instrument vis-a-vis foreign investment.
In 1979, the government introduced a 10% duty on
imported raw materials and machinery and equipment. 87
 The
88duty on machinery and equipment
In addition duty on a few items
exports and to reduce excessive
was raised to 20% in 1981.
was reduced to promote
protection. 89	i-The impos
tion of duty on raw materials was aimed at regulating the
use of imported inputs, and discouraging over-pricing of
7
imports in particular, machinery and equipment. This i s
the only use of tariff imposition aimed at regulating speci-
fic characteristics of investments since independence. In
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all its other uses, the tariff has been directed either
at the consumer, as in case of luxury goods, or at compe-
titors of domestic producers while the duty-free entry of
all raw material and industrial inputs was aimed at bene-
fiting the domestic producers who,in Kenya's import
substitution industry,are predominantly foreign. It is
very doubtful whether this will have any significant impact
on the present pattern of investment for several reasons.
First the applicable rate of duty is hopelessly low in
view of the fact that the level of protection offered to
investors through various protection measures is extremely
high in Kenya. The minister of finance in fact points out
that, "the effective rate of protection is in some cases
as high as 300% 90 To significantly affect the pattern of
behaviour in such industries through tariff measures would
require not only imposition of high duties for the inputs
but also a drastic reduction in the duties applicable to
competing imports. Second, the imposition of duty on
capital goods was more than compensated for by the aboli-
tion of sales tax on such imports (see below) and the
imposition of even higher duties on competing imported
goods. 91 Third, but related to the other two is that a 20%
duty on machinery and equipment would be hopelessly inade-
quate to reduce the incentive to over-invoice such sales.
It was the view of the government that
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Given the present rate of duty on plant and
equipment of 10%, the incentive to over-
invoice is great. With the new rate of 20%,
this incentive is considerably reduced, and
where it occurs, it will now be taxed.92
This appears to be a blear case of over-optimism or
glossing over an imported economic issue in Kenya today.93
This is particularly so in cases where foreign investors
are in joint venture with local capital. 94
In 1978, the government introduced sales tax on
important capital equipment again to discourage investors
adopting capital intensive production techniques. These
ranged from between 10 and 30%. However, following intensive
lobbying by domestic industries, this tax was abolished in
1981. Indeed, its abolition	 was aimed at providing
importers of such items with a net reduction in their costs
(resulting from fiscal policies) of importing them despite
the 10% increase in duty payable for such imports. Thus
the minister of finance explained that
Taken together with the changes in rates of
customs duty Bigher rates for competing
importa ... this change Cabolition of sales
tax on plant and equipment] will mean that
even after the increase in duty on plant and
equipment from 10 to 20%, industrialists will
benefit by a net reduction in effective
taxation of between 8% and 21%.95
Fiscal measures intended to influence investors in specific
directions appear to have been formulated and implemented in
such a way that they end up benefitting the investors of
capital even more while not achieving their objectives.
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Foreign investors dominate the sectors affected by these
fiscal changes.
C : THE INDUSTRIAL TRAINING LEVY 
One of the key factors usually cited by proponents of
unlimited encouragement of foreign investment is the belief
that they bring with them necessary but scarce skills as
well as creating employment. 96 Skilled manpower has often
been seen as a major constraint to economic development and
the government has often expressed, in its economic rhetoric,
its determination to remove this constraint. 97 A major pro-
blem in training manpower is its expense. To ease this
problem, , as well as to force the foreign dominated industries
to shoulder a proportion of the costs for training industrial
manpower, the government amended the 1959 Industrial Training 
Ordinance to provide for the imposition of an industrial
training levy. 98 S.5B of the Act empowers the minister for
labour to make a training levy order directed to any employer
imposing a training levy on such employer. All monies re-
ceived in respect of a training levy order are paid into a
Training Levy Fund and is disbursed to industries that have
training programmes in order to defray part of their training
expenses. 99 As a fiscal measure aimed at compelling inves-
tors to participate in the active training of local manpower,
the Act has not been effective because of three main reasons.
245
First, the Act has been applied to only a narrow spectrum
of the existing economic activities. Initially it only applied to
ten subsectors of the economy.
100
 There is no reason why the levy
should not have been imposed on all industries. However, the government
has enlarged the number of sectors covered by the levy and has proposed
further coverage.
101
 The second main reason for its non-effectiveness
is the lack of adequate enforcement even to the narrow scope of
industries it applies. The government admits that "collection of the
levy have been disappointingly small due to the large number of
defaulters." It plans to strengthen the collection mechanisms.
102
The third, and most negative aspects of the Act was the basis on which
the levy was calculated. The Act is silent on what the levy should be
based on. It would appear that, in some industries, the minister
chose to base the levy on the wage bills of the firms to which it
applied. This meant that the more labour intensive investments bore
the brunt of the levy., while those that were capital intensive had a
lighter load on their shoulders. By raising the cost of labour in
those industries which employ and train more labour, the levy has,
in effect, been a tax on jobs. To rectify this shortcoming, the
1979-83 Plan proposed a revision of the Act in accordance with the
new stated policy. The new policy was supposed to:-
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... ensure that the burden of this levy
should fall most heavily on those firms that
have designed their methods of production to
use the least labour. Thus, capital inten-
sive industries will pay a greater share of
the cost of training people for other indus-
tries where they can be employed.103
To achieve this objective, the levy was to be revised so that it
would be charged as a tax on depreciation thus basing it on
the annual cost of capital rather than on the annual cost
of labour. 104 However, as of December 1981, this policy change had
not been implemented.
D : CONCLUSION
In this chapter the main features of financial and
fiscal policy and regulation have been examined. It has been
shown that for the first ten years of independence, the govern-
ment had pursued a policy that left foreign investors hardly
affected in a serious way. Indeed, rather than the financial
and fiscal policy being used to regulate the investment
patterns and operations of foreign investors, they were pri-
marily used to attract such investors. Their attraction lay
in the fact that they left the investors relatively free to
tailor their own investment policies. But by the beginning
of the 1970s, the consequences of the policy being pursued
had been recognised as having actual and potential negative
effects on the economy. Even with this realization, the
government appears not to be over-enthusiastic to adopt, in
practice, changes it so eloquently and frequently promised
to bring about in its financial and fiscal policies. 105
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When the government finally adopted some fiscal
measures aimed at some form of regulation, its efforts were
rather half hearted despite pressure from IBRD to reform
its policies in particular those on tariff protection. 106
The inability and unwillingness by the government in impo-
sing effective regulatory financial and fiscal measures is
a direct result of the government's broad economic policy.
Its basic policy of a private capital based economy has led
directly to its heavy reliance on foreign capital. This has
in turn meant that it has to sustain its attraction to such
capital, a task it feels it cannot execute successfully if
it adopts tough and effective regulatory measures. The
adoption of an import substitution industrial policy has
further weakened the government's regulatory position. Such
industries are usually established only on condition they
receive high protection and other concessions. Once they
are established, to change this basis of their establishment
becomes extremely difficult. A major restructuring of finan-
cial and fiscal policies in order to make them effective
tools of regulation would require, as a condition precedent,
the reversal of the policy of attracting foreign investment
as well as that of high protection of domestic import substi-
tution industries. This would, in the vast majority of
industries, mean a virtual collapse. And this is what
the government fears.
As things are today in Kenya, it would be extremely
difficult to maintain the economic policy and at the same time
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effect financial and fiscal policies that are mainly of a
regulatory nature. The two appear to be largely mutually
exclusive. High duty on industrial inputs and low or no
duty on competing imports, for example, is incompatible
with an import substitution industry, such as exists in
Kenya. It would appear that a restructuring of the govern-
ment's economic thinking and policies is a condition
precedent to the imposition of effective regulatory financial
and fiscal measures.
Although the discussion in this section has concentrated on
tariff measures non-tariff measures feature more commonly in
government trade policy. Examples of these non-tariff measures
are dealt with in chapters-three and five.
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NOTES
1. SP 10/65, 6
2. For example, export allowance
3. A good example is the airport tax.
4. Established by The Central Bank of Kenya Act 1966.
5. See for example, Lloyds, Barclays, Standard, etc
banks' annual reviews on Kenya; Langdon, 1976,
Swainson, 1980.
6. Economic Survey, 1972, 58
7. Whenever there is a drastic short-fall in the foreign
exchange reserves, some existing development projects
are suspended. This happened during the 1974-78 plan
period for example. A major revision of the 1979-83
plan which involves the suspension of certain projects
was envisaged in Sessional Paper No.4 of 1980.
8. 1979-83 Plan, (iii).
9. See Ibid. Most officials of projects involving foreign
capital expressed a similar view.
10. Cap. 113.
11. S.7 of FIPA
12. Ibid. s.6. Such an approval process is merely a pro-
cedural formality and its only role is to ensure that
the funds applied for are covered under a valid CAE.
13. Art. IV 8.6.12. See also the General Motors, Rivatex,
Leyland Kenya, K.F.C., K.C.F.C. Investment Agreements
for examples.
14. EON No.31
15. All the agreements studied include provisions to this
effect.
16. See for example the USA/Kenya agreement.
17. Interviews with CBK and several companies' officials,
held in Kenya during 1980/81
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18. The author was informed of at least four other
similar cases in the course of field research in
Kenya. Each of the firms involved had powerful
political personalities backing them.
19. This, it is submitted, is the combined effect of
ss.2(4) and 21 of the EC Acts respectively.
20. s.7(c).
21. The CIC was set up in 1971 to consider applications
by firms wishing to go public. See Langdon, 1976.
22. Guidelines For Application to the NPC, 1979
23. All firms studied had a gearing ratio of over 33% with
eight of them averaging 7.5% See also Kaplinsky, 1980,
102 for details on debt-equity ratios of large scale
manufacturing and all tourist firms in 1966-76.
24. See Vaitsos, 1974, 87
25. Ibid.
26. For companies, E, F and G, for example, the fees are 200,
200 and 5,500% of dividends respectively for the five
years in which the two sets of figures are available.
Eight of these firms were included in the present study.
Of the remaining seventeen, eight remitted fees that
were, on average, higher than their dividend remissions
for the years 1976-79 while six remitted only fees,
either because they had made losses or had declared no
dividends. No information was available on the
remaining three.
27. Twenty-two of the 25 agreements studied had either a
fixed minimum fee or an ascertainable formula for fixing
such a fee.
28. See willy Mutunga, 1979.
29. See the discussion on income tax measures that follows
later in this chapter.
30. See Vaitsos, 1974; Kaplinsky 1978.
31. See Kaplinsky, 1980, 88 Table V
32. An official of the CBK told the author that approval
is usually a-formality although in some cases the
CBK tries to have the fees payable reduced.
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33. Kenya's record of permitting repatriation of fees is
described as being extremely liberal in comparison
with other systems. See ILO, 1972; Deepak Lal 1975
and IBRD 1975.
34. ECN No.31 para. 7
35. In the projects studied, over 70% of the directors
or their alternates representing foreign capital were
residents. However, several of these were foreign
firms registered in Kenya while most of the indivi-
duals were non-citizens.
36. ECN No. 31 para.7
37. See 1979 - 83 plan which states that the manufacturing
sector as a whole still relies to a very great
extent on imported intermediate inputs. An analysis
of Kenyan imports indicates that about 50% of our
import bill is accounted for by capital and interme-
diate goods imports". p.326- 7
38. For details of its operation, see D. Macrae, IDS W. P.
No. 90, (undated); Hoperaft 1979; IBRD, 1975.
39. These are contained in EON No.10
40. For example, Colombia, Greece, India etc.
41. Ss.7 and 8 of CAE.
42. GSC (Societe Generale de Surveillance S. A. - SGS -
in French) describes itself as "the world's largest
control and inspection company", offering a complete
range of quantity and quality checks and related
technical services. It is represented in more than
140 countries by 110 affiliated companies. Its head-
quarters are in Geneva. It has 8,000 specialists
working individually or in teams who carry out "any
control function from basic quantity checks to testing
of complex industrial equipment" in its 57 odd labo-
ratories. It has seven operational divisions: Indus-
trial and Consumer Products; Agricultural; Petroleum
and Petrochemical;, Mineral, Chemical and Metallurgical;
Non Destructive Testing; Industrial; and Laboratory
divisions.
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CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This Study has discussed not only some key regulatory
measures adopted by the government vis-a-vis PFI, but also
the general policy environment in which these measures have
been applied. Its primary purpose has been to bring out
the discrepancy that exists between explicit government policy
(rhetoric) on PFI and the reality as shown in the practice
followed since independence. All along, the view that has
been held by official sources has been that articulated by
the government and PFI. 1 This view has emphasised that the
Kenya government welcomes PFI only on condition that it
contributes to the achievement of its economic objectives
and further that the government exercise strict control over
such investment to ensure that they conform to its stated
policies. They cite the government's own rhetoric as
incontrovertible evidence that the government regulates PFI.
In short, official and business views seem concerned with
what appears to be rather than what is. They do not evaluate
the operation of the regulatory measures applied to determine
their efficacy or otherwise. On the other hand, some aca-
demic work on the subject of PFI in Kenya has convincingly
shown that they operate in the country relatively free from
the rigours of the existing regulatory framework. 2 This
study has shared this view and contributed empirical
evidence in its support.
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A : SOME CONCLUSIONS FROM THE STUDY
The main conclusions are grouped here as they are
presented in the study. The discussion in chapter one shows
that the reliance on private enterprise as the foundation
of the economy has its roots in Kenya's colonial history;
that this economic system was introducd to Kenya by the
colonial authority primarily to serve the interests of
non-Kenyan European population and, therefore, the metro-
polis; and that as independence approached, strenuam but
subtle efforts were made to ensure that the basic economic
fabric and ideology obtaining in the twilight days of colo-
nialism survived a change in government. By the time
indepehdence came, three main factors militated against any
radical change in both the economic thinking and structure
by the new African political leaders. First the structure
of the economy was already well established by East African
standards. To orient the economic system away from the colonial
pattern would have imposed great demands on the economy and
the political leadership. This would have required a
selfless leadership motivated by long term national objec-
tives and great political will to undertake the task.
Second, the aspirations, education and attitudes of the
political leadership had been shaped in such a way that the
soft option of continuing the existing system subject to
cosmetic changes seemed to offer the best of available
alternatives to the leadership. It was relatively easy to
carry on if they consolidated their political power by
stifling	 opposition. It also offered them the chance of
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accumulating wealth on a scale undreamt of in the colonial
days. Third, the World Bank had presented them with a ready-
made economic policy which met both their political and
private interests.
In addition, the chapter shows that the legal super-
structure necessary to facilitate the smooth operation of
the economic system and policies chosen was also formulated
in the colonial days. This includes the land legislation
as well as that on tariff protection, import and export
licensing, financial backing etc., all of which were vital
to the development of a PFI dominated economy.
In chapter two, the government's policy on private
enterprise and in particular PFI was discussed in some
detail. In considering government policy on private enter-
Pri se, the discussion clearly shows that the strategies of
the colonial authofity to bequeath independent Kenya a given
economic system and policies to run it were largely success-
ful. The discussion in the chapter brings out both the
explicit and implicit acceptance of the inherited economic
set up by the ruling regime in Kenya. The government's
policy position on PFI is shown to be largely a continuation
of existing economic policies. Three main conclusions
may be reached from the discussion of government's policy
on private enterprise, in particular PFI. One is that the
government's orientation towards a private enterprise centred
economy reflected not only its acceptance of the inherited
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economic system, but also the ideological position of the
ruling clique. While the government's rejection of
public ownership of the means of production as the ultimate
economic goal was absolute and unequivocal, its rationali-
sation of capitalism as 'African Socialism' was clearly a
far cry from advocating socialism. As the discussion clearly
reveals, the regime has practised unmitigated capitalism all
along. The second conclusion derives from the first as
well as the economic fact at independence. This is that,
having chosen a capitalist path, the regime had pretty much
narrowed its choice of available policy on PFI. The govern-
ment could not have been expected to turn around and throw
out PFI or make its existence intolerable. PFI formed
the basis of the economy especially the manufacturing sector.
Given this fact, the choice of the end, a capitalist economy,
determined the means, at least in the foreseeable future.
This means was PFI otherwise capitalism was a long way from
producing any tangible benefits for there was little private
capital and even less,entrepreneurship, in Kenya outside
PFI. The third conclusion concerns the possibility of
exercising effective control over investment that the govern-
ment had wooed into the country with the promise of a blank
cheque and of virtually unrestricted freedom of operation.
Having set out to attract PFI on quantitative rather than
qualitative criteria, the government had narrowed its chances
of thereafter effectively regulating PFI..
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The unwillingness of the government to be seen as
imposing unfavourable regulation on PFI is well reflected
in the discussion on the measures it took to safeguard the
interests of PFI. The economic and legal incentivesdiscussed
demonstrate an approach of a government committed to attrac-
ting PFI into the country almost at any cost . It is not
here being argued that rigorous regulation of PFI for the
national interest is necessarily enough to discourage its
inflow. The experience of the Andean group of countries,
Brazil, South Korea etc. stands out as clear evidence to the
contrary. The point being made here is that this appears
to be the view held by the government. Fear of discoura-
ging new PFIorscaring away those already in the country
_ _
would appear to have played a significant role in staying
the government's hand in this matter. Thus the government
seems to have 'decided that discretion is the better part
of valour'. 3 So far, the discretion has been exercised in
favour of PFI. The discussions in the three chapters that
follow chapter II provide evidence to support this contention.
The failure of the government to exercise effective
regulation over PFI is well portrayed in its foreign invest-
ment approval process. In theory, this process is supposed
to separate the 'chaff from the wheat' in its selection
of the PFI that is permitted to establish in the country.
The discussion in the third chapter leads up to the conclu-
sion that this process has been far from being effective in
doing this in the past and that the prospects for the future
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are not bright either unless the system is overhauled.
The process takes the form of bargaining between the PFI
and the Kenyan partners on the one hand and the authority
on the other hand. It is an ad hoc process based on a case
by case approach. It may be argued that this approach
provides a more flexible set up than apriori terms and
conditions to be fulfilled by all PFI. However, this pre-
sumed advantage is only realizable where capabilities to
bargain with PFI are adequate and properly utilised. In
Kenya's case, the existence of these presumptions has not
been borne out by experience.
The discussion on the approval process in operation
in Kenya leads to several important broad conclusions. The
first of these is that the process does not really screen
proposed projects, but rather endorses the proposal of
whichever investor is selected. The selection is usually
arbitrary and often does not involve the stated machinery.
The Ken-Ren and Firestone examples discussed in this study
provide telling examples of this endorsing role of the
approval machinery. As between competing applicants, the
process chooses one or more of them (i.e. if given a chance
so to choose, which is not always the case) and then proceeds
to endorse his proposal. Most projects' preparation and
search stage is executed bythe interested foreign party.
They usually conduct the feasibility studies upon which so
much of the evaluation is based by the approval machinery.
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The evaluation process rarely prepares its own feasibility
. studies or even subjects those prepared by the foreign party
to serious critical analysis. What this means is that the
agenda for the evaluation as well as the information and
data necessary to make an informed evaluation are both
supplied by the foreign parties. In legal terms, it is like
asking a defendant , to prepare the evidence upon which the
plaintiff will rest his case against him. The second con-
clusion to emerge from the empirical investigations is that
the PFI	 , so far as is possible to generalise from those
studied, appear to have had a field day in their negotiations
with the Kenyans. The corollary to this is that the process
has, therefore, been of neglible constraint to PFI operating
in Kenya. In fact, far from being a constraint, PFI has
found the bargaining process to be of great advantage in
their favour. Knowing that the regulatory measures applica-
ble to their operations are subject to government discretion
as to whom they apply PFI has, more often than not, used
with considerable success, the bargaining process to have
the government exercise its discretion in their favour.
This has involved obtaining exemptions from legal obliga-
tions such as payment of some taxes, limitation of local
borrowing etc., as well as the government using its powers
to stifle competition. In all the cases studied, the
process conferred more privileges on PFI establishing in
Kenya than the constraint it imposed on them. Strangely
enough, the process does not seem sufficiently concerned
with the ability and capacity of the chosen PFI to deliver
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their part of the bargain. This has led to what 7 in some
of the cases, can only be classified as acceptance of pirate
companies. But why has the process performed so badly?
As pointed out earlier,
apart from	 the difficulties posed by the complexities
of the issues involved, policy factors have contributed
greatly to the failure of the process as a regulatory measure.
First, because of the government's concern with attracting
PFI, it has failed to establish a viable institutional
machinery for evaluating proposals submitted by PFI and
developing the requisite capabilities over time. An effec-
tive regulatory system would call for minimum rules to be
satisfied; clear policy guidelines that provide as precise
criteria upon which to evaluate a project as possible; a
decision-making process based on objective consideration
of the facts rather than on arbitrary exercise of discre-
tionary decision-making power;; a well organised and co-ordi-
nated institutional machinery capable of accumulating
evaluation capabilities through learning by doing, as well
as collating, analysing and using available data and informa-
tion to maximum benefit'. All these factors are missing
in the Kenyan approval process. They are missing not
because they are impossible to achieve, but because the
government appears not to have been particularly keen on
them.
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The ad hoc case by case approach to evaluation means
that there are no minimum rules to be satisfied because
each PFI is likely to negotiate for different terms of
entry. Every issue is, therefore, negotiable. The flexi-
bility afforded by this system undermines the bargaining base
of the approval process. Such rules usually constitute a
bargaining base and leverage not obtainable otherwise. The
lack of clear policy guidelines complicates the matter even
more. What criteria should take priority? Foreign exchange
earning and/or saving prospects? Creation of employment?
Generation of technical skills? Creation of export capabili-
ties? The cost of a proposal project? All these or a
combination of such issues and many others should be clearly
laid out in identifiable policy guidelines. At the end of
the day, they determine the value of a project to the nation.
No such policy guidelines are available in unequivocal terms
to the Kenyan approval process. If any have been made avail-
able, their subsequent exclusion by decision makers involved
may have rendered them incapable of any rational sense of
application,
The ad hoc approval process has also meant that no
institution has developed in the country capable of evaluat-
ing PFI projects. The New Projects Committee, for example,
is itself an ad hoc body whose membership is constantly
changing. It has built up little expertise and capabilities
or any recognisable evaluation techniques. As the process
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operates at present, it allows the fragmentation of the
Kenyan parties involved into groups pursuing separate and
often opposing interests in the course of approving PFI
projects. This fragmentation of the government's organs
into separate interest groups has in the past resulted in
these groups being pitched against each other. The only
party who benefits from this fragmentation is the foreign
applicant. In addition to this weak point of the approval
process, the empirical investigation in this study reveals
the decision-making on who to let in and under what terms,
to be highly discretionary and susceptible to political
intervention from higher authorities. The decision-making
process is virtually divorced from the approval process. The
latter, when it comes to decision-making, is not only a tooth-
less puppy, but one without a tongue either. It cannot even
as much as bark! Those involved in the approval process have
no power to make decisions on the basis of their findings. They
cannot even question a decision overruling their recommenda-
tions. The views of the Kenyan personnel submitted to the
decision-makers do sometimes end up as mere piles of internal
memos • while the decision reached has little resemblance to
the analysis and recommendations contained therein. The
discretion of the decision-makers is absolute and because they
are located high up in the political hierarchy, they appear
not to be accountable for the consequences of their decisions.
Because of this highly discretionary decision-making process,
exemptions from regulation have become the rule rather than
the exception in the arrangement reached with PFI during the
approval process. Obviously, such a system is
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extremely susceptible to corruption, political interfe-
rence as well as to demoralising those in the process who see
their recommendations sacrificed in preference to personal
pecuniary, political or other interests.
A common notion that pervades both capitalist and
non-capitalist economic thinking is that ownership of
majority or controlling equity constitutes a viable basis
for exercising control over investment. This view seems to
be firmly held by the Kenya government. It has, therefore,
encouraged an Africanization programme partly as a way of
regulating and controlling PFI. The discussion in chapter IV
shows the programme has not been particularly successful and
that, in its present form, is not likely to succeed in
wrenching control from PFI in projects it is involved. There
are three broad reasons suggested in the discussion for
reaching this conclusion, One is that the programme has
concentrated on mere acquisition of equity without paying
enough attention to the development of indigenous entrepre-
neurial capabilities. Two is that the programme seems
indifferent to the very successful use of non-equity channels
of exorcising control. This success has no doubt been
facilitated by the first reason above. Finally, Africani-
zation of both equity and personnel has, in the majority of
cases, led to an Rlliance between foreign capital and the
local bourgeoisie who, in a large measure, have political
control over the country.
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This study has also shown that despite government
rhetoric against direct public participation in the economy,
it has nevertheless increasingly participated in equity in
areas that do not readily fall under its statainarrow scope
in which such ownership would be undertaken. 4 This has
forced the government to shift its rhetorical emphasis from
that of a private enterprise economy to that of a mixed
economy. 5
 This shift was clearly necessary because, except
in commerce and real estate, there was little private capital
investment by the local African bourgeoisie. As this was the
one area in which PFI still heavily dominated by the end of
the 1960s, the government was under some pressure from this
class to pave the way for their entry in industry in partner-
ship
 with foreign capital. Hence the concentration on the
acquisition of equity in foreign controlled enterprises.
The objective reality is that the programme as has been in
existence so far, has been aimed at, not the displacement of
PFI from the country, but participating in the profit sharing
with such PFI. As long as the profits continue to flow to
the local shareholders, the programme would not concern
itself with matters of control. In this sense, the parasta-
tals are simply paving the way for the entrance of local
private capital by absorbing the initial losses. At least
this was the original intention. The principal goal of
Afrinanization is, therefore, not to take over the running
of the economy, but to participate in foreign owned enter-
prises. Nowrojee has aptly described this aspect of
Africanization in the following terms:
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Africanization is not participation in 
domestic enterprise, it is participation by 
domestic capital in foreign private enter-
prise. Foreign interests are content to
have this happen. It ensures their continu-
ance,and diminished profitability is
compensated by increased security. Africa-
nization thereby only assists in leaving
untouched the neo-colonial process. The
implementation of africanization through the
parastatals additionally disguises that result.
This is because, firstly, the policy has pro-
moted apparent and not real change by putting 
in african replacements in privilege sharing 
positions instead of ownership and control;
secondly, the parastatals as government bodies 
carry out the exercise. This allays suspicion 
and makes it easier to mistake a substantial 
profit or-monetary gain for genuine ownership.
When the parastatal shows a profit it is easier 
to lose sight of the question: Did it gain 
control? For the price of profit is 
non-interference. 6
This describes the reality of Africanization in Kenya today
as presented in this study. In concentrating on acquisition
of equity, the Kenyan authorities have lost sight of the
need to master the strategies and instruments of control used
by PFI. Africanization has not, in the past, sought to deve-
lop local entrepreneurial capabilities, but merely to share
the profits from projects totally dependent on foreign entre-
preneurship. This explains the abdication of managerial,
technical and marketing roles to the foreign parties as
outlined in this study.
Far from limiting the abilities of PFI to control
economic operations in which it is involved, Africanization
has provided a valuable and effective buffer between the
government's actual and potential regulation and such
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investment. As the study shows, PFI has effectively used
its local partners and personnel as a lobby against unwelcome
and for welcome interference. Thus for example, ICDC, IDB
and DFCK, all major conduits of government participation in
partnership with foreign capital, have played a major role
in pressurising the government to abolish sales tax on
imported machinery which their foreign partners supply; to
lower or abolish duty on raw materials imported from their
foreign partners; to maintain a quantitative restrictions
based protection of industry system which favour PFI opera-
tions in the country etc. In addition, local equity parti-
cipation has greatly reduced the economic risks undertaken
by PFI by ensuring them access to otherwise unavailable
local risk capital. The interests of the local partners
in deriving profits from the partnerships makes them natural
allies of PFI in resisting unfavourable government regulation.
The African personnel in such projects play a similar role
to those of their fellows in equity partnerships. Like the
latter, the former's privileged financial positions are
invariably tied to the presence and flourishment of PFI. 7
This phenomenon is not unique to Kenya. Writing about Morocco,
for example, PierreJalee has this to say on the impotence of
local equity participation per se as a means of controlling
PFI.
... foreign capital is often associated with
Moroccan private capital or Moroccan public
capital or both together. The foreign capital
is quite happy to be minority partner and even
suggests that it should be, as evidence of the
purity of its motives. It goes so far as to
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agree to a Moroccan chairman of the Board
of Directors accepting for itself a deputy
director, and why should it require more?
It knows that the enterprise is viable only
on the basis of foreign technical capital.
Although in the majority, the indigenous 
capital is the prisoner of its foreign part-
ner. Mixed investment ... ties up the 
indigenous capital of the host country and
denationalizes it. 8
And so it is in Kenya. Local capital in joint venture with,
or leasing technology etc. from, foreign capital has become
the prisoner of the latter. It has acquired part, or 100%,
ownership in many projects, but foreign capital still calls
the tune in the operation of these projects. The present
Africanization of equity and personnel, while successful in
Africanizing the major economic risks, has left the job of
Africanizing effective control unaccomplishea. Other means
of control have effectively been applied by PFI to shift
control to the foreign interests displaced by the Africani-
zation programme.
The last chapter of the main body of this study looks
at some financial and fiscal regulations applied to PFI in
Kenya. The discussion examines the nature and operation of
these measures and suggests that they have been largely
ineffective constraints on PFI operating in the country.
Four main reasons are suggested as contributory factors to
the failure of these measures. First, their potential
effectiveness is frustrated by the government's heavy commit-
ment to attracting PFI into the country which, in a bid to
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create a hospitable investment climate, leads it to handle
such investment with 'velvet' gloves so to speak. This
frustration is particularly apparent in the CBK's exchange
control role under the ECA whose effectiveness in controlling
or regulating repatriation of funds by PFI is greatly hampe-
red by the legal guarantees afforded to such investors
under the provisions of FIFA. Second, many of these measures
are rendered inapplicable to particular PFI by exemptions
and privileges granted to them by the government on establi-
shment. This is a direct result of the government's case
by case bargaining approach during which a foreign investor
is able to squeeze as many concessions as he can from the
government. An example of such concessions and privileges
expressed as contractual obligation of the government is
reproduced in Appendix 1. of this work_. Many of the concessions
and privileges exempt the establishing projects from one or
more obligations imposed upon it by law or administrative
practice. Where such exemptions have been obtained, the
financial and, or, fiscal regulation is rendered useless.
Third, many of these regulatory instruments are simply
inadequate to deal with the complex global operations of
MNCs who are the major PFI operating in Kenya. For example,
the exchange control regulation, the income tax, the customs
etc. .machinery established by law seems designed to deal
with straightforward, honest transactions by those who are
subject to these regulations. They do not take into account
the fact that in business, morality (e.g. honesty) takes
second place after business interests. PFI have a wide scope
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to avoid financial and fiscal regulations through the
medium of transfer accounting. 9 The global nature of their
operations makes controlling their operations an extremely
complex task. Their attitude towards regulation does not
simplify the task either. One managing director of an MNC
subsidiary is reported to have said
We would not knowingly break the rules any-
where ... We always employ one set of
experts to tell us what they are, and another
set to tell us how to get around them.
And another one that
It is the job of governments to make the
rules and ours to find the loopholes.10
Most of the financial and fiscal legislation was not designed
for, and has not been adapted to deal with, such complex
global operations as are presented by many of the PFI in
Kenya. Finally, the machinery of enforcing the regulation
lacks both institutional coherence as well as financial and
human resources. The blamafor institutional incoherence of
the machinery as well as the limitations in available resour-
ces may, with reasonable justification, be laid at the foot
of the government. The study has, for example, shown that
there is little coordination between government institutions
e.g. the CBK and the income tax department; the customs
• department	 ; the ministry of indUstry etc.
Coordination
of the relevant government departments in any significant
form appears to be absent and little effort seem to have
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been spent on rectifying this haphazard organisation of
financial and fiscal regulatory machinery. For the last
eighteen years since independence, the government has not
seen it fit to have a special training programme for per-
sonnel specialising in monitoring and regulating the
activities of PFI. The bulk of exchange control in the CBK
for example, is carried out by ordinary bank clerks without
even basic training in the tasks they undertake. 11 The
income tax and customs departments have fared no better.
Failure to train personnel capable of monitoring and analy-
sing PFI's financial, production and marketing operations
in their global context means that even if the legal set up
in existence were suitable to deal with MNC's global opera-
tions the manpower constraint would greatly hamper its
efficiency. The attempt by the CBK to use external expertise
in the form of GSC, has clearly not proved effective despite
GSC's unverified claims. The cost of engaging GSC, added
to the acknowledged but not quantified loss through PFI's
financial manipulations, 12 would have been more than adequ-
ate to set up a specialised institution staffed with
specially trained personnel to monitor and regulate the
financial and fiscal aspects of PFI operations in the country.
Once again, the government seems to have lacked the political
will (not power) to strengthen its capabilities to financi-
ally and fiscally regulate PFI in the future.
The discussion and analysis of the empirical investi-
gation in this study have been conditioned by two main
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hypothesis. The first is that the overall economic
policy pursued by the government determines the nature and
extent of the regulation of PFI adopted as well as the
political commitment to enforce any regulation that may be
imposed, reluctantly or otherwise. The second is that PET
is capable of, and likely to try, countering any regulatory
measures imposed by the government with some considerable
success. The empirical investigations in this study have
shown that government policy-induced factors in conjunction
with PFI counter-regulation strategies have led to largely
ineffective attempts to regulate and control PET in Kenya
since independence.
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B : SOME OBSERVATIONS 
From these broad conclusions, we can venture to make
the following observations on the current system of regu-
lating PFI in Kenya. First, the government's belief that
strict regulation might keep PFI away does not seem to be
founded. However, even if it did, it may not necessarily
be to the detriment of the national economy. The past
experience could be said to be ample evidence 	 for the
proposition that PFI needs to be regulated if the country
is to rely on it to provide the foundation upon which an
independent economy is to be built. It would therefore,
be in the interest of the government to formulate a workable
regulatory policy that would operate without fear or favour.
As the discussion in this study indicates, the govern-
ment has yet to formulate a comprehensive policy and stra-
tegies towards the long term prospect of PFI. No effective
regulation of the same would be possible without clearly
defined objectives. The formulation of these is a political
matter which the government of the day has to face. The
choice of economic ideology has been made in favour of
capitalism not so much through a clearly articulated capi-
talist ideology, but rather by a clear and unequivocal
rejection of socialism. 13 In practice the ideology followed
has been capitalism pure and simple. This practice has been
greatly influenced by the concentration in the country of
most of the PFIs operating in East Africa.
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Having chosen a capitalist path, the government has to
make a choice whether to let the economy remain a dependent
peripheral capitalist or an independent one. The choice
is important in selecting the regulatory policies to
pursue towards PFI. It is upon the choice of policy made
that the degree of political will to control and regulate
PFI will rest. The more the policies are oriented towards
the attainment of economic independence in the long run,
the stronger the political	 will required to enforce the
necessary regulation for the achievement of this objective.
The choice is between controlling the economy through
public ownershiporthrough domestic private capital.
If the control of the economy is to come through
domestic private capital, then the Africanization programme
will need to be considerably overhauled. In its present
form, it produces profit receivers, managers and servicemen
for what are still -essentially projects controlled by
foreign capital with or without equity holding. The chall-
enge of the programme is to produce entrepreneurs capable
of running the economy without undue reliance on foreign
capital. The present breed of local capitalists is essen-
tially a distributor and consumer class (except in agricul-
ture). Swainson l s-and Ley's claim of an existing independent
local industrial capitalists is as-,yet to be empirically
verified. Indeed, the very personalities they cite as
proof of their claim of the existence of such a class are the
best examples of the comprador nature of the notable local
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capitalist class. 15 Available evidence clearly shows
that as the leading local bourgeoisie began to move into
industrial activity, they have become more and more depen-
dent on foreign technology, knowhow, management and
entrepreneurs. 16
 It seems that Swainson and company have
equated accumulation of wealth with economic independence.
The onus is upon them to prove that this is necessarily so.
If the comprador nature of private capital is to be
changed into a more dynamic and independent one, it is
necessary that the government change its present industrial
policies and strategies. This will not be an easy task.
It will involve a review of the role of PFI under whose
shadow the domestic entrepreneurship has had to operate for
decades. The formulation of appropriate policies will
require a detailed review of the operation and effects of
the present Africanization policy. We would suggest that
in formulating a new policy, the primary objective should
be the development of indigenous entrepreneurial, mana-
gerial, technical and marketing capabilities rather than
mere acquisition of shares in existing or new foreign con-
trolled operations. This would be a indium and long term
rather than a short term programme.
In the present Kenyan circumstances, certain re-
organisation in the regulatory process appears necessary
if PFI is to be used constructively. In the initial stage,
the concern should be on utilising PFI to build up a viable
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relatively independent domestic economy, be it public
or private controlled. Thus any regulation imposed on its
establishment or operations in the country should be concer-
ned first and foremost in directing its resources towards
the task of developing a viable self-sustaining domestic
economy. It is our opinion that a lot of efforts have to
be made to orient the present role of PFI in the country
towards the development of such an economy. The regulatory
framework in existence does not appear to have been designed
to significantly alter the role PFI has played in the economy
so far. Perhaps it was assumed that participation of dome-
stic capital in PFI operations would lead to the former
taking over. While this remains a possibility in years to
come, it has to be borne in mind that the interests of
domestic capital are not necessarily identical to those of
the nation as a whole. This is particularly so where the
domestic capital happens to be private capital, or even
public capital operating on capitalist economic principles
as is the case in Kenya. With this in mind, some active
regulation by the state may be a prerequisite to re-orient
the role of PFI in the manner described. Here we must
register a caveat. In Kenya today, it is difficult to
separate the interests of private capital from those of the
powerful political elements in government that have a vir-
tually unchallenged control over the affaLrs of the state.
This is so because though state institutions of governing
exist in the constitutional set up, the reality is such that
institutions derive their power from personalities rather
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than	 vice versa. Thus though parliament is declared
to be supreme in the constitution, the practice provides
a stark contrast to supremacy. As economic policy has
never been subject to unqualified public discussion in
independent Kenya, it is these same elements in the govern-
ment that have determiend the policies adopted towards PFI
and its role in the economy. It is therefore their attitude
to PFI as well as to the economic structure in which it
operates that counts. Ten years ago, the ILO mission to
Kenya described these attitudes thus
Kenyan attitudes and aspirations had perhaps
been moulded more than was realised ... by
the colonial experience of having to accommo-
date oneself and to work within the existing
structure of the economy rather than to
change it. Thus when national independence
was achieved the political aim of taking over 
the economy became merged almost imperceptibly
with individual aspirations to take over the 
jobs, positions and the lifestyles which the 
economy made possible. 17
It is in changing these attitudes that the present governing
regime will need a strong political will. Such a change of
attitudes will affect their private interests which as stated
above, are essentially one and the same with those of pri-
vate capital.
Asuming the existence of political will to override
the private interests in favour of public ones, three main
suggestions regarding regulation of PFI may be made based
on the empirical investigations in this study. First, there
needs be a moratorium in the establishment of projects
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dependent on foreign capital. It is our view that too many
such projects have been established in the last fifteen
years without due regard to the alternatives available;
the short and long term costs and effects of the projects;
their relevance and priority in the economy; and above all,
the nation's capacity and ability to absorb and utilise
them efficiently and to the public good.	 This has stret-
ched the nation's limited human and financial resources to
a level that only casual attention is paid to many of these
white elephants. The benefits that have flowed from these
projects have not always been without a high price to the
nation. In addition they have resulted in to overcapacity
in some areas leading to significant capacity under-
utilisation, a waste the country can ill-afford. For these
two main reasons, a moratorium may be a wise move. The
opportunity should be taken during such a moratorium to
review, through comprehensive investigative studies, the
performance of all major projects involving PFI as well as
to determine their contribution or otherwise to the achieve-
ment of a viable domestic economy. The investigation should
be of a public nature with all findings and recommendations
available to the public. Publicity has for so long been
kept out of dealings with foreign capital that it has been
possible to render the decision-makers in government un-
accountable for their actions owing to their secret nature.
On the basis of such investigations, the government should
then prepare a review of the organisational structure of
existing projects, as well as the criteria for admitting new
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PFI into the country. The primary criterion for determi-
ning the desirability of a project should be its long term
positive contribution to the nation's capabilities to achieve
meaningful economic independence.
The second suggestion relates to the institutional
set up for the regulation of PFI. It is the view of the
author that the regulation of PFI should be undertaken by a
specialised agency independent from government control.
This agency should also undertake the job of monitoring
the operations of PFI in the country. The agency would
coordinate with all government departments and have access to
all records and documentation relating to all PFI operating
in the country. Its ultimate objective would be to train
and develop manpower and develop technical capability to
deal with foreign firms operating in Kenya 	 and to serve
as a depository of complete records on the activities of
PFI in the country. - An important authority the institution
should be given is that of being the final authority (except-
ing acourt of law) to determine all matters connected with
PFI. No political institution or personalities should be given
veto over the agency's decisions or the power to appoint
any of the key personnel of the agency. The agency should
preferably be established by statute. Its proceedings
should be available to the public and its decisions subject
to public debate. Publicity would help reduce the common
political pressure such institutions are likely to be
subjected to. Once again, the setting up of such an agency
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should be seen as a long term undertaking. It would cert-
ainly take several years before it is sufficiently
operational as well as being manned by well trained local
personnel. The cost of setting up such an agency may appear
to be prohibitive at first instance, but its benefits in
the future can be in no doubt whatsover.
Finally, it is suggested that in its formulation of
policy on PFI and its regulation, the government should pay
much more attention to economic development and equitable
distribution of the nation's wealth than it has done so far.
In the past, it has emphasised 	 economic growth above
equity issues which has meant that the tangible benefits
of PFI have accrued to a very small proportion of tne popu-
lation which have in turn tended to align themselves to it.
A system that promotes benefits to a select few instead, or
at the expense, of the nation as a whole is likely to pro-
mote a comprador bourgeois capitalist class whose interests
may be more in line with those of foreign capital than with
those of the national economy. It would make the task of
achieving a self-sustaining domestic economy independent
from foreign capital much more difficult with such a class
wielding both economic and political power.
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C : A FINAL EMPHASIS 
A critical fact that any government seeking to regu-
late PFI ought to realize is that any form of regulation is
only a means to an end. Regulation of PFI must have an
objective or even many objectives. Thus the regulation
imposed must be carefully planned and firmly enforced with
reference to specified objectives. Regulatory responses
to incidental or isolated occurences cannot be the basis of
a sound and effective regulation of PFI. It is not the
legislation that is passed that makes regulation effective
and beneficial. Rather it is the soundness and sense of
purpose of the policies upon which the regulation is based that
make it
	
worthwhile. All over the world, regulation of
economic activities conforms to wider social, economic
and political policies and strategies. And so is the
position in Kenya.
The Kenya government has so far shown an ambivalence
in whether or not to secure more control over activities of
foreign capital in the country. 18
 Such ambivalence must
end if significant advances are to be made towards controll-
ing PFI in the country. The intended role of PFI must be
specified as clearly as possible and its regulation designed
to ensure that it plays this role in a satisfactory manner.
It is imperative to understand that the nature and extent
of regulation will be determined by the role assigned to PFI
in the economy and not vice versa. In turn, the role assigned
to PFI will be dependent upon the country l s broad social,
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economic and political ideology.
Implementation of regulation of PFI is every bit as
important as the formulation of the same. It is, however,
a much more difficult task than its formulation. While very
good policies may be formulated and eloquently articulated
in rhetoric, it is their implementation that gives them
meaning and distinguishes them from mere hollow rhetoric.
Thus for example, while the Kenya government has been proli-
fic in its rhetoric about its commitment to a fair distri-
bution of incomes, 19 in practice it has pursued policies
that have achieved the opposite. 20 A strong political will
is required to enforce any regulations imposed on PFI
operating in the country. In this study, we have seen that
lack of political will, as opposed to power, to enforce
existing regulations has left PFI very much free to pursue
its interests with relative ease. There have been far too
many and unnecessary concessions and compromises to PFI from
the government to the point that they may now be said to
have become the rule rather than the exception. Political
will is also necessary to change the attitude of policy
formulators towards a much more dynamic drive towards economic
independence rather than the present attitude of seeking to
work within the existing economic structure. They should
be prepared to change or modify their present economic ideolo-
gy if it stands in the way of the search for economic
independence.
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This study has not, on the whole, addressed itself to
the broader issues of the choice between a socialist or a
capitalist economy and also that between a public or a pri-
vate capital centred one. It has been largely confined to
an evaluation of some of the existing regulation on PFI in
the present Kenyan economy. It is, however, doubtful whether
an independent economic system truly based on private dome-
stic capital in the country is feasible in the near future
within the present political and economic environment. At
present, private capital involved in production is signi-
ficantly foreign owned and/or controlled and is likely to
remain so for some time to come unless a change in economic
policy is made. In addition, even those production opera-
tions that appear to be in the hands of domestic private
capital are substantially dependent on external resources.
and are therefore, not self-sustaining in the absence of
such external resources. Few of these have bothered to
develop their own capabilities instead of relying on those
of foreign suppliers. This has to, a large extent, been a
function of government economic policies in particular
industrial ones. If the country is to succeed in attaining
a viable independent economy that in addition distributes
benefits fairly equally throughout the entire population,
then it would appear to us that a capitalist oriented econo-
my is not one that-is properly equipped or inclined to meet
these fundamental goals. 21
 In an economic system governed
by the ethos of private capital, private interests are
likely to take priority over public ones. This likelihood
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is even more in a country like Kenya where a substantial
portion of the private capital in domestic hands belongs to
those few who wield political power. Indeed, this appears
to have been the case in Kenya, a fact that the government
explicitly admits. Thus the 1979-83 Plan observes that
The progress achieved since independence [in
economic growthj has unfortunately been
accompanied by an erosion of the high ethical
standards that once were typical of African
society. Private interests have too often 
been placed ahead of the public interests:
the social sanctions which controlled such 
behaviours in the traditional African setting
have not yet been successfully emulated in 
the modern setting of a national economy. 22
Instead, the 'ethical standards' of a capitalist economy
have been substituted for those of the 'African tradition'.
A substantial proportion of the private interests that have
'unfortunately' overriden public ones, have been associated
with PFI.
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NOTES
1. See for example, all the Development Plans since
1966; IBRD, 1975; and Business International, 1980.
2. See Langdon, 1976: Leys, 1975; Kaplinsky, 1979;
Hoperaft, 1980; Eglin, 1978; and Mutunga, 1979.
3. African Business, November 1979, from where this phrase,
is taken. It was their analysis of why the Kenya govern-
ment was doing nothing to bring Del Monte to book for
its transfer pricing activities.
4. SP 10/65
5. 1974-78 Plan, 2, 1979-83 Plan, 332
6. Nowrojee, 1975, 160. (emphasis added)
7. For a detailed account of this alliance, see Langdon,
1976, Chapter 3.
8. Quoted in Nowrojee, 1975, 161. (empahis added)
9. For details, see for example, Tugendhat, 1971 and
Lall, 1977
10. Both these quotes are taken from Tugendhat, 1971, 163
11. For example, out of about 150 personnel in the CBK's
exchange control department, only 10 have some rele-
vant qualifications and some training, but none of
these is specially trained in matters dealing with
MNC's global operational strategies and techniques.
12. See Budget Speech, 1980; ILO, 1972; IBRD, 1975 and
Kaplinsky, 1979 for examples.
13. See SP 10/65
14. Swainson, 1980; Leys, 1978 and 1980
15. These are: Njenga Karume, Udi Gecaga and Ngengi Muigai.
16. This is the case with Gecaga and Muigai in the AVA;
Karume in Dawa Pharmaceutical and Kalinga in J. K.
Industries, for example .
17. ILO, 1972, 87
18. See IBRD, 1975, 308
289
19. See SP 10/65 and all the Development Plans 
since independence.
20. For government's explicit admission of this,
see 1979-83 Plan, 5.
21. In addition to the achievement of economic independence,
alleviation of poverty is declared to be tl"e central
theme of the 1979-83 Plan. Among measures expected
to alleviate poverty is the equitable distribution of
incomes - see pp. 2 and 5.
22. 1979-83 Plan, 23.
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IX 1	 EXTRACT FROM KCFC's JOINT VENTURE
AGREEMENT
ARTICLE IV 
UNDERTAKINGS BY GOVERNMENT OF KENYA 
SECTION 4.01 GOK shall grant or cause to be granted to
the Company, in good time for the purposes of the project,
title to and possession of, and GOK shall further procure
or cause to be procured the provision to the Company at
those favoured rates of such piece or pieces of land as
are considered by the Management adequate for this project
and its future expansion of an area as shall be accepted by
the Company in Kisumu as suitable for the purposes of the
project, including the plant and other industrial buildings,
offices and residential accommodation.
Such land shall be granted for a leasehold term of at least
99 years, and upon the term and conditions and at a cost
no less favourable than those applied to other projects.
GOK shall further procure or cause to be procured at no
cost to the Company, the provision to the Company of the
followingservices or facilities in good time for the purposes
of the project:
(a) Electric Power	 - 6 MVA
(b) Water - 1,000,000 Imperial gallons per diem
(c) Effluent disposal - 225,000 gallons per diem
(d) All facilities such as road, water supply,
electricity connection, telephone, rail access,
affluent disposal and similar services required
for the operation of the Project and all GOK
approvals and licenses for the same.
(e) All permits, authorizations, approvals and
licenses required for the establishment and
the efficient and profitable operation of
the Project and the Cnmpany in Kenya
	 /2
(f) All port facilities necessary for the expe
ditious unloading of the materials and
equipment required for the establishment
and operation of the Project and their
transport from the port to Kisumu, and all
port facilities necessary for the export of
the Factory's products.
SECTION 4.02	 GOK undertakes to arrange the supply to the
Company of adequate supplies of molasses at reasonable
prices and all other local supplies necessary for the
operation of the Company's business to enable the
Company to meet its own minimum production standards per
annum, and to make all such other local arrangements as
may be necessary. Furthermore, GOK shall procure that
the outlets for power alcohol salers within Kenya to
petroleum companies respectively and-users shall be
arranged.
SECTION 4.03	 During the period from the date hereof until
12 months after the Project Completion Data, GOK shall
grant to the Company or (as the case may be) o the
contractor employed by it for the construction of the Project,
as and when required:-
(a) all import and other licences and permits
required for the import into Kenya of all plant
machinery, equipment, materials, tools and spare
parts which are required:-
i) for the construction and equipping of the
Project under this Agreement or under the
construction contract for the Project; and
ii) by such contractor for the carrying out of
such construction work:
provide that this paragraph (a) shall not apply to
furnishing, standard office quipment and non-specialised
vehicles for use -on roads or excluded from import under,
the provisions of the Restricted Imports (Commercial Motor
Vehicles) Order 1975 as for the time being in force, which
are ordinarily available in Kenya.
/-2
(b) exemption from all import duties, other than sales
tax, in respect of the items authorised to be
imported under paragraph (a) of this Section
except:-
i) any goods which shall then be produced and
be available in Kenya in appropriate type,
quality and quantity and at a competitive
price and at the appropriate time ("compe-
titive price" meaning the price of 000ds
produced and available in Kenya compared
with the cost of like imported goods when
landed, free on rail and duty paid, at
Mombasa and "produced" including assemply
or processing at any factory in Kenya); and
ii) items of contractors' equipment covered by
sub-clause (ii) of paragraph (a) of this
section.
All such importation as is mentioned in this Section shall
(unless otherwise required by GOK) be subject to surveillance
of General Superintendence Company (or other agent appointed
by GOK for such purpose) under the present procedures for
the import of goods into Kenya (in addition to the usual
Customs procedures).
Should GOK determine at any time up to the Project
Implementation Data as defined in Section 6.02 that import
duties shall thereafter be levied on any or all of the above
imported items then the Subscribers hereby agree and shall
vote and cause their Directors to vote for an increase of
share capital of the Company equal to the amount of said
import duties, to be allotted to GOK alone, for which GOK
shall subscribe and pay up. GOK shall grant the Company
as and when required after the Project Completion Date:
(a) all import or other licences and permits required
for the import into Kenya of all raw materials,
consumables, equipment, machinery, machines,
spare parts and fuel as are required for the
proper operation for the Project: Provided
that such items or any of them shall not at the
relevant time be available for supply in Kenya
in appropriate type, quality and quantity and
at a competitive price (as above defined);
(b) until the Project achieves full capacity as
described in Section 2.01 or until the total
Overseas Credits specified in Section 2.02 (b)
(III) have been repaid, whichever shall first
occur, full exemption from all customs duties
(other than Sales Tax) on the items imported.
under paragraph (a) above; provided that such
items shall not then be produced and available
in Kenya in appropriate type, quality and quan-
tity and at a competitive price (as above defined)
and at the appropriate time.
(c) after the period specified in paragraph (b) above,
such exemptions from duties and taxes as shall
be determined by GOK from time to time in accor-
dance with its usual discretionary duty
remission policies, but so that the Company shall
not be treated any less favourably than other
manufacturers benefiting from duty remissions in
similar undertakings:
SECTION 4.05 GOK hereby undertakes to grant or cause to
be granted all approvals and licences subject to normal pro-
cedures necessary to establish and to operate the Project
and in particular but without derogating from the
generality of the foregoing:
(a) As the Project shall have been granted approval
in principle under the Exchange Control Act,
all Exchange Control approvals required for its
completion and operation shall be granted by
GOK simultaneously and GOK undertakes that
appropriate foreign exchange shall be made
available for remittance outside Kenya for:
i) payment for all raw material imports;
ii) payment of commitment fees and prepayment
premiums;
iii) repayment of all loans and interest payments
thereon;
iv) payment of all dividends to non-residents
of Kenya;
v) payment of all fees and charges payable
under the PIMA Agreement and the TEA
Agreement for sale of management services,
machinery, know-how and engineering
services (including per diem);
vi)
	
repatriation of Kenya income and other
allowances of expatriate employees of the
Company in accordance with the practices
prevailing at the date hereof.
(b) overdraft facilities in accordance with the
prevailing exchange control r'egulations but the
company will not be treated any less favourably
than other companies of similar size and nature.
Subject to discretion of Exchange Control, all
exchange control consents and approvals
required for the remittance outside Kenya of
the proceeds of sale in respect of Shares of
the Company subscribed by CIE and Advait.
(c) The Company shall be granted permission, during
the period from the first subscription of equity
under Section 3.01 until the Project Completion
Date (as below defined) to maintain and operate
banking accounts in Zurich, London and Vienna
and such other place or places as the Company may
request and GOK agree, for the purpose of recei-
ving moneys from CIC and Advait, being non-
residents of Kenya, and of paying the expenses
of the Company incurred and payable outside Kenya,
provided that the Company shall submit from time
to time as required by the Central Bank of Kenya
such information as that Bank shall require and
the Company shall comply with all controls and
directives from time to time established by
the said Bank.
(d) Any entry, work or residence permit required by
any of the employees or advisers of the Company
who are needed and required as designated by
Management shall be promptly issued for as
long as such qualified personnel are not
available from Kenya Citizens.
(f) All necessary trading licences for the Company
and export licences in conformity with Section
5.03.
SECTION 4.06 GOK shall ensure that all its own departments
and agencies shall extend the same favourable purchasing
policy in respect of the Company's products which is
generally extended from time to time locally manufactured
goods under GOK's and local authorities purchasing
policies.
SECTION 4.07 GOK undertakes that exemption from tax
shall be granted in respect of any payments arising out of
this agreement and the Agreements contemplated hereby
and made by the Company to Swissbank, OKAG and/or their
sponsored banking institutions or other foreign government
or government sponsored lending institutions that shall
have entered into such Agreements with the Company and
the Company shall not be required to deduct at source any
tax in respect of any such payment.
SECTION 4.08 GOK shall guarantee the due payment by the
Company of the principal and interest on credits that
shall or extended by any foreign government or
government sponsored institutions including but not
restricted to Swissbank and OKAG sponsored
institutions. Where such financial institutions require
for whatever reason the participation of other
institutions GOK agrees to guarantee those credits
extended, by virtue of these requirements, by any such
financial institutions.
APPENDIX 2 
EXTRACT FROM RIVATEX'S JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT
NOW IT IS HEREBY AGREED as follows:-
1. This Agreement will come into force and (subject to the
provisions hereof) shall be irrevocably binding u pon the
parties hereto from the date of signature hereof.
2. SEDITEX shall by the Commencement Date enter into firm
and binding contracts with suppliers chosen by SEDITEX
for the supply and delivery of all machinery and eauipment
mentioned in the Final Proposals upon the dates according
to the specifications at the prices and subject to the
conditions of payment mentioned in the Final Proposals.
3. ICDC shall by the Commencement Date obtain from the
Government a Certificate of Approved Enterprise under the
Foreign Investments Protection Act in the name and in
favour of SEDITEX in PIVATEX as detailed in the Final
Proposals together with all other consents and approvals
from Exchange Control and other authorities to assure to SEDITEX's
satisfaction the free repatriation (in the currency
of original investment) of the total proceeds of realisation
of such investment and all deividends and other income
accruing therefrom to gether with the like consents
and a pprovals for the payment to SEDITEX out of Kenya of
the remuneration payable to it under the said Technical
Services and Supplies Agreement and Managing Agency
Agreement.
4. ICDC shall obtain from the Government and all relevant
local and other authorities assurances satisfactory to
SEDITEX and RIVATEX concerning the grant and provision
to RIVATEX of title to the plot of land in Nakuru aforesaid
already identified by and known to the parties hereto
together with all such water, electric power. railway,
port and other facilities as mentioned in Article 6 of the
said Technical Services and Supplies Agreement so as not
to hinder progress or cause any delay in the completion
of the Project according to the Realisation Schedule in
Appendex I of the Final Proposals.
5. ICDC shall obtain from the Government assurances
satisfactory to SEDITEX and RIVATEX that imports into
Kenya of textiles in general and polyester and polyester
blends in particular shall be so rationalised or controlled
that such imports shall in no way interfere with or
prejudice the production and marketing by RIVATEX of all
lines of textiles and other products to be manufactured
by the Project upon economical and com petitive terms.
6. ICDC shall obtain from the Government assurances satisfactory
to SEDITEX and RIVATEX to take all such steps as may be
necessary and practicable in view of the approved status
of the Project and the heavy finance charaes and depreciation
costs involved therein, to exempt RIVATEX from or minimise
the impact upon RIVATEX of Sales Tax and similar impositions
upon machinery and raw materials together with the like
assurances that the capital machinery necessaru for the
Project may be imported into Kenya free of any fiscal entry
import duty or other like duty or levy- together with
the like assurances that Rivatex shall obtain in respect
of its importations of machinery and materials at least
as advantageous exemptions, remissions or other reliefs
as those now or hereafter at any time granted to other
overseas investors in similar capital projects, and in
any case that any benefits or advantages which RIVATEX
may not now be able to obtain shall be conferred upon it
in the event of the event of the same being accorded in
the future to any other investment in Kenya.
7. ICDC shall obtain from the Government assurances satisfactory
to SEDTTEX and RIVATEX that such Entry Permits as may be
applied for under the Immigration Act will be issued
(subject to normal Government security requirements)
permitting the entry into and employment in Kenya of such
expatriate employees as are required from time to time by
the Project in accordance with Appendix VIII and Appendix
IX of the Final Proposals.
8. SEDITEX shall on or before the Commencement Date procure
the subscription and payment in cash in foreign currency
by it or its nominees of the remaining balance of the
foreign promoters' eauity of Kenya Shillings Fifty million
one hundred forty-nine thousand five hundred
(K.Shs 50,149,50017) upon the "A" Shares becoming
available on increase of capital such payment to be
remitted in forei gn currency to a first-class Bank in
Kenya as agreed upon between the parties but the release
of such moneys to RIVATEX shall be conditional upon receipt
by SEDITEX and RIVATEX of the guarantee referred to in
Clause 9 hereof.
9. ICDC shall procure the issue to SEDITEX and RIVATEX as
soon as possible and in any event not later than the
Commencement Date of a guarantee from a first-class Bank
in Kenya acceptable to SEDITEX and RIVATEX securing that
immediately and automatically upon receipt of the afore-
mentioned eauity subscription of K.Shs 50,149,5001- by
SEDITEX or its nominees then ICDC or its nominees shall
subscribe and pay in full the corresponding balance of
Kenya Shillings Forty nine million six hundred fifty
thousand five hundred (K.Shs 49,650,500/-) in res pect of
the "B" Shares in the increased capital.
10. ICDC undertakes in favour of SEDITEx and RIVATEX that
pending execution and implementation of the Finance
Agreement referred to in Clause II hereof it shall provide
bridging finance in accordance with the arrangements
referred to in Recital G (b) hereof in respect of the
funds ultimately to tbe provided and secured under the said
Finance Agreement.
11. ICDC shall proceed with all speed upon execution hereof
in its capacity as a Syndicate Leader and in co-operation
with SIFTDA to conclude a Finance Agreement with RIVATEX
fdr the provision to R1VATEX of all loan and credit
facilities (excluding suppliers' credits) required for
the Project as summarized in Appendix XX of the Final
Proposals.
APPENDIX 3
ARTICLE - I 
prOENTL ZNiT OF UTE 11.-INA. .EVT ID I:21*
TIE PROJECT
1.1 The Company hereby appoints the Management to plan,
construct, carry out, set up, establiSh, and ensure the
. completion of the Project on behalf of the Company with all
possible speed and to the intent that the Management shall
With land, building, plant and equipment acquired or to be
acquired in the name of the Company, be responsible for
providing, establishing and commissionimg .for the Company
a complete polyester fibre plant, and the Management accepts
such appointment and the full resconsibilities for it as well
as the satisfactory execution of all matters relative to
such undertaking'
1.2 Without derogating from the general provision of 1.1 above
or from any other obligations imposed (expressly or by
implication) on the Management by this Agreement or by law.
or commercial custom the Management sh21 1 in the discharge
of its duties under 1.1 accept full responsibility for:
1.2.1 Engaging a well known consultancy firm and •
preparing a market survey report of the local
as well as world markets for the fibre to be
manufactured by the Company based on the
estimate of the demand by standard methods for
various end uses;
1.2.2 Carrying out the feasibility study of establishing
a plant in Kenya, estimating the profitability of
the Project, estimating the funds required for the
project etc. and preparing the report on the sam-,.;
'N:gotiating and concluding an ngre=7ent for equity
ca241. -.1 participation in the Company from varlous
international agencies, national agencies, private
banks and ocher private parties to meet the equity
capital requirements of the Cempany;
1.2.4 Negotiating with various well ',clown international
companies to Obtain the requisite know,-how for
the Project, advising on the selection of the
supplier of know-how and ObtSining the know-how
- at terms agreeable to the Company;
1.2.5 Negotiating with various well known international
companies to obtain the requisite basic engineering
for the Project, advising on the selection of the
supplier of basic engineering and obtaining the
basic enginecring at terns agreeable to the
Company;
1.2.6 Cbtsin irs detailed engineering for the Projecc,and
bared on the know-bow and basic engineering so
obtained, (-11ing for bids and selecting detailed
engineering contractor at terms acceptable to
the Company;
1.2.7 . Using its best endeavours to procure the grant
to the Company of all authorisations of various
-
Governments and Government Agencies wherevef.
requirPd for the carrying out, completion and
operation of the Project;
-
.1.2.8 Planning, and equipping the Project in accordance
with the type and canacity of production
stipulated in the Joint Venture Agreement and in
the Engineering & Technical Services Agreement
attached thereto as Annexure II and in accordance
with the torrs and conditions contaLned In s'in
We=ments, and in each or them it being agr..ed
Vhat 1:anagcmant shall be entitled to agree to and
.approve, on behalf of the Company, any cnanFe or
modification of the cerms contained in such
Engineering & Technical Services Agreement uhith
does not materially affect The rights or obliga-
tions of the parties thereto and the preparation
and implementation of all proposals, projections,
specifications, bd.11 of quantities and engineering
and other documents required to enable the Project
to be carried out and completed with all possible
speed, using its best endeavours to achieve
economy and avoid wherever possible over-runs in
the total cost of the project;
1.2.9 Engaging legal connsel to prenare various material
documents such as the Joint Venture Agreement,
Know-bow Agreement, etc.
1.2.10 Carrying out negotiations and obtaining the re-
quired long, medium and short term finances for
capital expenditure such as buildings, equipment,
etc., as well as working capital requirements
from various international and national fiancral
and development agencies; 	 -
1..11 Carrying out all the formalities required under
the Laws of Kenya for the issue of the equity
capithl and managing the issue and subscription
of the equity capital of the Company including
1.
underwriting arrangements, if any, to be made;
1.2.12 Preparing and submitting to various financial
as well as regulating agencies all requisite
financial statements, projections, capital
budgets, estimates long term profitability
statements, cash flow statements, pay back
4period statements, rzpayment 	 e7c.,
as and v,hen required by then;
1.2. /13 Preparing specifications: Obtaining quotations
and/or tenders for the o,,rrh-/c or various
machineries and equipments and coordinating
purchases, inspection and testing of equipment;
1.2.14 Making proposals and rec,:mendations to the
Company for the most suitable site for the
erection of the Project in relation to transport
facilities, availability and costs of water,
fuel, power, labour, waste disposal facilities
and other technical recuirements;
1.2.15 Inviting tenders and selecting architects and
- building contractors for designing and constructing
the buildings and utilities for the Project, and
negotiating the terns of contracts with such
architects and contractors including or excluding
the materials to be used;
1.2.16 Arranging for the proper carriage, clearance,
reception, transportation, storage and erection
of all nlani, mpnhinery, equipment and materials
required for the purpose of the Project;
1.2.17 Supervising the construction of buildings and
.erection of machinery and eduipment and planning
.and synchronising work Of erectors appointed
by all suppliers;
1.2.18 Ensuring thatthe Project is adequately insured
. during the period fron the starting date to the
date of ccmpletion as deemed proper by Management;
1.2.1 Dealing on behalf cf the Ccmpany
coniractors and erectors, checking an approving
invoices and ma!(ing all necessary pay7.eats;
1.2.20 Negotiating with the suppliers and obtaining from
:then credit for the payment, negotiating and
obtaining deferred tern credits from various
agencies for the purehnse of necessary equipment
. for the Project;
.1.2.21 Ensuring that the effluent from the Project is
discharged in such a manner that it can be pro-
cessed satisfactorily and in accordance, with the
local and Central Government's requirements, and
standards required by the Project;
1.2.22 Establishing all requisite proper safety r .,71.11a-
tions, procedures and controls;
1.2.23 Supervising the starting up and cannissioni "0- of
. the plant, and preparing a canplete plan for the
• starting of the Project includi v*g- the :Purchases
of all raw materials and other iters necessary
for the efficient starting of the Project as well
as such test runs as the Management may think
proper and necessary for effecting the oannissioning
of the Project;
'1.2.24 Making satisfactory arrangments to ensure the
availability promptly at a. reasonable cost of
all spare parts that the Company may from time to
time require for its plant and equipment;
1.2.25 Selecting and recruiting the personnel required
for erecting the plant and equipment as well as
for the subsequent test runs;
:Lna r	 1LiZ pere..)nn--.1
for 
.the Company;
4
1.9.97 7ns'rllation -,nd operation	 a proper sy3t,-n1
of financ.ial control and keepir.g o. pracer books
of accounts and records in connection -.0..th
carrying out and completion of the Project;
1.2.28 Preparation, reVisicn . and updating-the systth,
as necessary, of the dethilel estimates and
forecasts of the costs of carrying cut and
- completing the Project and the time required
.. therefore and the prcmpt deli7ery to the Comp?nv
• of such estimates and forecasts (including all
• . revised and updated estimates and forecasts);
.1.2.29 .
 Providing or causing to be provided, all requisite
ci vil , mechanical, electrical, engineering- and
consulting services including but not limited to
site plan and the coordination of the construction
of the buildings and shipments, delivery, erecticn
and installation Of plant, machinery and equipment
as well as for all other above mentioned services:
•1.2.30 Ensuring that the cost of erecting and, setting an
the Project exclusive of know,
--how and engineering
fees, taxes andOvalirking capital up
 to the commi-
ssioning date shall not exceed the estimate jointly
agreed by n lgement and thc.
12.31 Ccapletion of all the transactions, operations and
services from the date of beginning of construction'
up to the .date of completion .sithin the time limit
mutually agreed;
1.2.32 Minimising the effects of the currency fluctuations
on the cost of the Project to the ext .,:nt possible.
ARTICLE - 
APPOINTMENT Or THE MANAGEMENT AS =:E2AL
Y ek r,TAGERS OF THE COIT.rr,
The Company hereby appoints the Ilanagement as its sole
exclusive General Manager in connection with all asnecus of
the business of the Cempany for a term ccmmencing as of th=
date hereof and terminating 10 years after the Project
Completion Date as defined in Section 6.02 of the joint
Venture Agreement, and the Management accents such appbint-
•
nent. Such anuointment shall be deemed to be renewed for
. a further period of five (5) years unless either party sl,-,11
within. 12 months prior to the end' of the first term, give
written notice to the other of its intention to tertinate .
the Agreement at the end of said 10 year term. Thereafter,
the said appointment shall continue from year to year until
termin2ted by either party by not less than twelve months'
previouS notice in sritirig to the other. NO person or'
comeany .other than the Management shall b° arTointed Co-
Managing Director, CO-Managi rg
 Agent or CO-General Manager
of the Company during the term hereof as extended from time
. to time.
2.2 Within the framework of the general overall policy and
consistent with the directions and i.s.mructions which may
". from time to .time be given . and subject' to the control'
and supervision of the Board of Directors of the Ccmnany,
the Management shall be entirely responsible for and
shall have full powers relative to the implementation of
the Project as described in Article I, the management
- and operation of the Company, arid shall direct all the
business and transactions of the Company.
2.3	 Tae	 shall o2 its own vplition as 2.7..r: of Its
duties under this A.:ticlemnke available to the Coopany
without any specific request Zrcm cne Company all information
known to it which ma: 'be useful to the Companv in conneutien
with the production and sale of polyester fibre chips and
's dyed and rawwhite 'polyester te:;turized filament and provide
• afull range of services in connection with all aspects of.
the Cbmpany's business, and with:cut deroga,.ing from the
• foregoing or from the general provisions of 2.1 . and 2..2
Above or from any other obligations imposed (expressly or .
by implication) on the Latagement or by Commercial Custom
-duties, responsibilities and powers of the2..2..f-r-emat
- 'under this Article shall be responsible for:
2.3.1 The preparation and implementation of all planning,
frvripzement, organization and the financial, techni-
cal and 2 ,-,mi n4 strative control of thea.,..uany's
business;
The oreparation and establis-mment of production
schedules, process, quality and cost. control
systems, buildings and plant maintenance prog-
rammes and all. other requisite schedules, systems
and prograr-rres;
2.3.3 Recruiting and:maintaining at all times the
managerial, technical, rnrketing and administrative
.	 :	
.	 .
staff and the work force remairtxi by the Company
for the purposes of carrying out the Project and
the proper and efficient conduct of its business
(includiner.arrangements providing for the allocation
of mInngement responsibility for all aspects of
the business), organisation . charts, staff schedules,
job contents, job manuals, instruction schedules,
and training programmes for all employees of the
Caz:ParlY;.
2.3.:1	 Instituting and arran. ;ing for t'.7.e carrying o:It in
the Company'splanz in Kenya or elo::thr.r...! of all
necessary training prol-ra7r.423 and courses for the
Comp=y's work force and its executive and adrami-
strative staff so as to achieve KcInyanisation of
all personnel within 7 years of the successful
commissioning of the plant;
2.3.5 Establishing proper and efficient financial.
control and record system and procedures;
2.3.6 Supplying to the Company full information regarding
the main sources of supply, the general levels of
prices and the eStimated dell.very.pericds fr.sm
time to time prevailing for may goods that may be
required by the Cbmnany for the purpose of its
• business andestablf_shiag departments, progr=mes
and arrangecnats for the direct anti prompt acquisiticn
by the Ccmpany of raw materials and spare parts at
best possible prices and conditions;
.2.3.7 Arranging for and carrying through the purchase
of raw materials, goods, property and other assets •
and all plant, machinery, store materials and other .
. things required by the Company;
2.3.8 Negotiating, carrying out and effecting all Kenyan
and foreign sales of all productioh of tne Ccmpany;
Dispatching, shipping or distributing all' production
of the Company and effectively insuring the same •
, against such risk of loss or damag- N thereto as it
is by commercial practice usual to insure against;.
.2.3.10 Ensuring efficient conduct of the(AA:Ipany's business
and attending to all ero-ineering and technical aspects
of the operations and maintenance of the Company's
plant;
r2.3.11 Koeping the azooany fully inforn; sd of all
deveLopments and improvements in ongineerina%
production, cuality . and cost control and main-
tenance techniques and Metnods knor. to the
Management which may be of benefit to the
Company in tha conduct of its business;
2.3.12 Ensuring the maintenance of nroper safety
regulations, procedures and controls;
2.3.13 Arranging for adequate ineurancepolicy or
policies regarding covering all risks wnich
. the Company ought to insure aaminst, from the
date of starting of the Project and negotiating
and obtaining the best bid =d most secure terms
for such policy or policies as the I2anagement
• deems fit;
2.3.14 Arranging for the sale, ddsbosal, shinment storage
and warehousing of the Company's production, goods,
• property and assets;
2.3.15 Disclosing or causing to be disclosed to the Board
all information matters and documents relating to
or having an influence on the property, busines
• or affairs of the Company which may come to the •
knowledge of the Nranagement;:
2.3.16 Rendering from time to time to the Board as it may
. require an account or statement of exnenditure
together with all reasonable details of the
disbursements chargeable by the Marr. ',ement amain-sr.
. the Ccmpany and such information as may be nece-
ssary to explain the same or as the Board or the
- Auditors of the COmpany shall from time to time.
reasonably require;
2.3.17	 or
perso.ns, being suitably qualified and ex:er-
leaned, to visit the Company's plant to advise
on any aspect of the Company's business;
2.3.13 The prenaratioa and conclusion of all contracts
and agreements relative to all a*gects of the
Company's normal business;
2_3.19 * Arranging for the breparation of all necessary
schemes and plans for the develocment and
operation of the plant of the Company and in
. connection therewith obtaining all necessary
or required specification, drawings and
costings;
2_3.20 ;Negotiating v.:1th and obtaining from various
agencies further finance as any be required
from ti.ate to tine for working capital as .wel l
as fixed assets either for the renlacement,
•bnlnncing or e,:pansion progr-
	 	
 s of the
Company;
• 2.3_21 . Using its best endeavours to pramte the
exports of the products of tte . Company in the
uorldmarkets;
2_3:22 Using. its best endeavours to further increase
the import substitution of various items that
may be required by the Commany;
2.3.23 Carrying out continuous profit improvement
programmes from time to.time ,sithin The
framework'of the. overall policy of the
Company;
2.3.24 Prcmoting, carrying cut and reaning the benefits
of indigenous research and deveiotemenc progrnmmes
in connection with Company's business;
2.3.25 Preparing and carrying out the maincenance and
'replacement progranmes for the various equipment
and property of the Company;
2.3.26 Investigating and protecting the use of patents ...
with regard to the Company's =ducts in Kenya;
,
•2.3.27 Using its best endeavours to inprove the prcduc-
, tivity in the plant of the Cc=any;
2.3.28 Generally carrying out arid p.erfo...-natng- all duties
necessary to the efficient condumt of managament
and control of the Company's business In Kenya;
2.3.29 implementing any other measures as deemed
A
necessary and useful by the M,Innement including
Changs in Production programmes, mtdificatica of
selling prices, of the Company's products as well
-
as varying the nuMber of personnel, their jobs
and salaric's
,
2.4 The Management may. convene Board Meetings of the Company
from time to time as maybe deemed necessary cud in accordance
•
with the TaDS of Kenya. The Management shall ensure that the
CompanY submits monthly to the Board of Directors of the Cbmpany
progress retorts and operating results up to the end of the
month and for the month, prepares prior to the ccrr.-encetent
of each financial year n.budget showing the projected capital
expenditures together with profit and loss statement . and cash
flow and prepares annually, prior to the Annual General .
ark
'Meeting of shareholders, a review of the operations of the
Company during the preceding year and a statement of reccmm,
endations for further improvements in operations.
